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Whither the Quid Pro Quo? 
 






 This dissertation seeks to understand the distributive strategies of local politicians 
in India— a context in which a robust secret ballot is in place and villagers have 
information on the allocation of selective state benefits due to the high-information 
context of village politics. Specifically, it seeks answers to three questions. Can local 
politicians in India identity voters’ partisan preferences, which is a critical assumption of 
theory on clientelism in comparative politics? Does a context in which citizens have a 
great deal of information on the beneficiaries of programs implemented by local 
governments and villagers and politicians are personally tied to one another pose 
constraints on targeting strategies relative to work on clientelism, elite capture, and 
citizen candidate models that predict co-ethnic targeting preferences? And do voters 
perceive that co-partisanship vis-à-vis sarpanch affects their access to selective state 
benefits and services? To address these questions, I draw on a unique original survey of 
village council presidents (sarpanch) and citizens across 96 village council areas (gram 
panchayats) in Rajasthan, India.  
 First, I argue that under a secret ballot, which voters overwhelmingly believe to 
protect the anonymity of their votes, the clientelistic logic that supports quid pro quo 
distributive politics does not hold. This has powerful implications for the role we should 
understand local leaders (who perform brokerage functions) to serve and whom we 
should expect sarpanch to target with antipoverty benefits implemented through the gram 
panchayat. I argue that if local politicians cannot identify the partisan preferences of 
uncertain voters, we should expect local politicians to target benefits in order to maintain 
their political constituencies, rather than pursuing a vote buying strategy to attract new 
supporters through a quid pro quo strategy. Second, I argue that the social and political 
context of the gram panchayat severely constrains sarpanch targeting behavior. In a 
context in which sarpanch and voters know each other and the latter can directly (or by 
rumor) observe who received visible and coveted selective benefits, and in which 
sarpanch and their kin are very likely to live in their village permanently, there is a 
powerful social cost to providing benefits to the non-poor. At the same time, citizens 
accept that local elections have consequences, which means that some favoritism toward 
supporters—but not kinship or ethnic lines—is tolerated as long as the pro-poor targeting 
norm is heeded. Finally, I check the validity of my argument on sarpanch distributive 
strategies by testing for the effect of co-partisanship on voters’ expectations of receiving 
selective benefits using a vignette experiment. I randomize partisan cues (Congress or 
BJP) based on prominent politicians identified by respondents themselves and find 
support for the claim that partisanship broadly affects access to state benefits.  
 Empirically, I draw on a unique survey of sarpanch and voters across rural 
Rajasthan. The survey includes two behavioral measures that cross-reference voters 
within sarpanch surveys. I ask sarpanch to guess sampled voters’ partisan preferences and 
ask them to allocate tokens across these individuals to affect a lottery with a cash prize. I 
also embed a survey experiment within the voter survey.  
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1. Motivation  
 
 Countries in the developing world face a difficult challenge when it comes to the 
implementation of anti-poverty policies. Federal governments or aid agencies like the 
world bank make large investments in social safety net programs and rural development; 
however, where the state has limited capacity to ensure these benefits reach their intended 
beneficiaries and corruption is pervasive, these programs are likely to be inefficient. In 
this context what incentivizes local leaders to target the poor? What is the political logic 
that underlies who they target with selective benefits and who they exclude?  
 Decentralization of targeted distribution is an important institutional answer to 
this question increasingly adopted by governments in the developing world in recent 
decades (See Crook and Manor 1998). Compared to the targeting of selective anti-
poverty benefits (e.g. food subsidies) through centralized bureaucracies that face 
informational problems and lack incentives for accountability to the poor, 
implementation through elected local governments gives electorally accountable 
politicians with extensive information on their fellow villagers responsibility over the 
selection of beneficiaries to anti-poverty programs.  
 Skeptics, on the other hand, argue that decentralization is unlikely to improve pro-
poor accountability in rural communities characterized by social and economic 
inequality. Here, local politicians and local economic elites can capture anti-poverty 
benefits for themselves with impunity (Bardhan 2002). If decentralization is to incentive 
local politicians to target the poor through an accountability mechanism, the question of 
whether or not democratic accountability shapes targeting behavior in rural societies such 
as India’s is central to understanding the best strategies for reaching the poor.  
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 At its core, the question of whether a logic of democratic accountability shapes 
local distribution under decentralization concerns whether voters have the autonomy to 
vote as they wish in order to hold politicians accountable. If local agents can monitor 
votes, which is necessary for them to compel voters to vote against their partisan 
preferences, or target benefits in an exclusive manner without fear of a political, social, or 
economic costs, we should expect local governance to defy the democratic accountability 
logic laid out by Cox and McCubbins (1986) among others. I argue in this dissertation 
that democratic mechanisms are robust at the local level, and that the capacity to practice 
coercive quid pro quo politics is much weaker than existing research assumes.  
 
2. Contributions to Existing Scholarship  
 This dissertation addresses the question of democratic practice and targeted 
distribution at the local level by drawing on literatures on political clientelism and 
decentralization in political science and political economy. Building on this work, I lay 
out an argument that situates distributive politics in the context of village politics. 
Understanding the social and political constraints that local leaders face in a context 
where voters live in close physical and social proximity to local politicians has important 
implications for how we understand distributive politics at the grassroots in rural India. I 






 2.1 The Clientelism Literature  
 The literature on clientelism is centered on the question of how parties or 
politicians strategically allocate limited selective benefits (e.g. welfare benefits or 
campaign handouts) in order to increase or sustain electoral support. Research by 
political scientists and political economists defines clientelism as a contingent exchange 
of benefits for votes (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Stokes et al. 2013; Bardhan and 
Mookherjee 2012). Following from this definition, the extent to which clientelism is an 
efficient targeting strategy depends on the capacity of party agents to enforce the voter 
side of the quid pro quo exchange through a system of vote monitoring and coercion. 
Susan Stokes describes this as perverse accountability because coercion flips the 
democratic accountability principal-agent relationship on its head. If this coercive form of 
clientelism explains politician-voter or broker-voter linkages, clientelism represents a 
distortion of democratic practice. Moreover, to the extent that this coercive form of 
politics is pervasive, it should shape our predictions about whether core or swing voters 
should be targeted with needed anti-poverty benefits.  
 Although existing research on clientelism has made important advances to our 
understanding of patronage politics at macro and micro-levels of analysis, it suffers from 
a fundamental limitation: brokers are broadly assumed to possess fine-grained 
information on voters’ preferences, and often assumed to be able to identify how voters 
vote irrespective of the secret ballot. This has not been tested. I provide the first test of 
this assumption in a democratic context in chapter 2. I find that village politicians— who 
often perform brokerage functions— lack the fine-grained information on voters’ 
political preferences that this literature assumes. In fact, they perform no better than low-
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information benchmarks with respect to non-co-partisan voters. Contrary to the 
conventional wisdom, I argue that where the secret ballot is robust, a coercive form of 
quid pro quo clientelistic exchange is unfeasible as a broad electoral strategy because 
voters are free to vote their preferences. Contrary to a depiction of weak accountability 
vis-à-vis the poor that the clientelism literature depicts, the results of this chapter suggest 
that the logic of democratic accountability should shape the behavior of politicians and 
voters alike. Although the patronage politics literature extends to many competitive 
democracies with a diverse array of party systems, this chapter suggests we should be 
skeptical that quid pro quo distributive strategies can be carried out efficiently in India 
and other democratic contexts where the secret ballot is robust.  
 
2.2 The Literature on Decentralization in the Developing World    
 The debate over the benefits of decentralized targeting of anti-poverty benefits 
through local governments concerns whether the accountability and informational 
benefits of targeting through elected local governments will improve accountability to the 
poor (Seabright 1996), or lead to worse outcomes due to the susceptibility of local 
governments to capture by local economic and political elites where the poor lack 
(Bardhan 2002).  
 I contribute to this literature by situating the targeting strategies of local 
politicians under decentralization in context of village politics, which is characterized by 
dense social interaction between voters and politicians and high levels of information on 
the allocation of selective benefits. With exceptions, the pervasive expectation of elite 
capture ignores the social and political constraints that local leaders face when it comes to 
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the allocation of visible selective benefits. Building on the implications for democratic 
accountability that follow from chapter 2, I argue that in a context of weak state capacity 
where the government has limited ability to ensure pro-poor targeting of anti-poverty 
benefits, and where social and democratic accountability incentives constrain politicians 
to target the poor, that decentralization provides the best available option for 
incentivizing pro-poor poor targeting. Consistent with the logic of targeting benefits to 
political constituencies in the literature on democratic accountability, I find evidence for 
core targeting in chapter 3. This has important theoretical and policy implications for 
research that explores the question of how to increase pro-poor targeting of social safety 
net programs.  
  
3. Research Design and Methodology  
 The empirical objective of the dissertation is to capture the information village 
leaders have on the political preferences of voters from their local areas and the principle 
of targeted distribution of selective benefits in India. This requires a research design that 
reflects the personal nature of village politics while effectively isolating the local 
politician-voter relationship from constraints they face from an array of actors outside the 
village council, or gram panchayat. In this section, I briefly introduce the setting of the 
study in the western state of Rajasthan and institutional setting of the gram panchayat. I 
then briefly describe the cross-referenced survey of voters and politicians, which I for 
analyses presented in chapters 2 to 4. Finally, I lay out the logic of the dissertation’s 




3.1 Research Site: Gram Panchayats in Rajasthan, India   
 This dissertation is based on data from rural Rajasthan, a northwestern Indian 
state with a predominantly rural population. Its politics is characterized by an 
institutionalized competitive two-party system. Across five elections that have taken 
place at the time of writing, three had aggregate margins of victory in terms of vote share 
below 4 percent. Power at the state level has alternated between Congress and the BJP in 
every election since 1993. It also has a large, although decreasing, number of rural poor, 
which means that selective anti-poverty benefits are politically salient to rural voters 
sampled for this study. Recent work suggests that voters frequently approach local 
leaders, and sarpanch particularly, in pursuit of these benefits (See Kruks-Wisner 2013; 
Krishna 2007).  
 The institutional context of this study is the gram panchayat, which is the lowest 
tier of India’s rural local government system, or panchayat raj. The panchayat raj system 
existed in some form prior to independence; however, the 73
rd
 amendment to the Indian 
constitution passed in 1993 gave the Panchayat Raj system constitutional status, and 
imposed federal requirements for elections of panchayat members, further integration of 
local government and government development functions, and quotas for women and 
marginal groups: scheduled castes, scheduled tribes, and other backward castes. Gram 
panchayats provide voters direct access to the state and are highly salient; in fact, voter 





3.2 Cross-Referenced Survey of Voters and Local Politicians  
 This dissertation draws on data from a survey of approximately one thousand 
voters and one hundred sarpanch across Rajasthan. The most unique feature of the survey 
is that the sarpanch were asked questions about respondents sampled in the voter survey. 
This allowed me to better capture the nature of political interaction between voters and 
sarpanch. For example, I capture the information that sarpanch have on voters’ partisan 
preferences with data from a behavioral measure, guessability, in chapter 2.  For this 
measure, I asked sarpanch to guess how thy think specific voters from their local areas 
voted or would vote if an election were held tomorrow. This allows me to test whether or 
not sarpanch can correctly identify voters’ preferences in a way that specifically captures 
a dyadic relationship. This survey design has not been implemented in a democratic 
country prior this study. This is an appropriate design for capturing local distributive 
politics in rural India as it matches its dyadic, multi-level structure.  
 The sample frame is designed to generalize to competitive, low-income village 
council areas. To achieve this sample, I compiled a list of sub-districts (blocks) in 
Rajasthan that were politically competitive (based on data from the Election 
Commission), predominantly rural (based on census data), and that had 20 percent of 
household below the poverty line (based on government data from Rajasthan). All gram 
panchayats are by definition located in rural areas; however, I restricted sampling to 
blocks that were 75 percent rural to ensure that I did not sample gram panchayats that 
served as de facto suburbs.  Beyond this, I ensured that gram panchayats themselves were 
politically competitive through a survey of block party leaders with intimate knowledge 
of gram panchayat politics; this was necessary given the lack of available local level 
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electoral data in Rajasthan. In short, this dissertation captures a context of rural 
competitive democratic politics where anti-poverty programs are salient to voters.  
 
3.3 Methodological Approach 
 In this section, I briefly discuss the methodological approach I take to testing 
hypotheses on sarpanch-voter interaction and party-voter linkages at the local level in 
India.  
 First, the empirical analysis and the research design of the survey and behavioral 
and experimental measured within it were informed by fieldwork with voters, village 
politicians, and party leaders in multiple states since 2009. This preliminary work proved 
invaluable as it led me to appreciate the power of democratic and social mechanisms on 
local politics and targeted distribution, which was a sharp departure from the 
conventional wisdom of weak accountability in Indian politics. My experience 
conducting small-scale voter and local politician surveys (including cognitive 
interviewing) aided my understanding of problems for measurement validity than 
alternative approaches introduced. I engage these insights most directly in chapter 4.  
 Second, the dissertation relies on behavioral and experimental measures that map 
onto democratic practice at the village level in India. Building on the cross-referenced 
survey design, bringing behavioral games and behavioral measures such as guessability 
to the field is a valuable option for understanding the extent to which local leaders know 
specific voters’ political preferences and what types of voters—whom they know 
personally— they prefer to target with selective benefits. In previous work, brokers were 
asked how confident they were that they could accurately identify co-partisans, swing 
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voters, and opposition voters (Stokes et al. 2013) or experts were asked to characterize 
vote buying in their countries (Kitschelt and Rozenas 2011). I move beyond this in 
chapter 2 by directly observing whether local politicians can correctly identify voters’ 
partisan preferences and matching politicians’ and voters’ responses. Throughout the 
dissertation, I use behavioral and experimental measures to capture politician-voter 
interactions in a way that comes closer to the high-information dyadic nature of 
politician-voter linkages in rural India.  
 
4. Chapter Summaries  
 In this section, I provide summaries of the empirical chapters of the dissertation.  
 
Chapter 2: Does Clientelism Work: A Test of Guessability in India 
 This chapter tests a core assumption of the clientelism literature: that local leaders 
know the political preferences of voters in their localities. This assumption is pervasive in 
the clientelism literature particularly among scholars who believe that votes can be 
monitored irrespective of the formal adoption of the secret ballot (Stokes 2005; Stokes et 
al. 2013; Chandra 2005; See also Bardhan and Mookherjee 2012). This has important 
implications for whether we should expect to see selective benefits targeted to core or 
swing voters (See Wilkinson 2014). 
 To test this assumption, I develop a behavioral measure, guessability, that 
captures the extent to which sarpanch can correctly identify the partisan preferences of 
voters from their gram panchayats. I construct this measure as follows. First, I ask voters 
which party they would vote for if a state assembly election were to be held tomorrow 
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and which party they voted for in the previous 2008 state elections— using a secret ballot 
survey instrument. Second, leveraging my cross-referenced survey design, I asked 
sarpanch to guess the party each voter sampled from their GP would vote for if an 
election were held tomorrow and in the previous election. Third, I match these responses; 
when the sarpanch’s guess matches the self-reported partisan preference of a particular 
voter, I code guessability as equal to 1. When they do not match, I code guessability as 0.  
 In the paper, I analyze guessability relative to low-information benchmarks in the 
aggregate, and analyze variation in guessability across sarpanch and voter characteristics 
using multi-level modeling with varying intercepts for gram panchayats. With respect to 
the former, I find performance on guessability by sarpanch— who are embedded in 
voters’ local communities— to be worse than benchmarks based on polling. This 
suggests that an outsider, such as a member of a state politician’s campaign staff, could 
out-perform local politicians who are expected to possess fine-grained information on 
voters’ political preferences.  
 In the multi-level regression analysis, I test for the observable implications of 
three mechanisms that underlie the identification of voters’ partisan preferences by local 
leaders. (1) The common knowledge mechanism posits that in lieu of fine-grained 
information, sarpanch will guess voters’ partisan preferences based on their priors about 
the extent to which ethnic and class groups support either of the two major political 
parties in Rajasthan. This is a baseline against which the remaining mechanisms should 
be judged. (2) If sarpanch have the capacity to identify voters’ partisan preferences, 
sarpanch who are more experienced (in the GP), educated, and connected to higher-level 
politicians should perform better on guessability—relative to the common knowledge 
 12 
baseline model— than those with lower levels of these attributes. (3) If partisan networks 
shape access to selective benefits, we should expect local politician to guess co-partisans 
particularly well. If voters understand that members of local partisan networks are 
favored with selective benefits, we should expect guessability among co-partisans to 
require less effort since voters have incentive to reveal their preferences to politicians 
(See Calvo and Murillo 2013).  
 I find evidence for the first and third mechanisms, and not the second. This 
suggests that brokers lack special skills at identifying voters’ privately held partisan 
preferences. My finding that vote preferences are particularly difficult to predict for non-
co-partisan voters suggests that voters broadly have the freedom to vote as they wish, 
which is compatible with the logic of democratic accountability I lay out in the next 
chapter.  
 
Chapter 3: Whose Side Are You On? Distributive Preferences in India 
 In chapter 2, I establish that voters plausibly have the freedom to vote as they 
wish without a threat of punishment that hinges on brokers’ ability to monitor votes. 
Moving beyond this core result, I develop and test a theory of village politicians’ 
distributive preferences among potential beneficiaries to selective benefits in chapter 3.  
 This chapter engages arguments in the debate over the extent to which 
decentralized targeting of anti-poverty benefits will increase accountability to the poor 
and incentivize pro-poor allocation. On the one hand, theory in the literature on 
decentralization argues that decentralization will increase the information politicians have 
on local needs and make it easier for governments to correctly identify the poor given the 
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superior information local politicians have on who in their village is poor relative to 
centralized bureaucracies (See Banerjee 2013). On the other hand, research on elite 
capture suggests that decentralization may undermine pro-poor targeting because local 
politicians will divert benefits to themselves or the non-poor through rent-seeking or 
capture by local economic elites. The main weakness of this work is that it makes 
assumptions about local politicians’ targeting preferences without measuring them and 
often does not take the social and political context of village politics into account. I 
address both of these weaknesses in chapter 3.  
 This paper makes two novel arguments. First, I argue that village politicians are 
constrained to target the poor because voters and politicians know each other and the 
distribution of selective benefits (e.g. food subsidies, government jobs) is publicly 
observable. Since local politicians in India are often in power briefly while residence in 
the village is permanent, blatant violations of this norm to target the poor has long-term 
reputational costs that affect future economic, social, and political opportunities. Second, 
I argue that sarpanch target supporters because voters see discrimination in this way as an 
acceptable yet temporary consequence of local elections, which in India are fought over 
how politicians will implement policies designed at higher levels. Consistent with the 
logic of democratic accountability, voters understand that those affiliated with the winner 
will benefit more than non-supporters. Importantly, partisan favoritism is considered 
legitimate because anyone can affiliate with a party, which is not the case for favoritism 
along ethnic or kinship lines.  
 I test this theory with a unique behavioral measure, distributive preferences, 
which isolates village council presidents’ (sarpanch) baseline preferences over the 
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selection of beneficiaries free from bureaucratic constraints and the influence of 
politicians above the village level. This measure is based on a lottery conducted in 95 
gram panchayats across rural Rajasthan. Each sarpanch was asked directly about 
randomly sampled heads of household who reside in their gram panchayat. I asked 
sarpanch to allocate five tokens among ten voter survey respondents and told them that 
each token would increase the chance a particular voter would win a 200 rupee ($3.65 
USD) cash prize— approximately equivalent to one day of agricultural daily wage labor. 
Token allocation was kept anonymous; however, lottery prizes were public, which means 
voters can observe the lottery winner and trace selection back to the sarpanch. This is 
similarly the case for allocation of housing subsidies and below poverty line (BPL) cards, 
which determine eligibility to a broad range of subsidies through India’s public 
distribution system (PDS). Consistent with my theory, results show that local politicians 
have strong pro-poor and co-partisan distributive preferences. 
 
Chapter 4: Parties On the Ground: Party-Voter Linkages 
 In chapter 4, I develop a unique vignette experiment to test a voter-level 
implication of the core targeting result at the elite level in chapter 3. I demonstrate that 
voters are more likely to expect selective anti-poverty benefits from co-partisan local 
politicians than non-co-partisans.  
 To identify the effect of co-partisanship on voters’ distributive expectations of 
selective anti-poverty benefits, I designed a novel survey experiment that cues 
partisanship with real local politicians whom voters know. In the experiment, I asked 
voters to identify the most prominent politician in their gram panchayat from each of the 
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two major parties in Rajasthan, and randomly assigned one of these as partisan cues. I 
then asked voters about their expectations of receiving various state benefits if the cued 
politician were to be elected as sarpanch in the next local elections.  
 This experimental design has important benefits over the method most often 
employed to identify the causal effects of candidate characteristics on voters’ evaluations 
of candidates: fictional candidate vignette experiments. I argue that these experiments 
suffer from problems of measurement and external validity due to the high cognitive 
demands they place on respondents, which is exacerbated by low levels of realism and 
low motivation on the part of respondents. The cognitive burden and the highly abstract 
nature of fictional candidate experiments make treatment effects difficult to interpret and 
difficult to generalize to real-world outcomes (e.g. vote choice) frequently used in this 
genre of experiments. Using a design that minimizes cognitive burdens and maximizes 
realism, I find that voters have higher expectation of receiving anti-poverty benefits when 
a co-partisan is in power locally. This confirms the voter-side implication of the argument 
for co-partisan targeting proposed at the elite level in the prior papers. 
 
1.5 Lessons Learned  
 In this section, I summarize the key insights of the dissertation as a whole. 
 
 The Secret Ballot is Real.  The broad conclusion of the dissertation is that Indian 
voters broadly vote as they wish— with the protections of a genuinely secret of ballot. In 
chapter 2, I showed that local politicians perform poorly at identifying the partisan 
preferences of voters from their gram panchayat. I found a similar result for ward 
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members who are their more immediate neighbors. If gram panchayat politicians perform 
worse at identifying voters’ partisan preferences than low-information benchmarks based 
on polling data alone, it is reasonable to surmise that ballot secrecy is robust. This is an 
essential requirement for democratic accountability because it makes it difficult for 
elections to be won through coercive means rather than through efforts to cultivate a 
coalition of electoral support in line with the logic of democratic accountability (See 
Mares 2014; Sircar 2014). 
 Local Democratic Accountability Incentivizes Core Targeting. If voters 
understand that the ballot is secret and vote according to their preferences, we should 
expect politicians to pursue a strategy of targeting selective benefits to core voters. This 
follows the logic of democratic accountability. In this theory, politicians must build and 
stabilize a coalition of supporters (See Cox and McCubbins 1986; Diaz-Cayeros et al. 
2012). For Cox and McCubbins, for example, democratic accountability means that you 
deliver on your campaign promises and that these promises are more likely to benefit 
your supporters than those who did not vote for you. This should be the case with respect 
to the allocation of selective benefits in Indian gram panchayats as favoritism in targeted 
distribution is an important basis of democratic competition in this context. I demonstrate 
in chapter 3 that democratic accountability shapes targeting behavior at the village level 
in this way. Although they broadly overestimate support, I find strong evidence that local 
politicians without constraints choose to target those whom they believe voted for them, 
and co-partisans whom they believe voted for them most of all. Consistent with results on 
distributive preferences, I find in chapter 4 that voters perceive this targeting strategy; 
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voters expect that co-partisan local politicians will be more likely to favor them with 
selective anti-poverty benefits than non-co-partisans. 
 Partisanship is Locally Salient. Each of the three substantive chapters of the 
dissertation shows that partisan ties at the village level are highly salient. This fits the 
logic of democratic accountability and also fits the theory presented in chapter 3 on the 
importance of local legitimacy in targeting by local elites. In line with recent work on 
party-voter linkages in India, my dissertation suggests that the basic logic of cultivating 
democratic majorities often trumps a co-ethnic targeting logic where groups are small and 
partisan preferences are increasingly heterogeneous within ethnic categories (See 
Dunning and Nilekani 2013).   
 Survey Design Can Capture Local Contexts and Local Mechanisms. Through the 
three chapters of this dissertation that follow, I emphasize developing survey measures 
that reflect the local context of GP politics. This was accomplished most of all through 
the cross-referenced survey design that captured the nature of politician-voter interaction 
I have observed in India over a number of years. I also developed three measures 
embedded in the Rajasthan survey that I believe capture critical aspects of local 
politician-voter interaction. Although there are costs to bringing the behavioral and 
experimental measures of this dissertation to a real, inter-personal setting, I believe an 
important take-away of the dissertation is that tractable survey designs can collect data 
that better reflects phenomena of interest than has been the case in the past. Even when 
this comes at some cost to causal identification, I argue in chapter 4 that this may lead to 
more valid estimates than alternatives that offer clean causal identification at a cost to 
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 A critical problem for democracies with weak state institutions is that politicians 
have incentive to manipulate the implementation of anti-poverty policies for electoral 
benefit. When this is the case, a central tenet of democracy—voters’ freedom to express 
their preferences at the ballot box—is lost as a casualty of coercive quid pro quo politics. 
In contradiction to fundamental notions of democratic accountability, in which voters 
hold politicians accountable for their performance in office, in this form of politics, 
referred to as clientelism, incumbent politicians threaten to withhold needed anti-poverty 
benefits from voters if they vote for the wrong party. For clientelism to be an efficient 
electoral strategy, parties must employ a large number of local agents – or brokers – who 
are tasked with collecting extensive, often private information on voters’ political 
preferences and distributing cash and targeted state benefits in a way that increases their 
principal politician’s vote share. Even when they are in large supply, however, this 
strategy places significant demands on brokers. They must be able to identify voters’ 
partisan preferences and know what types of benefits will induce particular passive 
supporters to turn out to vote, or swing voters to vote for their candidate. Even more 
challenging than this, some scholars even expect party brokers to have the capacity to 
monitor votes by circumventing the secret ballot directly or using a variety of clues and 
tactics to indirectly detect vote choice (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Brusco et al. 2004; 
Stokes 2005).  
 The assumption or strong expectation that brokers can collect fine-grained 
information on the partisan preferences of voters from their neighborhoods is at the core 
of theories in the clientelism literature. It is critical to explanations of who brokers target 
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with state anti-poverty benefits and handouts during election campaigns, the persistence 
of clientelism where the ballot is secret, and whether or not we should expect targeted 
vote-buying to be an effective electoral strategy (Stokes 2005; Calvo and Murillo 2013; 
Stokes et al. 2013; Finan and Schechter 2012; Bardhan and Mookherjee 2012). Drawing 
on unique survey data from rural India, I challenge the conventional wisdom that local 
brokers are skilled enough to identify voters’ partisan preferences – across more and less 
predictable groups of voters – where local inter-party competition is sufficiently high to 
make vote preferences uncertain and an Australian secret ballot is in place.
1
  
Despite a common perception that politicians develop ingenious ways to violate the 
secret ballot or capitalize on voters’ uncertainty that the secret ballot is really secret 
(Chandra 2004; Stokes 2005, Stokes et al. 2013), there are strong reasons to expect that 
this is not the case in India and other developing countries featured prominently in the 
clientelism literature (See Lawson and Greene 2014; Kramon 2011; Guardado and 
Wantchekon 2014; See also Nichter 2009).
2
 First, the independent Election Commission 
of India (ECI) is a global model for securing ballot secrecy, and Indian voters 
overwhelmingly believe their ballot is secret (Banerjee 2014; Sridharan and Vaishnav 
2013; McMillan 2010). According to the 2009 Indian National Election Study (NES) 
survey, conducted by the Center for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS), only 13 
percent of respondents believed that politicians can usually find out how people vote at 
the polls.
3
 A similar pattern exists for an increasing number of new democracies that have 
                                                        
1
 The Australian secret ballot is non-partisan; voters in the polling both can vote for any party they wish. 
This differs from partisan ballots, which activists often can provide on polling day. The latter restricts the 
vote to members of one party.   
 
2
 This work suggests that monitoring capacity is weak and vote buying is inefficient if not indiscriminate.   
 
3
 India’s record of anti-incumbency, which resulted in party turnover in every state election in Rajasthan 
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adopted a secret ballot and independent election commissions (See Mozaffar 2002; 
Hartlyn et al. 2008; Nichter and Palmer-Rubin 2013).
4
 Moreover, even parties with 
organized machines that reach down to the local level, such as the Peronists in Argentina 
and PRI in Mexico, invest in core targeting strategies such as turnout-buying and 
targeting mediated by partisan networks, which do not depend on this assumption 
(Nichter 2008; Calvo and Murillo 2013; Diaz-Cayeros et al. 2012). The results of this 
paper suggest that we should be skeptical of the assumption that local brokers in 
democracies characterized as patronage-based have the capacity to identify the votes or 
partisan preferences of an electorally decisive share of the electorate. This is problematic 
in cases such as India where party organization is weak at the local level, and requires 
empirical testing in a wide range of cases where this is taken for granted.  
I find that village council (gram panchayat) presidents, or sarpanch, who often serve as 
brokers to higher-level politicians, incorrectly guess the partisan preferences of voters 
from their local areas 35.5 percent of the time and perform worse than, or as well as low-
information, low-cost benchmarks, which do not depend upon the fine-grained 
information brokers are believed to collect.
5
 Specifically, I find that sarpanch are better at 
guessing the partisan preferences of voters who are either very easy to guess as a result of 
demographic characteristics that cue partisanship, or who are likely to reveal their 
                                                                                                                                                                     
since 1993, also suggests that the tools incumbents’ have at their disposal to monitor and threaten voters are 
limited (See Ravishankar 2009). 
 
4
 Lawson and Greene (2014) found that Mexican voters with lower levels of trust in the secret ballot to be 
no more likely to support the clientelistic machine party (PRI) than those higher levels of in ballot secrecy. 
 
5
 This is based on the vote intention measure. Note that GP ward members-- who are the more immediate 
neighbors of sampled voters-- have similar rates of guessability as sarpanch. Ward members correctly 
guessed voters’ partisan preferences (based on the vote intention measure) 64.4 percent of the time. I 
analyze GP Presidents in this paper because they are more likely to be political brokers. Results for this 
data is available upon request.   
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partisan preferences as members of local politicians’ co-partisan networks. This suggests 
that local brokers either do not attempt to perform the basic information-gathering role 
existing scholarship presumes they perform or lack the capacity to do so effectively.    
This paper provides one of the first tests of the presumption of high or complete partisan 
identifiability, which I refer to as guessability, and models variation in guessability across 
voter and elite characteristics. My measure of guessability captures whether or not 
sarpanch correctly identified the political preferences of a voter from his gram panchayat 
(GP). To obtain this, I conducted a survey of approximately 960 voters in 96 gram 
panchayats across Rajasthan and a separate survey of sarpanch and ward members 
elected to these GPs.
6
 The elite survey employs a cross-referenced design in which I 
asked local politicians to guess the partisan preferences of voters in their local areas 
whom they overwhelmingly (95%) reported to know personally. Sarpanch were asked to 
guess the party a randomly selected voter from their GP supported in the last state 
elections and the party he would support if an election were held tomorrow for all voters 
sampled from their GP. Their guesses were then matched to voters’ own responses to 
determine their accuracy. 
 This provides one of the only measures of the information local leaders (e.g. 
brokers) have on specific voters’ preferences. Moreover, it provides the only measure of 
brokers’ preferences in a context of intense inter-party competition and a secret ballot.
7
 It 
is also novel with respect to related empirical research on ethnic identifiability. This work 
                                                        
6
 From the elite survey, I present sarpanch data only in this paper.  
 
7
 My measure differs from Finan and Schechter’s (2012) similar measure from Paraguay because it capture 
guessability in a genuinely democratic setting. Finan and Schechter collected their data at a time when the 
country was identified as a semi-democracy and voters widely questioned the security of the secret ballot. 
19 percent of voters interviewed in the 2006 Latin Barometer Survey said that elections in that country 
were free and fair, compared to 69 percent who said they were not,
7
 and Hartlyn, McCoy and Mustillo 
(2008) code Paraguay’s election commission as highly politicized (See Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2008). 
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captures respondents’ ability to use visible cues to identify the ethnicities of individuals 
shown in photographs whom they have not met (Habyarimana et al. 2007; Harris and 
Findley 2014).
8
 My measure captures the information local leaders possess about voters 
they know and with whom they routinely interact. This makes guessability a measure of 
the nature of the relationship between brokers and voters rather than one of information 
processing.  
 This paper makes three contributions to our understanding of the logic and 
practice of targeted distribution. First, existing research focuses more on strategies 
inferred from targeting outcomes than on the capacity of party machines to effectively 
target benefits. For example, Stokes et al.’s (2013) model of divergent preferences 
between party leaders and brokers push us to reconsider theoretical predictions on 
targeting outcomes; however, we do not know whether the core targeting pattern they 
observe is due to brokers’ preferences over beneficiaries or a strategic consequence of 
their inability to identify less predictable voters’ preferences and votes. If it’s the latter, 
party leaders should pursue different distributive strategies.
9
 Second, it contributes to the 
paucity of systematic data on the technology of clientelism. Many of our insights on the 
mobilization and information gathering roles party agents perform come from 
ethnographic studies with necessarily small samples (Auyero 2001; Chandra 2004; 
Bjorkman 2013; Robinson 1988); cross-national elite surveys in which academics and 
                                                        
 
8
 Vaishnav (2012) measures voters’ ability to correctly identify the castes of candidates to the state 
legislature in Bihar. This comes closer to my measure, but also applies to a low information environment in 
which guessers are unlikely to have met these politicians in the past.  
 
9
 For example, party leaders who know that guessability is low should prefer to distribute benefits at the 
polling station level or above where information on aggregate vote shares is available without reliance on 
information from brokers, or may simply incentivize brokers to mobilize local co-partisan networks within 
which guessability should be high (See Bjorkman 2013; Calvo and Murillo 2013; Dunning and Nilekani 
2013). 
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journalists are asked to characterize parties’ electoral and distributive strategies at a high 
level of generality (Kitschelt and Rozenas 2011); or voter surveys and survey 
experiments that collect data on access to state benefits or exposure to vote buying 
(Brusco et la. 2004; Calvo and Murillo 2013; Corstange 2010; Gonzales-Octanos et al. 
2012). While these studies have advanced our understanding of the logic and practice of 
clientelism, research has not systematically assessed the information gathering capacities 
of local leaders’ that are essential to this strategy. 
 Third, this paper focuses on the information brokers have on voters’ partisan 
preferences between elections. This is a departure from existing work that focuses on 
vote-buying during election campaigns. While vote-buying provides a clear measure of 
how parties allocate their own funds free of the formal and informal constraints that 
shape policy implementation, evidence from studies of vote-buying, where party 
machines are less developed, suggest that vote-buying may be less politically targeted 
than expected (Kramon 2011; Guardado and Wantchekon 2014). We should also expect 
voters to weigh access to state benefits and services more than low-value campaign 
handouts (See Lawson and Greene 2014). If voters under clientelism must routinely 
navigate how to access state benefits and services, local politicians have incentive to 
leverage their discretion over the allocation of these benefits to increase their party’s vote 
share. This suggests they have incentive to perform on guessability during more 
quotidian times. 
 This paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, I discuss the pervasiveness of the 
assumption of high guessability in theories of clientelism and lay out three mechanisms 
to explain variation in guessability. In section 3, I provide background on the context of 
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the study: Rajasthan, India. In section 4, I discuss the survey instrument and survey 
design. In section 5, I present descriptive statistics on aggregate results. In section 6, I test 
mechanisms that explain variation in guessability across voter and sarpanch 
characteristics. In section 7, I address external validity and theoretical implications.  
2. Guessability and Theories of Clientelism 
 The assumption or expectation of a high level of guessability is pervasive in the 
literature on vote-buying and targeted distribution. The expectation is that as central 
figures in voters’ social networks, brokers can directly or indirectly observe voters’ 
partisan preferences and votes, find out which material benefits or favors voters want and 
what it costs to change their vote or induce turnout, and, according to Finan and 
Schechter (2012), identify information on social and partisan preferences. In this section, 
I demonstrate that the assumption or expectation that brokers can identify voters’ partisan 
preferences—across partisan types—is critical to a range of theories in this literature, 
consider how exploring variation in guessability challenges this theory, and lay out three 
mechanisms to explain variation at the micro-level.  
2.1 Guessability and Theories of Clientelism  
 Proponents of Stokes’ (2005) perverse accountability framework argue that 
brokers’ central location in voters’ social networks, real or perceived loopholes to the 
secret ballot, and routine and continuing interactions between brokers and voters allow 
the former to detect how people in their localities vote despite the secret ballot (See also: 
Brusco et al. 2004; Medina and Stokes 2007; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Chandra 
2004). Following from this, brokers can punish those who vote the wrong way, thus 
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solving the voter side of the commitment problem that underlies clientelism’s quid pro 
quo exchange of benefits for votes. Stokes explicitly assumes that brokers embedded in 
voters’ communities can identify voters’ partisan preferences through their information 
gathering skills, central position in social networks, and power vis-à-vis low income 
voters. Stokes et al. (2013) use data from a survey of brokers in Venezuela and Argentina 
to support this claim: 80 percent of brokers said they could identify which voters were 
swing voters, co-partisans, and supporters of other parties.
10
 Broadly speaking, scholars 
of distributive politics hold some form of the monitoring assumption for individuals or 
small groups in countries as diverse as India (Chandra 2004), Mexico (Medina and 
Stokes 2007), Lebanon (Corstange 2010), and Taiwan (Wang and Kurzman 2003).
11
  
 Another view by Finan and Schechter (2012) does not assume that brokers can 
identify how voters vote in the polling booth, but argues that local brokers use the 
extensive information they have on voters’ political preferences and more subtle 
characteristics to make compliance in the benefits-for-votes quid pro quo predictable. For 
them, clientelism’s commitment problem is addressed through reciprocity, which is self-
enforced by voters rather than coercively enforced by party agents. Brokers are essential 
to maintain the efficiency of this strategy because they have information on voters’ social 
preferences (such as intrinsic reciprocity and trust), which they use to distinguish 
between those who are more or less likely to comply with the voter side of the quid pro 
                                                        
10
 Interestingly, their conclusion that brokers target benefits to core voters against the wishes of party 
leaders is rooted in the difficulty of the latter in monitoring the former; the ability of brokers to identify 
voters’ partisan preferences and monitor their votes, with some investment in effort, is not considered.  
 
11
 Recent research cites this and related work to establish the validity of the monitoring assumption (See for 
example: Bardhan and Moohkerjee 2012; Robinson and Verdier 2013; Camp 2012).  
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quo after receiving a handout.
12
 As Finan and Schechter (2012) find that brokers in 
Paraguay possess fine-grained information on voters’ partisan and social preferences – 
irrespective of the their partisanship or level of social ties to brokers – their theory and 
results emphasize the capacity of brokers to perform exceedingly well on guessability. 
Consistent with this view, data from their survey of brokers and voters in Paraguay show 
that the former correctly identified voters’ partisan preferences 80 percent of the time. 
 Finally, scholars of clientelism working in contexts where ethnicity is politically 
salient suggest that taking group identities and group-party linkages into account reduces 
the difficulty of identifying voters’ partisan preferences and votes. Kitschelt and 
Wilkinson (2007) argue that voters may pressure co-ethnics or members of the same 
geographic unit to vote as a bloc because parties can punish the ethnic group or locality 
as a whole.
13
 Along similar lines, Chandra (2004) argues that co-ethnics coordinate their 
votes as a bloc in order to bargain with politicians for access to selective state benefits 
and services. Specifically, she argues that voters base their prospective judgments of 
parties on a combination of counting the number of co-ethnics in visible positions of 
power across parties and observing the ethnicities of those who received benefits in the 
past across parties. Ethnic groups use this information to coordinate their votes along 
ethnic lines and politicians mobilize voters along the same lines. Given the centrality of 
ethnic coordination, we should expect brokers to have localized and timely information 
on group-party linkages. If partisan preferences can be predicted reasonably well by 
                                                        
12
 Brokers correctly identified voters’ levels of trust in others and how they played dictator games 74 and 
66 percent of the time respectively. See Lawson and Greene (2014) for a reciprocity argument that does not 
rely upon this high degree of broker capacity.  
 
13
 Kitschelt, Herbert and Steven Wilkinson: p17.  
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ethnic identity at the local level and above—even among pivotal groups that change the 
party they support across elections but coordinate as a group—we should expect 




 That said, ethnic information shortcuts only improve guessability to the extent 
that partisan preferences are homogeneous within ethnic groups, which recent work on 
elections in India and other countries suggests is often not the case. For example, 
Dunning and Nilekani (2013) find substantial heterogeneity in partisan preferences 
among members of the same castes who reside in the same villages or village council 
areas, and evidence at the state-level in India similarly shows that party preferences are 
heterogeneous within groups (See Thachil 2011; Chhibber et al. 2013; Huber and 
Suryanarayan 2013). Heterogeneity in partisan preferences within ethnic groups is also 
common in ethnically diverse countries in sub-Saharan Africa, Europe, and Eastern 
Europe (See Dunning and Harrison 2010; Bratton et al. 2012; Huber 2012). This suggests 
that the extent of ethnic group coordination in India and other countries may often be too 
low for the assumption of guessability in theories of clientelism to be convincing. 
 Variation in guessability has important implications for theories discussed above. 
First, Stokes’ (2005) model predicts that party leaders will pursue a strategy of targeting 
swing voters because brokers can monitor the votes of all partisan types. If guessability is 
low, particularly with respect to the least predictable voters, the swing targeting 
                                                        
14
 Note that this claim holds with a constructivist approach to ethnicity. We should expect local politicians 
embedded in rural communities to base their guesses on voters’ partisan preferences on ethnic categories 
that are politically relevant at the local level as well as their local knowledge on the partisan affinities of 
groups which are relevant at this level.  
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prediction should not hold because politicians are extremely unlikely to be able to 
monitor voters’ compliance with the quid pro quo exchange. Relatedly, if guessability is 
low under a secret ballot, the practical implication of Stokes’ theory – that parties must 
invest in armies of brokers to monitor the quid pro quo – does not hold because 
guessability is limited even when such investments are made. This view is consistent with 
the results of Guardado and Wantchekon’s (2014) formal model, which shows that when 
the monitoring assumption is relaxed, vote-buying becomes either extremely inefficient 
or prohibitively expensive.  
 Second, if guessability is low, the applicability of Finan and Schechter’s (2012) 
argument that parties overcome the voter-side commitment problem by targeting 
intrinsically reciprocal voters will be limited to a core strategy of targeting co-partisans. 
Brokers will favor those they know best, whom are likely to be integrated into local co-
partisan networks (Calvo and Murillo 2013). It is unlikely that brokers have enough 
information on non-co-partisans, who are unlikely to be integrated into their local 
networks, to facilitate the collection of fine-grained information on voters’ social and 
political preferences. Moreover, it is plausible that Finan and Schechter’s (2012) results 
do not exhibit this limitation because Paraguay was characterized by low competition, 
low trust in the fairness of elections, and low levels of democracy at the time of data 
collection.
15
 This limits the generalizability of their results to more competitive contexts 
with a credible secret ballot. Third, when ethnic groups have heterogeneous preferences 
                                                        
15
 Finan and Schechter’s data collection in Paraguay spanned from 2006 to 2010. Scholars considered the 
country a semi-authoritarian regime, which experienced 61 years of one-party rule until 2008 (Abente-Brun 
2009). Freedom House coded Paraguay as partly free throughout the period of this study. This makes 
Paraguay akin to pre-1994 Mexico rather than more democratic cases such as India, Argentina, or even 
post-transition Mexico (See Magaloni 2006).   
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within local areas, low guessability poses problems for vote coordination where political 
mobilization occurs along ethnic lines. Chandra (2004) argues that under low 
information, voters and politicians bargain as ethnic groups. When politicians cannot be 
certain that group leaders will be able to deliver their members, however, this strategy 
becomes inefficient.  
2.2 Mechanisms of Guessability: Variation at the Micro-Level:   
 
 The central question of this paper concerns whether brokers have the capacity to 
identify voters’ private partisan preferences. If brokers are uniquely skilled in this area, 
relative to ordinary villagers, we should expect brokers who exhibit high-skill to correctly 
identify the partisan preferences of both voters whose characteristics make them more 
predictable (e.g. members of local partisan networks and members of ethnic groups 
closely aligned with one party) and those who are less predictable (e.g. swing voters, 
non-co-partisans, non-partisans). If high-skill brokers perform no better on guessability 
than those with low skill, we should expect brokers overall to perform no better on 
guessability than ordinary villagers. To adjudicate between these views, I consider 
variation in guessability with respect to three mechanisms: common knowledge, broker 
quality, and co-partisan networks. The common knowledge and co-partisan networks 
mechanisms do not require brokers to invest effort in identifying voters’ private partisan 
preferences since guesses by these mechanisms depend on information-shortcuts or 
information on preferences that voters provide themselves. The broker quality 
mechanism tests the observable implication of existing scholarship, which suggests that 
competent brokers are likely to know voters’ partisan preferences irrespective of the 
secret ballot.  
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 As a low-information baseline, by the common knowledge mechanism, any broker 
should use information that is publicly known to make an educated guess about voters’ 
partisan preferences in lieu of finer-grained, higher quality information. This includes 
two types of information: priors on the distribution of partisan preferences across ethnic 
and class groups and knowledge of voters’ participation in publicly observable (partisan) 
political activities. The former requires the least effort or knowledge. In India, among 
other settings where ethnicity is politically salient, physical features and names allow 
brokers to identify voters’ ethnic identifies, which are predictive of partisan preferences 
where identity markers are visible and politically salient (Chandra 2004; Posner 2005).
1
 
In a local setting where brokers know voters personally, we should expect brokers to be 
able to accurately categorize voters according to both ethnicity and socio-economic status 
even if this requires finer grained information. Information shortcuts from ethnicity, 
however, provide clearer cues to partisanship for some ethnic groups than others. If 
brokers depend on ethnic cues to identify voters’ partisan preferences, we should expect 
guessability to be higher for members of core groups with more homogenous partisan 
preferences and lower for swing groups with more heterogeneous preferences (See Heath 
2005; Huber and Suryanaran 2012). Similarly, where socio-economic status maps onto 
partisanship, we should expect local politicians’ stereotypes about class-party linkages to 
explain variation in guessability.  
 In a local setting where villagers can easily observe other villagers’ public 
activities, participation in public partisan activities provides an additional source of 
common knowledge most villagers can access. While research suggests that brokers 
compel members of their partisan networks to attend rallies (Auyero 2001; Szwarcberg 
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2011), brokers should be able to easily observe villagers’ public partisan activities, 
whether the latter are part of their own partisan network or members of the network of a 
broker from another party. Thus, brokers who have incentive to identify voters’ partisan 
preferences should know which villagers are active in local partisan politics, and take this 
into account when they guess their partisan preferences. The availability of cues to 
partisanship from participation in public political activities, of course, varies across 
voters’ propensities to participate in political activities. For example, passive voters are 
unlikely to participate in public political activities, and swing voters may avoid these 
activities in order to drive up the price of their votes (See Nichter 2009). This means that 
knowledge on political participation will be valuable only for the subset of voters who 
participate the most. In short, we should expect brokers to take common knowledge into 
account when they do not have better information through the broker quality or co-
partisan networks mechanisms. This is a baseline mechanism that brokers and non-
brokers alike can employ with comparable accuracy. The remaining mechanisms are 
compliments to this baseline.  
 The broker quality mechanism captures the conventional wisdom that brokers are 
capable of collecting information on voters’ partisan preferences despite a secret ballot. 
Where a secret ballot is in place, brokers must use their central location in local social 
networks, rumors, and visible clues to identify voters’ partisan preferences. Brokers use 
these tactics when elections are not imminent as well as during election campaigns to 
determine the allocation of state benefits that are allocated in quotidian times and 
handouts distributed during election campaigns respectively. Brokers are critical players 
in the quid pro quo exchange because they have the ability—unlike ordinary villagers—
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to identify the partisan preferences of voters from their communities who have 
characteristics that make them more difficult to guess. If an important part of a broker’s 
job description is to perform on guessability, we should expect variation in broker quality 
to explain variation in performance on guessability. Broker quality is a latent variable that 
captures a local broker’s skills to perform the functions the clientelism literature suggests 
brokers are expected to perform: information collection on voters’ political preferences, 
voter mobilization, and political targeting of selective benefits. Recent work suggests that 
principal politicians use the size of brokers’ networks as a summary measure of broker 
quality (Stokes et al. 2013; Camp 2013; Szwarcberg 2012; Auyero 2001). Since 
measuring broker networks in a large number of villages is unfeasible, and is an 
imperfect measure of competence where the number of co-partisans is high, I consider 
characteristics that explain variation in a brokers’ capacity to perform these basic 
functions.  
 The co-partisan networks mechanism is an alternative low-information 
mechanism that explains variation in guessability to the extent that brokers need not 
invest in effort to identify voters’ preferences. By this mechanism, we should expect 
brokers to correctly identify co-partisan voters’ partisan preferences because voters 
seeking access to the benefits of membership in local partisan networks have incentive to 
reveal their preferences. Calvo and Murillo (2013) argue that brokers condition access to 
selective benefits on whether voters are integrated into partisan networks, which they use 
to collect extensive information on voters’ preferences and behaviors (See also Auyero 
2001; Dunning and Nilekani 2013). Brokers use this information to distinguish between 
reliable and unreliable voters before distributing patronage benefits. By this mechanism, 
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parties have incentive to require benefit-seeking voters to reveal their partisan 
preferences through their participation in brokers’ local partisan networks, and voters 
have incentive to reveal their own preferences. If this is true empirically, brokers should 
be better at guessing the political preferences of co-partisans than non-co-partisans, 
which they can do with minimal effort.
16
 
 How should we expect brokers to learn co-partisan voters’ partisan preferences? 
One explanation applied to studies of the Peronist UCJ in Argentina is that voters reveal 
their preferences through attendance at party rallies (Szwarcberg 2012; Auyero 2001). It 
is not clear that this applies to India as voters often attend the rallies of more than one 
party or candidate due the festival atmosphere and handouts that surround them (See 
Banerjee 2014). A second possibility is that voters publicly declare their support through 
public pronouncements such as planting a party flag in front of their house before an 
election, which is a costly signal of partisan allegiance that makes it more difficult to take 
benefits from another party (Nichter 2009; Nichter and Palmer-Rubin 2013). 
Nonetheless, it is likely that active partisan voters are most likely to place a party flag in 
front of their home. In my data, for example, 64 percent of those who reported that they 
planted a party flag in front of their home in the past five years also reported that they 
participated in door-to-door campaigning for a candidate. Following Calvo and Murillo 
(2013), I expect that information on voters’ partisan preferences come from routine 
interactions between brokers and voters. When brokers have extensive access to voters, 
the information they gain from rally attendance and other visible cues to partisanship is 
likely to be small. In short, brokers know the partisanship of those in their co-partisan 
                                                        
16
 In a village setting, I consider co-partisans to be members of (roughly) the same local partisan network. 
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networks because they interact often with these voters who have incentive to reveal their 
preferences. 
3. Background: the Case of India 
 This study applies to contexts where the ballot is secret, democracy is 
consolidated, and electoral politics is sufficiently competitive that election outcomes are 
uncertain. In this section, I argue that India, and Rajasthan in particular, is a compelling 
case for the study of guessability and provide background on the paper’s institutional 
setting: the village council or gram panchayat (GP). 
3.1. Features of the Indian Context 
 India, and the state of Rajasthan specifically, provides a hard case to test the 
assumption of high guessability because it has features that suggest guessability should 
be high. First, scholarship on India establishes its politics as patronage-based (Chandra 
2004; 2014; Wilkinson 2007; Besley et al. 2007; Zeigfeld 2014; Keefer and Vlaicu 2008; 
Stokes et al. 2013; See also Berenschot 2011; Piliavsky 2014; Witsoe 2013). Chandra 
(2004, 2011) defines India as a “patronage democracy” characterized by a dominant state 
sector that controls primary avenues to upward mobility and survival and discretion over 
individualized provision of jobs and services.
17
 Moreover, Chhibber and Osterman (2013) 
see the Indian state as arbitrary with access dependent on particularistic favors.
18
  
                                                        
17
 This takes into account reforms that liberalized the Indian economy and reduced the size of the state. She 
finds that the state sector currently retains dominance as a source of jobs, benefits, and services, particularly 
for the rural poor.  
 
18
 This is consistent with work conducted in Rajasthan by Kruks-Wisner (2013) who finds that Indian 
citizens with more diverse connections are more likely to engage with state office holders, and Krishna 
(2007) who argue that the emergence of local fixers with connection to politicians and bureaucrats have 
become a critical resource for the poor who help citizens seek entitlements and state services they could not 
otherwise access (See also Manor 2000). Politicians covet these fixers who they believe can deliver the 
votes of their supporters during elections.   
 36 
 Second, Rajasthan is a predominantly rural state with a large share of poor 
voters.
19
 According to estimates based on consumption data from the 2004-5 National 
Sample Survey, Rajasthan has a rural poverty rate of 19 percent, which is modestly below 
the 22.5 percent average for Indian states (Dev and Ravi 2007).
20
 Selecting a state with a 
significant poverty rate is necessary as the scholarly consensus is that parties target poor 
voters with clientelistic benefits (Calvo and Murillo 2004; Brusco et al. 2004). Focusing 
on a state with a substantial population of poor rural citizens makes Rajasthan a hard case 
to test the guessability assumption as studies show that a strategy of clientelism is more 
feasible and likely in in areas with low population density where brokers can more easily 




 Third, Rajasthan is an ideal case to test the implications of electoral uncertainty 
on clientelistic strategies. It is a competitive state with a 2-party system that has 
alternated between the BJP and Congress Party in every state assembly election since 
1993, usually by small margins of victory.
22
 At the constituency level, the average margin 
of victory across Rajasthan legislative assembly constituencies in 2003 and 2008 was 8.7 
and 8.9 percent respectively.
23
 Fourth, Rajasthan has an institutionalized party system 
                                                        
 
19
 Note that poverty alleviation policies have made progress in recent years, along with growth, making 
Rajasthan above average relative to other North Indian states.  
 
20
 This takes into account the 17 most populous states.  
 
21
 This literature considers low population density to be key. This can apply to small towns or small 
neighborhoods within towns as well as to rural areas. 
 
22
 Of the five most recent state elections in Rajasthan, three had overall margins of victory in vote share 
below 4 percent. In 1998 and 2013 the Congress Party and BJP each won by 12 percent of the vote, 
respectively.    
 
23
 The median margin of the vote in 2008 was 6.6 percent.  
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relative to other Indian states-- although local party organizations are believed to be weak 
as are most parties throughout India (Lodha 2009; Chhibber et al. 2012; Jensenius and 
Suryanarayan 2013; See also Kohli 1990; Thachil 2011).
24
 Fourth, Rajasthan is a state 
where ethnic identity is a salient predictor of partisanship; it falls in the middle of the 
distribution of Huber and Suryanarayan’s (2013) measure of party voting polarization 
across Indian states.
25
 In sum, Rajasthan is a context of moderate poverty, intense 
electoral competition, politically salient ethnicity, and electoral uncertainty at the state 
and constituency levels. In this context, efficiency in the targeting of benefits, facilitated 
by performance on guessability, should be valued.  
 
3.2. The Gram Panchayat and Panchayat Raj in India 
 Local elites surveyed for this project are elected gram panchayat (village council) 
presidents or sarpanch. The gram panchayat is the lowest tier of India’s three-tier local 
government or Panchayat Raj system below elected bodies at the District (zilla parishad) 
and sub-district or block (Panchayat Samiti) levels.
26
 The panchayat raj system existed in 
some form prior to independence. The 73
rd
 amendment to the Indian constitution passed 
in 1993 gave the Panchayat Raj system constitutional status and imposed federal 
requirements for elections of panchayat members, further integration of local government 
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
24
 To illustrate this, Chhibber and Nooruddin (2008) place Rajasthan in the bottom third among major states 
for their respective measures of electoral volatility (See Heath 2005). This is moderate compared to state 




 This measures the extent of party polarization by sub-castes across Indian states using 1999 and 2004 
NES election data.  
 
26
 Gram panchayat boundaries are based on administrative units and are not perfectly nested within 
electoral districts. However, in this study, all the GPs sampled from a selected block reside within one state 
assembly constituency.  
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and government development functions, and quotas for women and marginal groups. GP 
boundaries are based on population and consist of one large village or as many as 35 
smaller villages.
27
 Each gram panchayat in Rajasthan has one directly elected sarpanch 
and directly elected ward members for each ward. The number of wards in a gram 
panchayat also depends on population.
28
  
 Gram panchayats are subject to quotas for women and marginal groups: 
scheduled castes, scheduled tribes, and other backward (middle) castes. As of 2010, 50 
percent of seats were reserved for women. In 2008, 21, 18, and 42 percent of elected seats 
in the state were reserved for scheduled castes, scheduled tribes, and other backward 
castes (OBCs) respectively. Eligibility according to these quotas rotates with each new 
election cycle. This means that it is unlikely that the same politician will be eligible to 
contest for re-election; which impacts the distribution of political experience of GP 
politicians as can be seen by the large number of first term sarpanch in the elite survey 
sample (See Dunning and Nilekani 2013). Finally, unlike the case at higher levels, party 
symbols are not permitted on the ballot in elections to the GP. Parties have nonetheless 
penetrated the GP (Dunning and Nilekani 2013; Yadav and Palshikar 2008). They use the 
GP as a recruiting tool, GP politicians depend on partisan politicians such as MLAs and 
representatives of the higher tiers of the Panchayat Raj for funds for pork projects, and 
sarpanch often serve as middlemen to higher-level politicians.
29
 Voters are also aware of 
                                                        
 
27
 GPs in Rajasthan modally have populations below 3,000 people according to Rajasthan Government 
population estimates from 2000. See: http://www.rajsec.rajasthan.gov.in/secraj/pan_partA-3.htm. In my 
survey data, there are 750 households per GP on average.  
 
28
 There are nearly 9,200 gram panchayats with approximately 114,000 elected members in Rajasthan 
(2008 Figures). Government of Rajasthan: 
<http://www.nird.org.in/Rural%20Development%20Statistics%202011-12/data/sec-9.pdf> 
29
 In another paper with Neelanjan Sircar, I find strong evidence that GP Presidents prefer to target benefits 
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GP politicians’ partisan affiliations: 82 percent of surveyed voters in Karnataka and 96 
percent in Rajasthan correctly identified the party of the GP President (Dunning and 
Nilekani 2013).  
 
3.3. Identifying Brokers  
 
 I define brokers as local politicians who are deeply embedded in their local 
communities and serve as middlemen to higher-level politicians. Scholars understand 
brokers to possess information on voters’ material needs, votes, partisan preferences, and 
the elasticity of their partisan preferences conditional on selective benefits. Higher-level 
politicians purportedly find brokers essential to winning elections because they can 
leverage their knowledge of voters’ partisan leanings and specific material demands to 
target swing voters or passive co-partisan voters with the minimum payoff necessary (i.e. 
reservation price) to induce vote switching or turnout. To this end, brokers use their 
central location in local social networks and routine interaction with voters to ensure the 
latter’s compliance with their end of the benefits-for-votes exchange (See Stokes 2005; 
Stokes et al. 2013). The characterization of the broker-- rooted in research on urban 
machines in contemporary Latin America and the United States in the 19
th
 and early 20
th
 
centuries— takes a different form in rural India where parties are poorly organized at the 
grassroots. The Indian literature differs on the extent to which middlemen are formally 
party agents. For example, Manor (2000) refers to opportunistic informal local leaders or 
‘fixers’ whose party loyalties are opportunistic and volatile from one election to the next. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
to co-partisans, which provides further evidence of partisan salience at the gram panchayat level.  
 40 
 I am agnostic as to whether a broker’s allegiance is based on a long-term 
commitment or temporary and won by the highest partisan bidder (See Camp 2012).
30
  
I identify brokers through the institution of direct elections of gram panchayat presidents 
in Rajasthan. This is reasonable for several reasons. First, GP Presidents oversee 
implementation of many government anti-poverty schemes funded by federal and state 
governments, and like local brokers broadly, use discretion in selecting beneficiaries (See 
Besley et al. 2005; Dunning and Nilekani 2013; Markussen 2010). Second, especially 
among the poor, there is evidence that the first point of contact for voters seeking benefits 
or favors is the sarpanch, who has access to higher-level contacts that are important 
where the state is unresponsive (Kruks-Wisner 2010; Bussell 2011; Chhibber and 
Osterman 2013). Third, my own informal interviews and ethnographic fieldwork by 
Pattenden (2011) finds that local brokers (or fixers) tend to be current or past sarpanch or 
GP members, and that prominent fixers are often recruited to contest for sarpanch. 
 Fourth, evidence suggests that sarpanch in India are active in campaigns and serve 
as local mobilizers for state politicians. In my data, 92 percent of sarpanch reported that 
they campaigned for a state politician in the last 5 years (since the previous state 
assembly elections in 2008); 80 percent said they attended a party rally for a party or 
candidate; and 85 percent attended a party meeting. Finally, Yadav and Palshikar (2008) 
observe that despite the 73
rd
 amendment’s non-partisan goals for local government, 
parties have largely coopted gram panchayats as a resource for local middlemen and local 
information. This supports my presumption that while many local brokers have not been 
elected to the gram panchayat, GP presidents-- or their husbands or close family 
                                                        
30
 I find substantial stability (90%) in the partisan preferences of sarpanch across state elections in my 
survey data. This occurs despite the fact that party symbols are banned from the ballot in village council 
elections in Rajasthan and most other Indian states.   
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members-- are likely to function as brokers. Identifying brokers formally through the 
result of elections has the strength of objectively yielding an identifiable local leader for a 
large number of GPs. This is the most reasonable, reliable, and feasible option for a large-
scale measure of guessability.
31
  
4. Survey Instrument and Sampling 
 The data for this paper comes from a 2013 survey of approximately one thousand 
voters and one hundred sarpanch conducted in twelve competitive blocks selected from 
seven districts throughout Rajasthan. In this section, I describe the survey instrument 
used to create the guessability measure and sampling design. 
4.1. Survey Instrument  
 Guessability is a dichotomous measure of whether or not there is a match between 
voters’ responses to vote intention and 2008 state assembly elections vote recall questions 
and GP Presidents’ guesses about these voters’ preferences and votes. I report 
guessability on the 2008 vote choice item as a robustness check; however, due to recall 
concerns, I center the statistical analysis on the rate of correct guesses for the vote 
intention question: If an MLA (state assembly) election were to be held tomorrow, which 
party would you support? This question captures voters’ current partisan preferences 9 
months before the 2013 Rajasthan state assembly elections. I ask sarpanch which party he 
or she thinks a voter sampled from his GP would support if a state assembly election 
were held tomorrow and which he voted for in 2008. Sarpanch were shown a sheet of 10 
photographs of sampled voters including information provided in the electoral roles: 
                                                        
31
 The caveat to this design is that I could not determine ex ante whether unelected local leaders would 
perform better on guessability than sarpanch. I argue that identifying the true broker informally is 
unfeasible and susceptible to considerable error of an uncertain direction.  
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name, father’s name, and house number.
32
 They were then asked to guess the past votes 
and vote intentions of each of the voters sampled from their GP. The survey instrument 
for the vote intentions and 2008 vote choice items for voters and local elites follows 
standard secret ballot design.
33
 Interviewers assured respondents of their anonymity and 




 Fieldwork suggests that sarpanch took the task of identifying voters’ partisan 
preferences seriously. Anecdotally, I observed sarpanch respondents thinking aloud as 
they developed their guesses— taking caste into account for example. Respondents in 
many cases also took their time in answering questions to the guessability measure.  
                                                        
32
 See figure 1 for the survey instrument. 
 
33
 The vote choice survey instrument follows one fielded for Rajasthan respondents in post-poll surveys 
carried out by Lokniti in 2008 and 2009. Respondents received a ballot paper with party symbols and were 
asked to check the box next to the party symbol they preferred. They then were asked to fold the ballot 
paper and insert it into a sealed ballot box. Ballot boxes were not opened for coding until the research team 
exited the gram panchayat. 
 
34
 It should be noted that parties in India do not release the candidate list for state assembly elections until 









Now I will ask you about  _____________ [VOTER’S NAME]. [INTERVIEWER: POINT TO THE PHOTO.] 
If an MLA election were held tomorrow, which party 




c) Other __________ 
Which party do you think [voter name] ___________ 
supported in the last MLA elections in 2008? 
a) INC 
b) BJP 
c) Other __________ 
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 4.2. Sampling 
 The survey sampled 96 gram panchayats in seven districts, twelve blocks and six 
of Rajasthan’s seven administrative divisions.
35
 The sample generalizes to voters and GP 
politicians in rural contexts with a moderately high share of households below the 
poverty line and inter-party competition. To build the sample frame for this population, I 
used 2001 census data on the rural composition of blocks,
36
 data from the Government of 
Rajasthan on the share of below poverty line (BPL) households across blocks in 2001, 
and Election Commission data on political competition in panchayat samiti elections—
the tier of the panchayat raj system above gram panchayats, which aligns with 
administrative blocks.
37
 I restricted my sample to blocks with a 75 percent rural 
population according to the 2001 census to reduce the chance of sampling GPs that 
function as suburbs, and excluded blocks with less than 20 percent of households in the 
BPL category in 2001 to ensure that the chance of sampling voters eligible for anti-
poverty programs at random was non-trivial. I also excluded blocks where the median 
margin of victory across Panchayat Samiti ward elections was greater than 15 percent to 
increase the chance that I selected competitive GPs.
38
 After this restriction was applied, 
approximately 60 of 249 blocks were eligible for sampling. Logistical concerns required 
that we sample two blocks in each district to the extent possible. This reduced the list to 
                                                        
35
 Rajasthan has 33 districts, 249 blocks, 7 administrative divisions, and 9177 gram panchayats in all. 
 
36
 Government data on the share of BPL households across gram panchayats was from 2001. More recent 
data was not available at the time of fieldwork in 2013.  
 
37
 This is the lowest level of aggregation at which election commission data is available from a central 
source and the lowest level that permits party symbols on the ballot. 
 
38
 Each member of this block-level legislative body is elected from one single member ward and elected 
according to a first past the post electoral rule. I use the median margin of victory across ward election in 
each panchayat samiti as gram panchayat electoral data could not be obtained. 
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approximately 50 blocks. I randomly sampled one district in 5 of Rajasthan’s seven 
divisions from a pool of districts in which three or more blocks were eligible for 
sampling according to these criteria. Two blocks were randomly selected from the pool of 
eligible blocks in each district. In Udaipur, the sixth division selected, three eligible 
blocks did not exist in any one district; As a practical alternative, I randomly selected one 
block each from two neighboring districts in the division: Udaipur and Rajsamand.   
 Once 12 blocks were sampled, I collected data on political competition across 
gram panchayats through interviews.
39
 Members of my research team and I interviewed 
block party presidents—party organizers immersed in the politics of gram panchayats in 
their block— who were asked to characterize the level of competition between Congress 
and the BJP as non-competitive, somewhat competitive, or very competitive. Of the 452 
GPs in 12 sampled blocks, 180 were described as non-competitive, 133 as somewhat 
competitive, and 139 as very competitive. To increase the chance that the target 
population would be sampled, given resource constraints, non-competitive GPs were 
dropped from the pool for sampling. In each block, I randomly selected 4 GPs among 
those coded as somewhat competitive and very competitive respectively. I then randomly 
selected one ward in each sampled GP and randomly sampled household in sampled 
wards using the gram panchayat voters’ list, which is public information provided by the 
Election Commission.
40
 I sampled (predominantly male) heads of household in randomly 
sampled households because they are generally the household member most engaged in 
                                                        
39
 This was necessary because electoral commission data on gram panchayat elections is not available from 
a centralized source. 
 
40
 This was done because the elite survey samples one ward member in each GP for analysis not included in 
this paper. To analyze ward member-voter ties, all sampled voters must live in one GP member’s ward. 
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village politics and citizen-state relations.
41
 The elite survey was fielded the day after the 
vote survey was completed in a given GP. I illustrate the steps in sampling in figure 2 
below. I provide descriptive statistics on the survey sample in tables A1 and A2 of the 
appendix. Sample statistics show that sarpanch are politicized and drawn from a more 




5. Results for Guessability: Descriptive Statistics 
 In this section, I present aggregate descriptive statistics on guessability. First, I 
show that guessability is lower than existing literature suggests. Second, I show that 
observed sarpanch perform worse or as well as low-information benchmarks that do not 
require brokers. Third, I explore the structure of mistakes local politicians make on 
guessability.  
                                                        
 
41
 To identify heads of household, interviewers were instructed to request to speak to the head of household 
upon approaching each sampled household. If heads of household were not at home, interviewers were 
instructors to either interview them in the fields in which many of them worked or to return to the 
household later in the day. If they did not return, supervisors provided alternative respondents who were 
also randomly selected from a voters list.   
42
 Besley et al. (2012) find a similar pattern in South India. 






Select 1 District 
in 6 of 7 
Divisions  
Randomly Select 
2 Eligible Blocks 
from Selected 
Districts  
Randomly Select 4 
Very Competitive  
and 4 Somewhat 
Competitive GPs in 
Each Block  
Randomly Select 1 
Ward per  GP 
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‘ 
 5.1 Aggregate Guessability Rates 
 
 Table 1 shows that GP Presidents guess voters’ partisan preferences incorrectly 
35.5 percent of the time.
 43
 While it is plausible that this is due to the fact that not all 
sarpanch are brokers and not all sarpanch who are brokers are high quality brokers, data 
suggests this is not the case. To address this, I conducted difference-in-means tests on 
guessability rates comparing female and male sarpanch and comparing sarpanch from the 
upper castes and other backward castes (OBCs) and those from the scheduled castes and 
scheduled tribes. T-tests show no significant differences across these groups— despite 
the fact that female sarpanch are likely to be housewives and lower caste sarpanch are 
less educated than their upper caste counterparts.
44
 This is also consistent with the null 
result on measures of broker quality relative to the common knowledge baseline model— 
discussed in section 6.3. In short, guessability is low in the aggregate and this is the case 
for sub-groups of sarpanch who are more and less likely to be employed as local brokers 
to higher-level politicians.  
Table 1: Aggregate Guessability Among GP Presidents (Restricted) 
 Vote Intention 2008 State Elections 
Incorrect Guesses 286 (35.5%)  287 (34.5%) 
Correct Guesses 520 (64.5%)  544 (65.5%) 
Total Observations  806 (100%) 802 (100%) 
*I present raw numbers followed by percentages of observations in the sample. 
 
                                                        
 
43
 The results I present are based on survey data with several restrictions that ensure my measure of 
guessability is conservative. I discuss this in Appendix B. 
44
 Note that interviews with female sarpanch were conducted with their husbands (when requested) in effort 
to capture the maximum level of information sarpanch have on voters’ preferences ultimately.  
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5.2 Benchmarks of Guessability 
 What does a guessability rate of 64.5 percent say about the level of information 
local politicians in rural Rajasthan have on voters’ partisan preferences? I show here that 
local politicians perform as well as or worse than benchmarks that do not require the 
presence of brokers to predict vote preferences. In a two-party system, the least 
impressive benchmark is random chance or 50 percent— equivalent to guessing partisan 
preferences by flipping a coin between Rajasthan’s two major parties: Congress and the 
BJP. Table 1 shows that guessability rates on vote intentions and 2008 vote choice items 
exceed random chance in the aggregate. Guessability aggregated to the GP (or sarpanch 
respondent) shows that 69.6 (64 of 92) and 67 (62 of 92) percent of GP presidents 
perform above the 50 percent random chance benchmark.  
 Second, I fit a minimalist multinomial logit model on partisan preferences based 
on voters’ self-reported vote intentions. I include jati (sub-caste), self-reported land 
holdings, and block fixed effects. This model provides a low-information benchmark 
based on the most visible demographic information that most villagers can easily 
observe. This model correctly predicts observed vote intentions 65.3 percent of the time 
as compared to an observed aggregate guessability rate of 64.5 percent in the pooled 
sarpanch, which suggests that guessability for politicians immersed in voters’ networks is 
roughly indistinguishable from a simplistic demographic model at a high level of 
aggregation. 
 The third benchmark compares observed guessability rates against the rates that 
party leaders would have observed if they used publicly available results from state 
assembly election post-poll surveys conducted by Lokniti, a national survey institute in 
 49 
India, following the previous two elections in 2003 and 2008. Published in newspapers at 
the time, these results include aggregate statewide vote shares for BJP and Congress 
across major caste groups and Muslims.
45
 I develop a blunt yet plausible decision rule 
based on voting patterns across these ethnic categories as follows. When the difference in 
vote share between support for the Congress Party and BJP (averaged between the 2003 
and 2008 elections) among members of broad caste categories or Muslims is greater than 
or equal to 15 percent in Rajasthan as a whole, sarpanch guess that all members of that 
group supported that party. When the difference in vote share for that group is less than 
or equal to 15 percent, sarpanch guess that half of the members of that group will support 
either the Congress or BJP. Since Rajasthan is a two-party system, this simple decision 
rule assumes no guesses of third party support.
46
 This means that all voters who prefer 
Rajasthan’s comparatively weak third parties will be guessed incorrectly by this decision 
rule.
47
 This decision rule is conservative and should perform worse on guessability than 
local politicians living amongst the voters whose partisan preferences they were asked to 
guess. Surprisingly, if sampled GP presidents followed this decision rule, they would 
have achieved an aggregate guessability rate of 75.9 percent. This exceeds the aggregate 
guessability rate I observe in the pooled sample (64.5 %) by 4.4 percent.
48
 Thus, an 
outsider who followed this simple decision rule would substantially out-perform the 
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 These groups include Muslims, forward castes, Jats, Gurjars, scheduled castes, scheduled tribes, and 
other backward castes (middle peasant castes), which exclude Jats. 
 
46
 Sarpanch guessed third parties for 7 of 806 voters in the restricted samples and only 2 of these were 
correct; thus, the 2-party focus fits with sarpanch behavior. 
 
47
 See Table A4 in the appendix for details on how guesses based on this decision rule compare to observed 
sarpanch guesses.   
 
48
 When I change the threshold from a 15 percent average margin of victory to a 10 and 20 percent margin, 
the decision rule yields guessability rates of 67.6 and 69.4 percent respectively. Both of these exceeds 
observed guessability.      
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aggregate guessability rate of local politicians immersed in voters’ social networks. I 
provide results based on the decision rule benchmark in table A4 of the appendix.  
 
5.3 Guessability Across Partisan Types  
 In the above section, I demonstrated that village politicians perform worse than 
benchmarks that rely on publicly available information on group voting patterns. In this 
section, I examine variation in aggregate guessability rates across voters’ partisan types— 
namely core, opposition, and swing. I demonstrate that guessability is particularly low 
among non-core (co-partisan) voters.  
 As discussed above, research on political targeting in contexts of patronage 
politics differs in its expectations of guessability among core co-partisans, supporters of 
opposition parties, and swing voters. Stokes (2005) argues that brokers immersed in local 
communities can identify all types of voters’ partisan preferences through monitoring and 
other methods, while Calvo and Murillo (2013) expect guessability to be high only for 
co-partisans who are integrated into local partisan networks. I use two measures to 
identify core, opposition, and swing voters to calculate sub-group guessability rates 
across these voter types. First, I calculate the proportion of core, opposition, and swing 
voters by considering matches in elite and voter survey question on partisanship based on 
a psychological attachment survey instrument.
49
 I define core voters as those who share 
the partisan preference of their sarpanch; opposition voters as those who feel closest to a 
different than their sarpanch; and swing voters as those who do not feel close to any 
particular party (i.e. non-partisans).  
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 The survey question asked to both voters and sarpanch is as follows: ‘Do you feel close to any particular 
party? [If so] Which one?’  
 51 
 I also use a more restrictive measure that takes into account responses to a 
question on the elite survey that asked sarpanch to guess whether a particular villager 
voted for him. Sarpanch guessed that 66 percent of respondents voted for them, in some 
cases guessing that all sampled voter survey respondents did so despite the competitive 
nature of local elections in India. This suggests that when a sarpanch guessed that a 
particular voter did not vote for him (or her) in the previous local elections, we can 
consider this person out of that politician’s core network with some confidence. When the 
sarpanch guessed that a voter did vote for him, we should expect this to reflect the pool of 
plausible supporters including core and swing voters.  
 I identify voters as core, opposition, and swing types for this more restrictive 
measure as follows. I identify core voters as those who are both co-partisans and whom 
the sarpanch perceived to have voted for him. I identify opposition voters as those who 
are partisans of the opposing party—vis-à-vis the sarpanch— and whom the sarpanch 
perceived not to have voted for him. I identify swing voters as all voters who did not fit 
the two former categories of core (co-partisan) or opposition voters.
50
 Importantly this 
broad residual category of swing voters comprises 58 percent of the sample for the 
guessability measure, or 499 respondents.
51
 More restrictive measures of core, 
opposition, and swing that take perception of having voted for the sarpanch into 
accounting capture the extent to which a voter’s partisan type— as core and opposition 
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 The number of observations in these three restrictive categories are as follows: core voter (N=205), 
opposition non-voters (N=102), and the broad residual swing category (n=410).  
Note that I restrict the swing voter category to those who reported turning out to vote in the previous MLA 
elections to ensure this measure is sufficiently conservative to capture those who are seen as voters in state 
elections.    
 
51
 See appendix C for details on these restrictions. 
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particularly—was visible to the sarpanch personally. I present descriptive statistics on 

















*Moving left to right, margins of error across partisan sub-groups are as follows: +/- 4.7%, 5.1%, 5.3%, 
8.6%, 7.4%, and 4.8%.  
 
  
 In figure 3, we can see that guessability rates are above random chance and the 
aggregate guessability rate of 64.5 percent for core voters (according to both measures) 
and partisans of a party different than that of the sarpanch’s who sarpanch also perceived 
not to have voted for him (or her) personally. Consistent with Calvo and Murillo (2013), 
aggregate results bluntly suggest that voters who are integrated into co-partisan 
networks are particularly guessable. This is particularly the case for the more restrictive 
measure. I argue that co-partisan voters who the sarpanch also perceives to have voted 
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 More restrictive measures are in dark blue.  
 





























































for him are his most visible supporters. According a similar logic, we can consider those 
who affiliate with a party different from that of the sarpanch and who are guessed not to 
vote for the sarpanch to be a group the sarpanch believes he can identify as opposition 
supporters. On the other hand, guessability does not exceed 56 percent with respect to 
supporters of the opposition irrespective of the vote question and both measures of 
swing voters.   
 
5.4 The Structure of Errors 
 
 To understand the structure of mistakes on guessability, I briefly examine the 
extent to which errors are false positives (co-partisan guesses for non-co-partisan voters) 
or false negatives (non-co-partisan guesses for co-partisan voters) with respect to the vote 
intention measure of guessability. I find that errors in guessability were more likely to be 
the former due to substantial over-guessing of co-partisans. Overall, 37 percent of co-
partisan guesses and 28 percent of non-co-partisan guesses were incorrect. With respect 
to party, Congress and BJP sarpanch guessed that 66 and 62 percent of voter survey 
respondents would support their party; of these co-partisan guesses, 43 and 26 percent 
were incorrect respectively. In the minority of cases when Congress and BJP sarpanch 
guessed that voters would support the opposing party, they guessed incorrectly 21 and 40 
percent of the time. Over-guessing co-partisans is particularly evident with the broad 
category of swing voters introduced in figure 3: 57 percent (140/ 247) of co-partisan 
guesses were incorrect while 24 percent (34/143) of non-co-partisan guesses were 
incorrect.
53
 This suggests that Congress politicians did not take into account anti-
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 Note that the total swing (broad) category has a denominator of 390 instead of 410 observations here 
because non-partisan sarpanch only sarpanch who identified themselves as partisans could be included in 
this analysis.  
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incumbent (i.e. anti-Congress) movement in partisan preferences despite the strong anti-
incumbent mood at the time of the survey, and that politicians broadly inflate their 
support among the broad pool of voters who they don’t identify as near-certain 
opposition party supporters.  
 To summarize this section, aggregate measures of guessability based on the vote 
intention and 2008 vote choice measures are consistently lower than theory presumes, 
and sarpanch perform at comparable or worse levels than simple, methods for identifying 
voters’ partisan preferences that rely on aggregate information and do not require the 
fine-grained information brokers are understood to collect. These aggregate results give 
us empirical grounds to question the guessability assumption. In the next section, I model 
variation in guessability at the micro-level. 
 
6. Explaining Variation in Guessability: Regression Analysis 
 In this section, I test for the observable implications of three mechanisms 
introduced in section 2.2 that allow us to distinguish between a low or high information 
explanation for variation in guessability: the (baseline) common knowledge mechanism, 
broker quality mechanism, and co-partisan networks mechanism. Recall that only the 
broker quality mechanism explains variation in guessability as a function of a broker’s 
ability to identify privately held partisan preferences. The remaining mechanisms use 
information from observable cues or information on partisan preferences that voters 
provide to brokers themselves. I find that variation in guessability is only explained by 
the variables that measure the (baseline) common knowledge mechanism and co-partisan 
networks mechanisms.  
 55 
 
6.1. Empirical Model 
 To test the observable implications of these mechanisms, which include measures 
of voter and elite characteristics and their interactions, I estimate a set of varying-
intercept multilevel logistic regression models of the following form: 
Pr(𝑦𝑖 = 1) = 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡
−1(𝛼𝑗 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖 + 𝛾𝑈𝑗[𝑖] +  𝜀𝑖𝑗)                                                            (1) 
 𝛼𝑗  ~ 𝑁( 𝑈𝑗𝛾, 𝜎𝛼
2)                                                                                                               (2) 
 The outcome  is a binary indicator for whether or not a GP President correctly 
guessed the party a voter reported that he would support if a state assembly election were 
to be held tomorrow.
54
 A value of one represents a match between voter responses on this 
item and a local politician’s guess about a particular voter’s partisan preferences. 
𝛽 represents a vector of coefficients on voter and dyadic characteristics that capture the 
common knowledge and co-partisan networks mechanisms as well as controls for co-
ethnicity and swing voters. This includes indicators for voters’ ethnicity and wealth, 
voter-level political characteristics, and dyadic characteristics, which include indicators 
for co-partisanship and co-ethnicity.  𝛾𝑗  is a vector of sarpanch characteristics (indexed 
by voters) that capture the broker quality mechanism: education, tenure in the GP, family 
connections in politics, measures of the frequency of contact with higher-level politicians 
and bureaucrats in the past month, and political characteristics.   are gram panchayat 
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 Other parties were grouped together into a single category due to the small number of observations in 
narrower categories. If a politician guessed “Other” and a voter chose a party other than Congress or BJP, 




random effects modeled by a group-level intercept and a normally distributed error 
term.
55
   
 The varying-intercept, or random effects, multi-level model can be interpreted as 
a model with a different intercept on guessability for voters in each GP.
56
 The voter-level 
model in equation 1 and model of GP intercepts in equation 2 are estimated 
simultaneously. Multi-level modeling is an appropriate estimation strategy for this 
analysis for several reasons. First, multi-level modeling allows us to account for 
individual and group-level variation when estimating group-level coefficients—the 
modeled group (GP) intercepts in this case. Multilevel modeling allows me to model 
gram panchayat random effects as well as sarpanch predictors at the GP-level. Second, 
unlike classical regression, which treats all observations as independent, multilevel 
approaches allow researchers to use all the information that is available but have 
correctly estimated standard errors with clustered data. This is because multilevel 
modeling represents a compromise between the two extremes of completely pooling the 
data and estimating separate models for each group (no pooling). By “partially pooling” 
estimates, multilevel modeling considers pooled and un-pooled information and weighs 
that information according to the sample size of the groups and the within and between-
group variation (Gelman and Hill 2007).  
 I present results from multi-level logistic regressions below. I focus the discussion 
on the vote intention measure of guessability, but provide confidence intervals for 
guessability on the 2008 vote choice measure as a robustness check. The vote intention 
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 Note that since there is one sarpanch in a given GP, random effects capture intercepts for sarpanch and 
village characteristics together.  
 
56
 Recall there is one GP President sampled in each GP.  
 57 
measure captures partisan preferences on the day of the survey, which was completed 9 
months before the Rajasthan assembly elections that took place in December 2013. The 
2008 vote choice measure is based on voters’ recall of their vote choice in an election that 
occurred 4 years prior. This means that it cannot be used to test claims on vote 
monitoring—due to recall bias-- but can show consistency across measures that should 
move in the same direction.
57
  
6.2 Common Knowledge  
 In this section, I test for the observable implications of the common knowledge 
mechanism. According to this mechanism, as a baseline, sarpanch use information 
shortcuts based on their perceptions of ethnic and class group-party linkages and 
knowledge of individual voters’ publicly observable political behavior to identify voters’ 
partisan preferences. At the group level, this means that sarpanch observe voters’ visible 
markers of ethnicity and class, and guess their partisan preferences according to priors for 
whether that particular group generally supports the BJP, Congress Party, or a third party. 
Sarpanch will be more likely to guess the partisan preferences of voters correctly when 
priors on group-party linkages are most reliable, which should be the case for groups with 
more polarized partisan preferences (core groups) as compared to those with more 
heterogeneous or volatile preferences (swing groups). In Rajasthan, ethnic groups 
historically aligned with Congress include scheduled castes, scheduled tribes, and 
Muslims. Ethnic groups aligned with the BJP come from the upper castes: Rajputs and 
Brahmins.
58
 Jats, an upwardly mobile peasant caste officially identified as another 
                                                        
57
 Regression results from models on both dependent variables are provided in the appendix.  
 
58
As a caveat, Lodha (2009) notes that Congress has made inroads into the BJP’s Rajput support base since 
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backward caste, Meenas, an upwardly mobile scheduled tribe, and Other Backward 
Castes (excluding Jats) have more heterogeneous preferences.
59
 I also test for the effect 
of socio-economic status according to the same information short-cut logic. Here, the 
most well-off are more likely to be associated with the BJP, while the least well-off are 
more likely to be associated with Congress.
60
   
 I use the following measures in regressions discussed below. First, I create 
indicator variables for politically relevant ethnic groups in Rajasthan. I include indicators 
for upper castes, which includes a number of Brahmin sub-castes; members of the 
influential upper caste Rajput sub-caste (jati); Jats (an upwardly mobile peasant caste 
identified as OBC), a residual category of OBCs that excludes Jats; a number of jatis 
classified as scheduled castes; Meenas (an upwardly mobile scheduled tribe); scheduled 
tribes (excluding Meenas); and Muslims.
61
 To test the group-level implication of class on 
guessability, I code socio-economic status using a standardized wealth index based on 15 
asset items in the voter survey with weights derived from principal component analysis 
(Filmer and Pritchett 2001). I split the distribution on this index measure into indicators 
for wealth quintiles.
62
  At the voter-level, I expect sarpanch to be better at identifying the 




 Other Backward Castes are an official category of historically disadvantages castes. This category is 
distinct from scheduled castes and scheduled tribes. 
 
60
I also expect the richest and poorest voters in GP to interact more often with the sarpanch than other 
socio-economic groups. The richest members tend to be prominent members of their villages and likely to 
be more socially connected with the local political elite while poor voters are likely to contact sarpanch in 
pursuit of benefits from government schemes such as subsidy and government work programs.      
 
61
 I classify Muslims as a single group even though they reported various caste identities. I do so because 
Muslims are treated as an ethnic voting bloc in most analyses of Indian electoral behavior. I code caste 
categories by locating respondent-reported sub-castes (or jatis) in a Rajasthan codebook of jatis according 
to caste categories provided by MORSEL and check this against a codebook produced by Lokniti, a 
national survey institute based in Delhi.  
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partisan preferences of voters who report high levels of publicly observable political 
participation as compared to less active voters. To measure this, I created a composite 
participation index that includes binary questions on whether or not a respondent reported 
that he participated in one of four public political activities in the last 5 years: attending a 
rally, attending a party meeting, putting a party flag in front of their home, and 
canvassing for a candidate during an election campaign. I sum the number of these self-
reported activities and weight the sum by two standard deviations to capture large 
differences in public political participation relative to zero. 
 I also include the more restrictive measure of swing voters introduced in section 
5.3. This is a dichotomous measure that identifies those respondents who do not belong to 
categories or core or opposition voters as the sarpanch perceive this. Recall that I 
identified core voters as co-partisans vis-à-vis the sarpanch who the sarpanch also 
perceived to have voted for him personally in the previous  (formally) non-partisan local 
elections in 2010. I identified opposition voters as those respondents who are partisans of 
the opposing party vis-à-vis the sarpanch who the sarpanch perceives to not have voted 
for him personally. Swing voters are voters in neither of these categories who also report 
that they voted in the last state elections. This restriction ensures that I do not judge 
sarpanch performance on guessability with respect to non-voters. The coefficient on the 
swing voter measure indicates whether sarpanch perform worse at guessing the partisan 
preferences of voters with less obvious partisan preferences by the common knowledge 
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 The asset items included in the composite measure of wealth are as follows: numbers of rooms in the 
respondent’s home, number of buffalo, number of cows, self-reported land holdings (bighas), and indicator 
variables for the following asset: a houses is made of concrete and brick (pakka), a separate kitchen, a fan, 
a car/jeep/van, a tractor, scooter or motor bike, TV, toilet, fridge, electric pump set for irrigation, mobile 




 I present regression results for vote intention and 2008 vote choice 
measures of guessability that test the common knowledge mechanism in tables A5 and 
A6 in the in appendix; I present confidence intervals in figure 4 below.  
 Regression results support the group-level implication of the common knowledge 
mechanism for vote intention and 2008 vote recall measures of guessability. This 
mechanism predicts that sarpanch are more likely to identify voters’ partisan preferences 
when they belong to groups that are closely identified with one of the main political 
parties in Rajasthan. Using scheduled castes—a low caste group generally aligned with 
the Congress Party—as a baseline ethnic group,
64
 confidence intervals show that Jats and 
Meenas (swing groups) are substantially more difficult to guess than core ethnic groups.
65
 
In substantive terms, coefficients on indicators for Jats and Meenas decrease sarpanch 
guessability rates by 5.5 and 4.5 percentage points compared to the scheduled caste 
category, holding income quintiles and political characteristics at their median.
66
 I also 
consider the marginal effect of socio-economic status on guessability. Excluding the 
middle wealth quintile as a baseline, results presented in figure 4 show that guessability is 
significantly higher for the poorest and richest quintiles compared to the baseline middle 
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 Swing voters are a check on the predictions of the mechanisms proposed here; I do not expect sarpanch 
who simply use common knowledge to be able to identify swing voters’ preferences.  
 
64
 The baseline group of scheduled castes is generally identified with the Congress Party. In his 2011 survey 
of Rajasthan, Thad Dunning found 75 percent of his large sample of Scheduled Castes to feel closest to the 
Congress Party. The result on Rajputs should be understood relative to this baseline. Interestingly this 
group’s vote preferences are strongly toward the BJP but sarpanch guessed Rajput’s partisan preferences 
close to 50/50 across Congress and BJP.   
 
65
 These groups typically swing elections against the party in power at the state level (See Jaffrelot and 
Kumar 2011). For example, according to Lokniti state assembly election post-poll surveys, margins in Jat 
support swung from favoring the BJP by 13 percent in 2003 to supporting Congress by one percent in 2008.  
 
66
 Put another way, sarpanch guessed Jats’ and Meenas’ vote intentions correctly 60 percent of the time as 




 The party preferences of voters who belongs to the poorest and richest 
wealth quintiles are respectively 2 and 3.6 percentage points more likely to be guessed 
correctly than the partisan preference of a voter from the middle wealth quintile.  
Moving to individual characteristics, I expected brokers to infer partisan preferences by 
observing voters’ public displays of partisanship through political participation. Results 
displayed in figure 4 show that the political participation measure fails to reach statistical 
significance. When we move from voters with very low to very high levels of 
participation, the effect on guessability is approximately zero.
68
 Finally, sarpanch are 4.5 
percentage points less likely to correctly guess the partisan preferences of swing voters 
than voters whose vote preferences are consistent across 2008 vote recall and vote 
intention items. This negative coefficient holds for both measures of guessability. In 
short, voter types that are easiest to guess as a function of the information group 
membership provides on partisanship are guessed substantially better than members of 
swing castes and swing voters who are harder to guess. We should expect an average 
villager or outsider—such as a member of a state politician’s staff— to employ a similar 
baseline mechanism with similar results. 
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 The coefficient on the indicator for the poorest quintile is significant at the 90 percent level; the richest 
quintile is significant at the 99 percent level.  
 
68
 This holds for both guessability measures as well as models in which I include only the largest 
component of the participation index: rally attendance. The effect also does not differ across Congress and 




6.3 Broker Quality 
 
 According to the broker quality mechanism, brokers should be able to identify 
partisan preferences and monitor votes through their central position in social networks 
and skill in collecting information on voters. If brokers provide added value in identifying 
voters’ partisan preferences, brokers who are more skilled than others should out-perform 
the baseline common knowledge mechanism tested above. To test this hypothesis, I break 




                  Logit Coefficient 
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broker quality into basic capacity (captured by education); direct or indirect experience in 
the GP; and connections to higher-level politicians. Education captures the basic ability a 
sarpanch has to navigate the gram panchayat in order to target benefits to her constituents 
or mobilize voters (See Besley et al. 2005; Krishna 2007; Afridi et al. 2013).
69
 To 
measure education, I use an ordinal variable with a range of 0 to 13 according to years of 
education and divide by two standard deviations to capture large increases in education 
from the bottom category of illiterate.  
 Experience captures variation in the knowledge a sarpanch has of the gram 
panchayat, and local political power through a sarpanch’s ability to win plurality 
elections as ward member or sarpanch more than once.
 70
 It is also a standard measure of 
politician quality in political science (See Cox and Katz 1996; Bardhan and Mookherjee 
2012; Afridi et al. 2013).
71
 I measure experience directly as tenure: the number of terms a 
sarpanch served in the GP as either GP president or GP ward member.
72
 As an indirect 
measure of experience, I create an indicator for whether or not a sarpanch respondent has 
a relative who currently holds elective office or did so in the past.
73
 This measures 
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 Interviews with sarpanch in three Indian states suggest that poorly educated, and particularly illiterate, 
local politicians are often less active in political and government activities and more deferential to more 
educated local elites. Additionally, Krishna (2007) argues that new leaders (akin to fixers) achieve their 
social status because they are more educated and connected than poor villagers. 
 
70
 Along similar lines, Bardhan and Mookherjee (2012) find that skill, proxied by length of tenure in office, 




 Work in American Politics on the incumbency effect on house election posits that tenure captures 
unobserved political skills. 
 
72
 I measure tenure in terms of both prior terms served as GP members and sarpanch because my sample is 
overwhelmingly comprised of first-term sarpanch. This is similarly the case in Bardhan and Mookherjee’s 
(2006) sample, and is due the rotating quota system. 
 
73 Respondents were asked to provide details on the position, years that person 
held this post, and the relative involved.  
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experience because belonging to a local political family gives a sarpanch experience 




 Third, connections to higher-level politicians capture an element of broker quality 
because local brokers who have close ties to higher-level politicians are more likely to 
work as brokers to these politicians, and thus more likely to be incentivized to perform on 
guessability if this is an important part of the job of broker. I operationalize this with 
measures of the self-reported frequency of contact (in the past month) between sarpanch 
and higher-level leaders: MLAs (state legislators) and representatives of the two upper 
tiers of the panchayat raj system: panchayat samiti (block-level) and zilla parishad 
(district level). Responses vary along a 5-point scale from zero meetings in a month to 
more than one meeting weekly.
75
 Finally, I include an indicator for self-identified party 
activists as a proxy for motivation.
76
 To summarize, we should expect more competent, 
experienced, and well-connected brokers to be better able to identify the political 
preferences of a wider range of voters than those with lower levels of skill along these 
lines. 
 Results presented in figure 5 do not support the expectation of the broker quality 
mechanism. None of the measures of basic capacity and experience achieve statistical 
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 More specifically, in a context of rotating quotas along gender lines, we may expect a sarpanch who has 
a husband or other close family member who held elective office to draw on the experience of these family 
members when they make decisions.   
 
75
 These responses are inflated with a mean of one meeting per month for all three politicians. To correct 
for this, I create a standardized variable weighted by two standard deviations to capture significant 
increases in the frequency of sarpanch-reported meetings above the mean. There is substantial variation on 
these variables with a standard deviation of approximately one point on the ordinal scale for measures of 
contact with each of the three higher-level politicians.  
 
76
 Note that this is not a measure of broker quality but motivation. 
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significance at conventional levels, and they are not jointly significant according an f-test. 
An increase of two standard deviations in years of educational attainment—from illiterate 
to completion of middle school— has no significant effect on guessability, and illiterates 
are statistically indistinguishable from the highly educated on guessability. Second, 
neither tenure nor belonging to a political family has a significant or substantial effect on 
guessability for the vote intention measure of guessability; being a member of a political 
family does have a negative and significant effect on the 2008 vote choice measure of 




 Finally, I consider the effects of motivation and its interaction with measures of 
broker quality. I proxy motivation with a survey question on whether or not a sarpanch is 
an active party member, which is akin to an activist in the Indian context. Local 
politicians who self-identify as party activists are likely to exhibit strong connections to 
parties and partisan politicians and likely to be interested in political careers beyond the 
GP. If guessability is a requirement for executing a clientelistic strategy, we should 
expect it to be particularly high for party activists. Although active party membership has 
a statistically significant (at the 90% level) positive effect on the 2008 vote recall 
measure of guessability before interactions are introduced,
78
 it does not have an 
independent effect for any regression on the more dependable vote intention measure.
79
 
The interaction effects on the indicator for party activist and voter political participation, 
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 The only effect that reaches statistical significance is contact with a state assembly legislator (MLA), 
which is negative. 
 
78
 See model 1 on Table A8.  
 
79
 Only the interaction between party activists and belonging to a political family shows a substantially 
large interaction effect. Activists from political families perform better than activists who do not belong to 
political families by 2.3 percentage points, all else equal.  
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however, suggests that activists are more motivated than non-activists. Sarpanch who 
identify as party activists are 2.7 percentage points more likely to identify voters two 
standard deviations above the mean on the participation index, which refers to those who 
participated in 3 to 4 (of 4) types of public political participation.  
 Taken together, these results show that the low level of guessability I find relative 
to theory and low-information benchmarks is not a function of low quality sarpanch who 
lack incentive or basic capacity to perform on guessability. While those who are self-
identified activists from political families—arguably the most politicized category of 
sarpanch— perform better on guessability, these effects are small relative to the 
predictive power of the baseline model. This is consistent with the argument of this paper 
the monitoring assumption is implausible with respect to those outside of brokers’ local 
partisan networks where there is a secret ballot and inter-party competition. 
 
6.4 Co-Partisan Networks  
 
 Finally, the co-partisan networks mechanism suggests that a sarpanch will be 
more likely to guess a voter’s partisan preference when he is a co-partisan. Rather than 
investing effort to identify voters’ privately held partisan preferences, I posit that brokers 
know co-partisan voters’ preferences because they routinely reveal their preferences as a 
cost of entry and integration into local partisan networks. I consider a voter to be a 
member of a sarpanch’s co-partisan network when they share partisan preferences 
according to a party-closeness measure asked to both voters and sarpanch.
80
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 Note that I do not measure whether a voter is in a sarpanch’s inner circle in this network. The expectation 
is that when a voter share partisan preferences he is more likely to interact routinely with a sarpanch and 
other leaders in a local partisan network. He is also particularly incentivized to reveal his partisan 
 67 
Confidence intervals presented in figure 5 support the implication of the co-partisan 
networks mechanism for guessability.
81
 A sarpanch is 3.5 percentage points more likely 
to correctly guess a voter’s partisanship if he is a co-partisan than if he is a non-co-
partisan, all else equal. To further demonstrate the impact of co-partisan ties on 
guessability, I estimate the effects of interactions, which I present in confidence intervals 
in figure 6.
82
 These results show that co-partisanship has a large, positive effect when 
interacted with variables that had large, negative coefficients in earlier models. First, co-
ethnicity has a substantively large and significant effect when it is interacted with co-
partisanship, although it has no independent effect in regressions presented in figure 5. 
Substantively, the probability of correctly identifying the partisan preference of a voter 
who shares partisanship and co-ethnicity (on the vote intention measure) is 5.5 
percentage points higher than would be the case for a co-ethnic voter who is not a co-
partisan, all else equal.  
 Second, coefficients on interactions between co-partisanship and indicators for 
swing group, Jats and Meenas, flip dramatically to large and positive in regressions on 
both measures of guessability. These coefficients are inefficiently estimated, but show 
large positive point estimates for groups identified as least guessable in tests of the 
common knowledge mechanism.
83
 Evidence is also consistent with the co-partisan 
networks mechanism when we consider interactions between co-partisanship and contact 
                                                                                                                                                                     
preferences to the sarpanch—particularly when he needs favors or benefits from the GP—which I 
understand as the costs of entry to local partisan networks in this paper.   
 
81
 Note that figure 5 shows confidence intervals from a regression model that includes measures from the 
common knowledge mechanism (not shown), measures of broker quality, and co-partisanship.   
 
82
 See model 3 in tables A7 and A8 in the appendix for multi-level regression tables.  
 
83
 The interaction between co-partisanship and Jats is positive, but does not reach conventional levels of 
statistical significance. The interaction on Meenas is positive and significant at the 90 percent level.  
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between the GP President and panchayat samiti (block) representative— the politician 
one level above the sarpanch.
84
 When co-partisanship is taken into account, the effect of 
panchayat samiti contact flips from negative to positive and the effect is large and 
statistically significant across both measures of guessability. Among sarpanch who report 
meeting his panchayat samiti member representative weekly or more often, which is two 
standard deviations above the mean, the probability of correctly identifying the partisan 
preference of a co-partisan voter is approximately 4 percentage points higher than would 
be the case at the same level of contact if the voter was a partisan of another political 
party. This suggests that political connections impact guessability when we locate them 
within co-partisan networks but not otherwise.
85
 Finally, I included interactions between 
co-partisanship and attendance at party rallies and placing a party flag in front of one’s 
home respectively to the regression model presented in figure 6.
86
 I found no effect for 
either of these. I argued in section 2.2 that the high level of information brokers possess 
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 Note that interactions between co-partisanship and measures of politician quality are not statistically or 
substantively significant.   
 
86
 I do not include this result here. These results are available upon request. 
 
87
 I also find no effect on voter turnout, however this is largely do to the small number of co-partisan non-
voters (under 30) and their ethnic characteristics.  
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To summarize, evidence broadly suggests that guessability can be explained by 
two low information mechanisms: default guessability and co-partisan networks. 
Employing the common knowledge mechanism, sarpanch make educated guesses about 
voters’ partisan preferences according to their priors on the distribution of partisan 
Figure 6: Co-partisan Interaction Effects on Guessability 
 
 
Logit Coefficient  
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preferences among voters’ group identities. Sarpanch are also better at guessing the 
partisan preferences of voters located in their co-partisanship networks. The lack of an 
effect of co-ethnicity on guessability suggests that the co-partisanship effect fits the 
political networks mechanism rather than being a function of familiarity between 
sarpanch and voters who share social characteristics. Evidence does not support the 
assumption that savvy brokers effectively extract private information on voters’ political 
preferences despite the secret ballot.  
It is important to understand the practical significance of these results. First, the 
larger point that guessability is low outside of partisan networks holds. Under the 
circumstances in which voter and elite characteristics make guessability highest—
scheduled caste voters from the poorest wealth quintile with high political participation 
and sarpanch who are activists with relatives in politics—guessability does not exceed 71 
percent. In more typical cases, guessability falls below 64 percent, which is the 
percentage of correct guesses in the pooled sample. Second, we should compare results 
against a baseline of 64 percent, which is the predicted guessability rate for an OBC 
middle-income voter based on the regression model presented in figure 4. Relative to this 
baseline, the observable implications of the information shortcuts mechanism show large 
effects with guessability rates dropping approximately 5 percentage points when the voter 
comes from a swing ethnic group for example. The effect on guessability of belonging to 
a GP President’s partisan network—proxied by co-partisanship—is substantively large at 
3.5 percent before exploring interactions. In the aggregate the co-partisan effect on 
guessability is particularly striking. This increases, even for difficult to guess groups, 
when we take interactions between co-partisanship and elite and voter characteristics into 
 72 
account as displayed in figure 6. Guessability increases dramatically when interactions 





This paper suggests that sarpanch—my proxy for brokers—perform poorly at 
identifying voters’ partisan preferences with the exception of those whose preferences 
require the least effort to identify. Even in competitive settings where the incentive to 
perform on guessability should be palpable, there is little evidence that this is the case. 
Instead, guessability varies with group characteristics that make voters broadly guessable 
to brokers and non-brokers alike. The results of this paper are consistent with two 
interpretations: that brokers fail at a central task party leaders expect them to perform, 
and that brokers invest minimal effort in guessability because party leaders only expect 
them to organize voters into local networks. If the latter interpretation is true, we should 
expect party leaders to pursue strategies that do not depend on guessability such as the 
allocation of benefits to aggregate units (e.g. polling stations), targeting based on simple 
decision rules, or indiscriminate targeting. Recent evidence from Mexico (Diaz-Cayeros 
et al. 2012), Argentina (Stokes et al. 2013; Calvo and Murillo 2013), Kenya (Kramon 
2011), and Brazil (Zucco 2013) suggest that parties rely less and less on strategically 
targeted and monitored vote buying.
88
 An alternative strategy is to primarily target voters 
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 Vincente (2008) finds that voters who accept handouts in election campaigns can be easily persuaded to 
vote as they wish (See also Hicken et al. 2012). Banerjee’s (2014) ethnographic work and my own 
discussions similarly suggest that voters tell party activists who provide handouts that they will give them 
their vote with little intention of doing so.   
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integrated into co-partisan networks, whose preferences are known (See Calvo and 
Murillo 2013). If the former interpretation that brokers are motivated to perform on 
guessability and monitor votes is true, this paper shows that even those sarpanch who 
have characteristics that make them most likely to be effective brokers fail at this task.   
 
7.1 Does Guessability Travel? 
 
I expect my main results for Rajasthan to hold across Indian states, and the three 
mechanisms I propose to explain variation in guessability across Indian states and 
countries. I locate Rajasthan among other cases by considering the common knowledge 
and co-partisan networks mechanisms in the aggregate. First, we should expect 
guessability to be higher according to the common knowledge mechanism when ethnic 
groups are polarized across parties. Suryanarayan and Huber’s (2013) analysis of group 
polarization show that Rajasthan is a typical case with respect to caste polarization across 
parties (See also Heath 2005).
89
 Voters in states with more ethnically polarized systems 
such as Uttar Pradesh and Assam may be easier to guess by this mechanism while voters 
in less ethnically polarized states such as Tamil Nadu and Maharashtra will be more 
difficult to guess (See Sircar and Vaishnav 2010; Palshikar et al. 2009). We should also 
expect guessability to vary with the level of ethnic polarization across countries (See for 
example Ferree 2006; Huber 2012).  
Second, we should expect guessability to be higher where parties possess 
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 Rajasthan falls at the middle of the distribution on Huber’s Group Vote Polarization (GVP) across Indian 
states (based on 1999 and 2004 parliamentary elections post-poll data). GVP captures the extent to which a 
group’s vote is polarization across parties, aggregated to the level of Indian states and takes the number and 
size of groups and parties into account.  
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organized machines that reach the local level, which increases the chance that a voter is 
integrated into a partisan network (See Freidenberg and Levitsky 2006; Nichter and 
Palmer-Rubin 2013). While parties in Rajasthan lack this level of local organization, 
Chhibber et al. (2012) code Rajasthan’s party system as on of the most organized (at the 
district level) in India and the most organized in North India. This suggests that 
guessability is unlikely to be worse in Rajasthan than in most Indian states. Moreover, 
recent work conducted during the 2006 state elections in West Bengal suggests that vote 
preferences are difficult to predict even in a state where the Communist Party (Marxist) 
established a party machine over 40 years in power (See Bardhan and Mookherjee 2014; 
Sircar 2014).  
In short, guessability is likely to be low throughout India where parties generally 
lack organized machines; this is also modally the case in developing democracies around 
the world. Broadly speaking, where elections do not resemble ethnic censuses at the local 




This paper has important implications for the study of distributive politics in India 
and other developing countries. While guessability is a strong assumption in canonical 
cases of clientelistic party machines such as Argentina and Mexico, this paper strongly 
suggests that we should be skeptical that brokers can monitor votes or efficiently target 
benefits on a quid pro quo basis. An implication of low guessability is that brokers should 
mobilize votes and target selective benefits through co-partisan networks within which 
guessability is high. I show that this is the case in two subsequent papers from this survey 
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project. Using a behavioral measure, I find in the previous chapter that sarpanch strongly 
prefer to target co-partisans with selective benefits. Using a vignette experiment that cues 
partisanship with real local politicians, Schneider (2014) finds that co-partisan voters are 
substantially more likely to expect jobs and welfare benefits when the sarpanch is a co-
partisan. This work all points to the prominence of a strategy of core targeting through 




 Theory in the clientelism literature suggests that brokers perform an essential 
information-gathering role that party leaders cannot perform. This makes local agents 
indispensable. Evidence presented here suggests that local brokers do not perform as well 
as theory predicts, or as well as inexpensive, low-information alternatives that require 
only information on basic demographics or polling data that party leaders can easily 
access or collect themselves. If party leaders in state capitals and legislators and staff 
sitting in constituency offices can out-perform sarpanch on guessability, scholars would 
be wise to look beyond the coercive quid pro quo logic of clientelism. Instead, it may be 
more prudent for them to explore theories that explain how parties, politicians, and their 
local brokers attract and retain voter support where there is a secret ballot and genuine, if 
not necessarily programmatic, democratic competition that shapes the behavior of voters 
and politicians alike. Here, the challenge parties face is how to respond to rising demands 
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Table A1: Descriptive Statistics—Sarpanch 
 
Mean SD 
Male  0.54 0.5 
Upper Castes 0.25 0.43 
Other Backward Castes 0.37 0.48 
Scheduled Castes 0.2 0.4 
Scheduled Tribes 0.18 0.38 
Illiterate 0.18 0.38 
Primary School Education 0.24 0.43 
Middle School Education 0.2 0.4 
Secondary (includes matriculation) 0.19 0.392 
Post-Secondary 0.19 0.39 
Land Holdings Scale 5.98 3.3 
Active Party Members 0.39 0.49 
Prior Terms Served as GP President  0.14 0.47 
Prior Termed Served as GP Member 0.38 0.65 
BJP Supporters 0.32 0.47 
Congress Supporters 0.63 0.48 
Participation in Canvassing  0.92 0.28 























Table A3: GP President Guessability Across Caste and Gender (%) 
Group Male Female Overall  
Forward Castes 75.5 (98) 72.5 (120) 73.9 (218) 
Other Backward Castes 55.6 (153) 56.4 (133) 55.9 (286) 
Scheduled Castes 71    (93) 61.6 (73) 69.3 (166) 
Scheduled Tribes 75.3 (88) 64.6 (48) 61.8 (136) 
Total (%)         (477)          (402)          (879) 
*I provide the percent of correct guesses left of apprentices; the number of observations are in apprentices.  
 
 




Male 0.99 0.096 
Upper Castes 0.095 0.293 
Rajputs 0.113 0.316 
Jats 0.096 0.295 
Other Backward Castes (OBCs) 0.319 0.466 
Scheduled Castes (SCs) 0.48 0.355 
Scheduled Tribes (STs) 0.063 0.244 
Muslims 0.102 0.303 
Land 3.1 2.64 
Illiterate 0.36 0.48 
Primary School Educated 0.24 0.43 
Middle School Educated  0.22 0.42 
Secondary School (Includes Matriculation) 0.35 0.53 
Post-Secondary School 0.09 0.28 
Voter Turnout in 2008 State Elections 0.91 0.29 
Partisans 0.75 0.43 
Swing Voters 0.17 0.37 
Share Volunteer in Political Campaigns 0.29 0.45 
Share Attend Party Rallies 0.29 0.45 
Relatives of Sarpanch 0.05 0.22 
Friends of Sarpanch 0.15 0.36 
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Table A4: Sarpanch Polling Data Benchmark-Based and Observed Guessability 
 
 Margin  BJP Congress Others Guessability 
(w/ Decision Rule)  
Upper Castes 31.5% 172 (138) 0 (32) 0 (2) 80.2% (172) 
Jats 6% 38 (48) 38 (26) 0 (2) 84.2% (76) 
Gurjars 15% 23 (33) 23 (13) 0 (0) 78.2%  (46) 
Other OBCs 23% 210 (133) 0 (70) 0 (7)      63.3% (210)  
Scheduled  
Castes  
15.5% 0 (34) 129 (92) 0 (3) 71.3% (129)  
STs 12% 49 (47) 49 (51) 0 (0) 98% (98)  
Muslims 62%  0 (21) 75 (53) 0 (1) 70.7% (75) 
Guessability 
Rate 
NA 83.7 %(453) 68.9% (338) 0% (15) 75.9% (806) 
*Margin is the average difference in vote share between Congress and BJP across these subgroups 
according to Lokniti’s 2008 Rajasthan State Assembly Post-Poll Survey. Numbers in apprentices are 
observed numbers of voters based on a vote intention item in the voter survey. Numbers left of the 
apprentice indicate the share of voters one would guess to support each party based on the decision rule 
benchmark that uses Lokniti polling data. I restrict the observed data to the observations used in the 













Table A5: Sarpanch Guessability (Vote Intention): Common Knowledge Mechanism 
 








 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Upper Castes -0.09 -0.09 -0.06 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) 
Rajput -0.10 -0.10 -0.08 








 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
OBC -0.02 -0.02 0.01 








 (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
ST 0.06 0.06 0.06 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Muslim 0.00 0.01 -0.02 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 







 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 







 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Wealth Quintile 4 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 







 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Participation  0.01 0.01 
  (0.03) (0.03) 
Swing Voters    -0.20
***
 
   (0.03) 
Log Likelihood -542.14 -544.53 -530.00 
Num. obs. 806 806 806 
Num. groups: GP number 92 92 92 
Variance: GP number.(Intercept) 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Variance: Residual 0.20 0.20 0.19 
***
p < 0.01, 
**
p < 0.05, 
*













Table A6: Sarpanch Guessability (2008 Vote) Common Knowledge Mechanism 
 








 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Upper Castes -0.10 -0.10 -0.07 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Rajput -0.11 -0.11 -0.09 








 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
OBC -0.08 -0.08 -0.06 








 (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
ST 0.06 0.06 0.06 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) 
Muslim 0.01 0.01 0.00 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 





 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 







 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Wealth Quintile 4 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 







 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Participation  0.02 0.01 
  (0.03) (0.03) 
Swing Voters    -0.18
***
 
   (0.03) 
Log Likelihood -552.40 -554.67 -542.48 
Num. obs. 831 831 831 
Num. groups: GP number 92 92 92 
Variance: GP number.(Intercept) 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Variance: Residual 0.20 0.20 0.19 
***
p < 0.01, 
**
p < 0.05, 
*













Table A7: Sarpanch Guessability (Vote Intention): Elite Characteristics 
  










 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Tenure 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Political Family 0.01 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Education 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
PS Member Contact -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.13
**
 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) 
ZP Member Contact 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.11
*
 








 (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) 
Activist 0.05 -0.07 -0.08 -0.08 
 (0.05) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) 





  (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Activist * Political Family  0.13 0.13 0.13 
  (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) 
Co-Ethnic   0.02 -0.05 
   (0.05) (0.06) 
Co-Partisan   0.12
***
 0.04 
   (0.04) (0.05) 
Co-Partisan * Co-Ethnic    0.24
***
 
    (0.09) 
Co-Partisan * Jat    0.04 
    (0.12) 
Co-Partisan * Meena    0.27
*
 
    (0.16) 
Co-Partisan * PS Contact    0.20
**
 
    (0.08) 
Co-Partisan * ZP Contact    -0.04 
    (0.09) 
Co-Partisan * MLA Contact    -0.10 
    (0.08) 
Log Likelihood -499.30 -499.63 -499.25 -497.31 
Num. obs. 739 739 739 737 
Num. groups: GP number 92 92 92 92 
Variance: GP number.(Intercept) 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 
Variance: Residual 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 
***
p < 0.01, 
**
p < 0.05, 
*
p < 0.1 
 
*This paper presents results from multi-level regressions of dyadic characteristics, elite 
 characteristics, and interactions on the vote intention measure of guessability. Voter level 
 characteristics included in table 5 are included these regressions but not shown here.  
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Table A8: Sarpanch Guessability (2008 Vote): Elite Characteristics 
 










 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Tenure -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 







 (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) 
Education -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.06 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
PS Member Contact -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.07 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) 
ZP Member Contact 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.06 








 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) 
Activist 0.08
*
 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 
 (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Activist * Participation  0.08 0.08 0.08 
  (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 





  (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Co-Ethnic   0.06 0.01 
   (0.04) (0.05) 
Co-Partisan   0.07
*
 -0.02 
   (0.04) (0.05) 
Co-Partisan * Co-Ethnic    0.20
**
 
    (0.09) 
Co-Partisan * Jat    0.13 
    (0.11) 
Co-Partisan * Meena    0.43
***
 
    (0.15) 
Co-Partisan  PS Contact    0.11 
    (0.07) 
Co-Partisan * ZP Contact    0.00 
    (0.08) 
Co-Partisan * MLA Contact    -0.15
**
 
    (0.07) 
Log Likelihood -554.30 -555.22 -557.40 -555.33 
Num. obs. 831 831 831 828 
Num. groups: GP number 92 92 92 92 
Variance: GP number.(Intercept) 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 
Variance: Residual 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 
***
p < 0.01, 
**
p < 0.05, 
*
p < 0.1* 
 
*This paper presents results from multi-level regressions of dyadic characteristics, elite 
 characteristics, and interactions on the vote intention measure of guessability. Voter level 
 characteristics included in table 5 are included these regressions but not shown here.   
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Appendix 2B: Missing Values, Data Restrictions and Guessability. 
 The statistical analysis and aggregate statistics on guessability presented in 
sections 5 and 6 are based on a restricted measure to ensure that guessability rates are not 
deflated where voter responses on the vote intentions and 200 state assembly vote choice 
items may be suspect. This makes my measurement of guessability a conservative upper 
bound. In this section, I report and describe the restrictions applied here as well as 
missing data.  
 I demonstrate that missing values on vote choice in the voter survey do not bias 
results. I break this down into voter survey non-response due to a failure or refusal to 
mark the secret ballot survey instrument for past and expected vote choice and elite 
respondent non-response. First, 89 observations drop out of the 2008 state assembly 
elections measure of guessability because they report that they did not vote in that 
election. Only one respondent who reported that he turned out to vote is missing because 
he failed to complete the 2008 state assembly elections secret instrument. Second, 909 of 
959 respondents marked a party preference on the vote intention survey instrument-- 
which is the basis of my regression analysis of guessability-- leaving 50 missing values. 
Twenty of the respondents who did not provide a vote intention reported that they did not 
turn out to vote in the previous state elections. 19 of the remaining 30 missing values 
distributed across 20 gram panchayats explicitly stated that they would not choose a party 
before knowing the candidate running in their constituency,
90
 only 3 of these 19 
professed partisanship toward any party, and 5 of the 11 of 30 missing values who turned 
out in 2008 professed any partisanship. This suggests that missing values in the voter 
survey are the result of either non-voters or swing voters. I expect that including these 
observations if values could have been obtained would reduce guessability rates further. 
This means that my results may show guessability to be slightly higher than might be the 
case without missing values on vote intentions.  
 Next I explain further restrictions to the data included in this analysis. First, three 
sarpanch refused to answer most question on political characteristics as well as 
approximately all questions on political and economic attributes of voters cross-
referenced in the elite survey.  
 Elite non-response is coded as a failure to guess a voter’s vote choice or vote 
intention when the voter provided this information. One alternative is to simply consider 
these elites as thoroughly uninformed and to code all non-response pertinent to 
guessability as a mistake. However, the plausible possibility that these individuals were 
simply uncooperative and thus a poor representative of the pool of brokers I aim to 
generalize to, led me to drop these from the analysis. Finally, 68 respondents from the 
voter survey reported a third party vote intention after reporting that voted for one of the 
two major parties in 2008. Given the nature of Rajasthan’s two-party system, I suspect 
that third party answers in this case are akin to missing values among respondents. It is 
plausible in this case that respondents felt that they should mark the secret ballot vote 
instrument, rather than leave it blank, but did not mark a valid preference. Until further 
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 These respondents can be considered swing voters. Only 3 of these 19 who said they would wait for 
candidates to be named professed partisanship toward any party. Only 5 of the remaining 11 missing values 
(among voters who turned out in 2008) professed any partisanship.  
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analysis of these individuals, I drop them from the analysis on these grounds. I keep those 

































Appendix 2C: Robustness Checks on Endogeneity of Broker Quality Null 
Result 
I conducted a robustness check to evaluate whether or not the null result on broker 
quality discussed in section 6.3 is due to a correlation between the difficulty of 
identifying voters’ partisan preferences and broker quality. If weak performance on 
guessability occurs because the most talented brokers were elected in GPs with the 
hardest to predict voters (e.g. the most swing voters), broker quality might positively 
affect performance on guessability if this endogeneity were removed. This relationship 
between electoral competition is plausible according to political economy literature 
which argues that political competition, like economic competition, drives up the quality 
of politicians and raises the political costs of poor performance (See De Paola and Scoppa 
2011; Ashworth et al. 2006).  
To assess whether or not there is an empirical basis to this concern with respect to 
sarpanch in my study, I ran a series of simple bivariate regressions on the difficulty of 
guessing voters’ partisan preferences in a GP as a whole and measures of broker quality. 
To measure the difficulty of guessing voters’ political preferences as a GP characteristic, I 
draw upon the average difference in self-reported vote choice according to CSDS 2003 
and 2008 state assembly election post-poll surveys. I calculate the average party distance 
of sampled voters in a GP on this measure to capture the difficulty of partisan 
identifiability as a GP characteristic. I also calculated the number of correct guesses 
across GPs on my guessability measure to test for a direct relationship between 
guessability and measures of broker quality. I find no statistically significant results in 
any of these regressions.
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 The measure of motivation—active party membership—shows 
that a sarpanch is more likely to be a party member where competition is lower. In short, 
blunt statistical tests suggest that there is no empirical basis to the concern that broker 
quality and the difficulty of guessability are correlated.  
This result is not surprising when we consider the logic. Candidates for sarpanch 
must live in the GP in which they contest. This means that parties do not have the ability 
to allocate broker quality as a function of electoral uncertainty. There is also good reason 
to doubt such a strategy would be effective if it were legal a sarpanch elections are highly 
personal, which makes it difficult for an outsider to develop a network of support. 
Therefore, if the selection problem existed, it would have to be the case that parties or 
local patrons—given that party symbols are banned in GP elections and parties do not 
have the power to nominate candidates—backed higher quality candidates for sarpanch in 
more competitive GPs than in less competitive GPs or that there are more high quality 
local leaders in more competitive GPs than in less competitive GPs. This is unlikely to be 
a substantial concern for several reasons. First, a policy of rotating quotas makes it 
extremely unlikely that a sarpanch will be in power for more than one term. In my data, 
90 percent of sarpanch held that office for the first time. This means that there would 
have to be a pool of higher quality sarpanch candidates in less guessable GPs conditional 
on the ethnic quota in place at a given term. Since parties are widely understood to be 
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 I also find no relationship between measures of broker quality and whether the GP was highly 
competitive or somewhat competitive. Recall that this was coded according to block party leaders’ 
assessments and is the only measure of variation in competition in my survey. I only sampled somewhat or 
very competitive GPs. 
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poorly organized and do not have formal control over who is on the ballot, it is not clear 
that such a vetting process exists nor is thee good reason to expect the distribution on 
leader quality to vary across more and less competitive GPs. Finally, the position of 
sarpanch has limited resources at its disposal and significant but limited discretion over 
the allocation of these resources (See Chauchard 2014; Schneider and Sircar 2014). 
Although sarpanch have discretion over local infrastructure projects and the selection of 
beneficiaries for welfare programs, state and federal governments often try to minimize 
local control to the extent possible. For this reason, it is not clear that the most talented 
leaders in a GP—who may have alternative career options—are more likely to choose to 
contest in more competitive GPs (See Manor 2000). The null result of individual and 
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For every rupee spent by the government for the welfare of the common man, only 17 
paise reached him.  
— Rajiv Gandhi, 1985. 
 
 
1.  Introduction  
 
 Despite large investments in anti-poverty programs in India and other developing 
countries, the lion share of these resources fail to reach the poor. In India, it is unclear 
that the grim picture painted by Rajiv Gandhi has improved despite a massive investment 





 amendments 15 years ago (Besley et al. 2012; Ram et al. 
2009). This paper engages the debate on whether the decentralization of anti-poverty 
programs should improve targeting outcomes—through increased information and local 
accountability—or whether local politicians’ incentives to claim benefits for themselves 
or the non-poor leave the poor worse off than they were under centralized distribution 
(See Alatas et al. 2012, 2013; Alderman 2002; Seabright 1996; Besley et al. 2004, 2012; 
Bardhan and Mookherjee 2002, 2012; See also Dreze and Sen 1996; Crook and Manor 
1998). Central to this debate is the concern that local discretion will result in the 
manipulation of these programs relative to a programmatic ideal of perfectly targeting the 
poor—an ideal that is often unfeasible in countries with weak state capacity like India. I 
contribute to this debate with a novel theory and behavioral measure, which identifies 
local politicians’ baseline preferences over the selection of beneficiaries in the context of 
a lottery with a modest cash prize. I argue that in a context where the state (under 
centralized implementation) achieved a dismal record of targeting the poor, political 
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targeting under decentralization provides an important mechanism for encouraging pro-
poor targeting.  
 To preface the theory, I argue that local politicians— with discretion over the 
allocation of selective benefits— are incentivized to target poor villagers through social 
and democratic mechanisms. First, I argue that in a village setting where local politicians 
and voters know each other, and the selection of beneficiaries is observable, a social 
norm to target selective benefits to the poor constrains the former’s choices over 
beneficiaries. In this context, they face significant costs for targeting selective benefits to 
the non-poor, including violence, a loss of support for their party in local and state 
elections, and reputational costs that can threaten career opportunities after they leave 
elective office. Following from this norm, villagers judge the acceptability of targeting on 
whether local politicians predominantly target the poor.   
 Second, I expect sarpanch to target selective benefits to those whom they perceive 
supported them in the previous local election. This is consistent with the logic of 
democratic accountability (Przeworski et al. 1999; Cox and McCubbins 1986). Villagers 
see discrimination in the allocation of selective benefits along these lines as legitimate 
because anyone can become a supporter by simply voting for a politician in local 
elections, and local elections are fought over which candidate’s supporters will gain 
privileged access to these benefits.
92
 This is importantly not the case for co-ethnicity, 
which can be a source of permanent exclusion (Fearon 1999; Posner 2005). Given social 
pressure to target the poor through the pro-poor targeting norm, I show that political 
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 In contexts where competition concerns selective implementation of policy (outputs) rather than 
competition over programs (inputs), I view selective targeting toward one’s coalition of support as evidence 
of responsiveness to local electorates consistent with democratic accountability.   
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targeting—when local politicians have full discretion and selective benefits are 
observable— results in substantial pro-poor targeting.  
 I test my theory with a unique behavioral measure, distributive preferences, which 
isolates village council (gram panchayat) presidents’ (sarpanch) baseline preferences over 
the selection of beneficiaries free from bureaucratic constraints and the influence of 
politicians above the village level. This measure is based on a lottery conducted in 95 
gram panchayats (GPs) across rural Rajasthan. The lottery was embedded in the elite 
survey; each sarpanch was asked directly about randomly sampled heads of household 
(sampled in the voter survey) who reside in their GP. I asked sarpanch to allocate five 
tokens among ten voter survey respondents and told them that each token would increase 
the chance a particular voter would win a 200 rupee ($3.65 USD) cash prize— 
approximately equivalent to one day of agricultural daily wage labor. Token allocation 
was kept anonymous; however, lottery prizes were public, which means voters can 
observe the lottery winner and trace selection back to the sarpanch. This is similarly the 
case for allocation of housing subsidies and below poverty line (BPL) cards, which 
determine eligibility to a broad range of subsidies through India’s public distribution 
system (PDS). I see this measure as a lower bound measure of targeting preferences 
because it was low value and sarpanch had full discretion over who should receive the 
benefit. Even in this case, mechanisms of social and electoral accountability powerfully 
shaped allocation. 
 This paper makes three contributions. First, I contribute to political economy 
literature on the allocation of selective (i.e. household) state anti-poverty benefits 
implemented by local governments. A central concern in this research is that when 
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discretion over distribution is decentralized, local politicians will allocate benefits to 
themselves, their family members, or the non-poor who have influence over local policy 
implementation that the poor lack (Bardhan and Mookherjee 2000, 2006; Besley et al. 
2004, 2005). I contribute to this research in two ways. First, I develop a theory that 
explains why targeting selective benefits to supporters is consistent with the logic of 
democratic accountability where state capacity is too weak to ensure (unbiased) 
programmatic distribution. I also contribute by developing a behavioral measure, 
distributive preferences, which captures how local politicians allocate selective benefits 
when they are not constrained by state institutions or politicians outside the village. 
Unlike work that uses data on final allocations of policy benefits to infer local politicians’ 
preference—despite their limited discretion over this outcome— my measure captures 
what the allocation of selective benefits would look like if local politicians possessed 
complete discretion over the selection of beneficiaries. 
 Second, I contribute to recent research on the distributive effects of partisanship at 
the local level. Building on work that focuses on the distributive strategies of local 
brokers (Stokes et al. 2013) and partisan targeting at the local level (Calvo and Murillo 
2013; Dunning and Nilekani 2013), the behavioral measure allows me to test the relative 
salience of open ties (such as electoral support and co-partisanship) and closed ties (such 
as co-ethnicity). Contrary to the predictions of existing theory, I find that partisanship is a 
much more powerful predictor of distributive preferences than co-ethnicity (Besley et al. 
2004; Chandra 2004; Posner 2005). My theory provides a mechanism to explain why this 
is the case.  Third, this is the first paper to my knowledge that addresses issues of 
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statistical dependence and attributes of the pool of potential receivers in behavioral 
measures of this form.    
 This paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, I situate the paper in three literatures: 
decentralization, patronage politics, and democratic accountability. In section 3, I lay out 
the theory. In section 4, I describe the context of my study: Rajasthan, India. In section 5, 
I describe the design of the survey in which the lottery measure is embedded. In section 
6, I explain the design of the lottery measure. I present empirical results in section 7.  
 
2. Developing a Theory of Targeted Distribution Under Decentralization 
  
 It is increasingly common for central and state governments in developing 
countries to delegate the implementation of anti-poverty policies to local governments 
(Treisman 2007; Galasso and Ravillion 2005; Crook and Manor 1998). The debate over 
the relative benefits of decentralized targeting—relative to centralized targeting— 
concerns whether granting local politicians discretion over the selection of beneficiaries 
to these programs will increase the chance that these programs reach the poor or place the 
poor at a further disadvantage. In an influential statement on the matter, Bardhan and 
Mookerjee (2000) argue that while decentralization has accountability and informational 
advantages, the risk of capture of policy benefits by local elites— particularly in areas of 
high economic and social inequality—introduces informal mechanisms that undermine 
accountability toward the poor (See Crook and Manor 1998). In a developing country like 
India where the central state lacks capacity to reach the poor or effectively monitor local 
bureaucrats involved in policy implementation, however, progressive preferences under 
centralization may be of limited practical value (See Niehaus and Sukhtankar 2013; 
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Galasso and Ravillion 2005). In this setting, alternative mechanisms of accountability are 
required, which are binding at the implementation stage.   
 
2.1 Decentralization and Local Accountability  
 Decentralization has clear accountability advantages that encourage pro-poor 
targeting even where the state is weak. First, decentralization gives voters the ability to 
hold local representatives involved in allocation of policy benefits accountable in local 
elections. While corruption in the targeting of anti-poverty benefits in any one village has 
minimal consequences for re-election rates under centralization, voters have a chance to 
punish bad behavior by voting against the local incumbent politician (or his party) under 
decentralized targeting. This incentivizes local politicians and their parties to target poor 
citizens whose vote preferences are most responsive to selective anti-poverty benefits 
(Seabright 1996; Tommasi and Weinschelbaum 1999). Second, local politicians—and 
villagers in general— possess nuanced information on the socio-economic status of 
citizens in their localities (Alderman 2002; Krishna 2011; Alatas et al. 2010, 2013). In 
this regard, local elites are better at identifying the extreme poor than centralized methods 
that depend on government-administered poverty censuses (Alatas et al. 2010; Banerjee 
et al. 2011).
93
 Third, decentralization creates a layer of local representatives who are 
accessible to the poor. Bussell (2011) and Kruks-Wisner (2013) both find that voters 
contact sarpanch more than any other representative, and provide an essential point of 
contact for the poor in particular.
94
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 If democratic accountability shapes their behavior, local politicians have incentives to use this 
information when they select beneficiaries to government programs (See Bardhan 2002). 
 
94
 This provides an important avenue through which the poor can obtain information on government 
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 Research on elite capture accepts the informational and formal accountability 
benefits of decentralization, but argues that where local elites dominate village politics—
in contexts of inequality—the poor lack the means to hold local elites accountable 
(Bardhan and Mookherjee 2000, 2006; Bardhan 2002). If local accountability 
mechanisms vis-à-vis the poor are weak, we may broadly expect local politicians to 
pursue targeting strategies that exclude the poor and the public welfare more broadly 
(Golden and Min 2013). Examples of this include rent-seeking in which politicians 
capture selective benefits for themselves (Besley et al. 2005); co-ethnic targeting in 
which an ethnic minority receives a disproportionate share of the benefits (Chandra 2004; 
Pande 2003); and targeting along kinship lines. At the core of this latter research is the 
expectation that the democratic accountability principle will not hold when informal 
power dynamics are taken into account. I argue that while elite capture is an important 
concern in a minority of cases of extreme inequality, local politicians by-in-large face 
pressures to target selective benefits in less exclusionary ways than the thrust of this 
literature suggests (See Alatas et al. 2013).  
 
2.2 Democratic Accountability and Democratic Practice in Village Politics  
 Research on democratic accountability is centered on a moral hazard problem. 
Politicians are agents of voters (principals) who elect them, but have private preferences 
that diverge from those of their constituents. While divergent preferences are natural, this 
is problematic because informational asymmetries are such that principals cannot 
effectively monitor their agents, and elections that occur every several years are too blunt 
                                                                                                                                                                     
programs and complain when services are not provided, which should positively impact their chance of 
receiving selective benefits. 
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to ensure that politicians do not shirk in office. When principals can monitor their agents 
with full information and there are costs to shirking, the expectation is that politicians 
follow through on their promises to voters. Under this more robust informational 
environment, democratic accountability should compel elected politicians or parties to 
represent members of their electoral coalition (Cox and McCubbins 1986; Diaz-Cayeros 
et al. 2012). Going back to Downs (1957), the expectation is that parties (or politicians) 
make promises that will garner a minimum winning coalition, and then deliver on their 
promises to their coalition of supporters. I argue that the logic of democratic 
accountability applies to programmatic as will as non-programmatic distribution.  
 The allocation of selective benefits by local governments in developing countries 
has distinctive contextual and informational features that support this view. First, local 
competition surrounds the implementation of policies designed at higher levels of 
government rather than competition over policy programs. This means that voters choose 
which candidate they think will bias policy benefits in a way that benefits them the most 
(See Dunning and Nilekani 2013; Besley et al. 2004). This is reasonable in a context 
where the state lacks the capacity to ensure that policy benefits will reach their intended 
beneficiaries according to passed legislation (Barenschot 2011; Krishna 2011). In India, 
for example, problems of bureaucratic corruption (Chhibber and Ostermann 2013), 
limited bureaucratic reach (See Krishna 2011; Krishna and Schoeber 2014), and poorly 
trained staff means that local politicians have non-trivial power over allocation. In this 
setting, voters distinguish candidates on their promises over allocation of selective 
benefits and evaluate representation in terms of whether or not the elected politician they 
voted for delivered on their promises.  
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 Second, local politics takes place in a high-information environment. First, local 
politicians overwhelmingly know voters in their localities and vice versa, and villages 
tend to have stable populations with paternal lineages that go back centuries.
95
 To 
illustrate this point, sarpanch reported to personally know 98 percent of voters in my 
data.
96
 This means that villagers and sarpanch have established a long history of social 
interaction. Second, villagers and politicians both know who is poor. Third, the allocation 
of targeted benefits is directly or indirectly observable. For example, in rural India, the 
list of households allocated BPL cards is generally written on the walls of local 
government buildings. For another example, the Indira Awas Yojana Housing Program, 
which funds repairs or new housing construction for the poor, requires the installation of 
a permanent sign on the front of beneficiaries’ houses. Outside of this extreme, villages 
are high-information contexts where information on salient matters such as the allocation 
of anti-poverty benefits travels quickly. It is unlikely that allocation of such selective, 
visible benefits can occur without a large share of villagers knowing about it in a short 
period of time.
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 Fourth, voters in my context—and I expect many others— know who 
has discretion over the selection of beneficiaries for these benefits and local politicians 
know that they will be held accountable for targeting outcomes.
98
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 Women tend to marry men from outside their villages and move to their villages.  
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 In the full sample of 95 GPs where sarpanch and voter surveys could be completed, sarpanch knew 95 
percent of respondents. In the 84 GPs I analyze in this paper, sarpanch reported to know 98 percent of 
respondents.   
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 This means that if local politicians want to enrich themselves or their relatives they should do so in less 
visible ways such as skimming from poor beneficiaries rather than by visibly targeting the non-poor.   
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 Even though sarpanch have limited discretion, they are the most accessible of those with some amount of 
discretion and should behave knowing that this is the case.   
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 Returning to the democratic accountability framework, local politicians with 
discretion of the allocation of selection benefits operate in a context that closely 
approximates full information for this class of benefits. Given a range of social and 
political mechanisms to hold politicians accountable, they have incentive to target 
benefits broadly to their coalition of supporters rather than be perceived to target benefits 
narrowly to those closest to them. I discuss this in more depth in the theory that follows.  
 
2.3 Implications for Debates in Distributive Politics 
 The characteristics of decentralized targeting of selective benefits have 
implications for two important debates in comparative politics. The first debate addresses 
the question of whether parties favor core supporters or swing voters. This comprises two 
opposing theoretical models that begin from the premise that parties promise a fixed 
amount of goods to groups in exchange for their votes. Voters’ political characteristics 
are of three types: core voters (partisan base voters), opposition voters (i.e. core voters of 
the opposing party), and swing voters who are indifferent across parties and vote for the 
party that offers the most material benefits. One set of models in this debate predicts that 
parties will target selective benefits to core voters. This has several rationales including 
turnout mobilization (Nichter 2008), minimizing waste through the informational 
advantages of local partisan networks (Calvo and Murillo 2013), stabilizing coalitions of 
support (Diaz-Cayeros et al. 2012), or simply because parties prefer to target supporters 
whenever possible (Cox and McCubbins 1986; Vaishnav and Sircar 2012; Ansolabehere 
and Snyder 2006). On the other side of this debate are models that predict swing targeting 
(Lindbeck and Weibull 1987; Dixit and Londregan 1996; Stokes 2005). The logic of 
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these models is that core supporters will vote for the party they prefer most regardless of 
targeted distribution. Therefore, it is most efficient to target indifferent voters whose 
votes are easiest to buy. This paper is most sympathetic with core targeting; however, my 
logic suggests that politicians may weigh concerns of legitimacy in allocation over 
ensuring efficient targeting through network-mediated distribution (Calvo and Murillo 
2013).  
 A second line of inquiry concerns whether the allocation of selective benefits is 
conditioned on partisan or ethnic characteristics. At the outset, scholarship suggests that 
ethnic favoritism is likely in ethnically diverse settings where political competition 
surrounds targeted distribution (e.g. pork and selective benefits) because partisan 
targeting is susceptible to over-sized coalitions (Chhibber and Nooruddin 2004; Fearon 
1999). Similarly, a group of papers explicitly assume that politicians have preferences to 
target co-ethnics (Chandra 2004; Pande 2003; Besley et al. 2004, 2012).
99
 Contrary to 
this work, recent research suggests that incentives to cultivate political majorities trump 
preferences over co-ethnic targeting (Dunning and Nilekani 2013; Jensenius 2013). This 
paper contributes to this discussion by providing a mechanism for why the social context 
of village politics dis-incentivizes a targeting principle that permanently excludes the vast 
majority of voters. I lay out the argument in the next section.  
3.  A Theory of Distributive Preferences Under Local Discretion  
 
 In this section, I develop a theory of the distributive preferences of local 
politicians over the targeting of private selective benefits (e.g. conditional cash transfers, 
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 Bardhan and Mookherjee (2012) also expect local politicians to possess co-ethnic targeting preferences 
even if constraints prevent them from acting on these preferences in practice (under certain conditions).  
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subsidized food). I focus on private or selective benefits because local politicians in my 
context have discretion over the targeting of these benefits, and may use their discretion 
to target villagers according to characteristics other than eligibility criteria in settings of 
non-programmatic distribution (See Besley et al. 2005; Bardhan and Mookherjee 2006). 
Distribution in the context described above is distinct because voters have full 
information and personal, routine access to politicians (Kruks-Wisner 2013).
100
 This 
means that local politicians are concerned with avoiding a backlash or reputational 
damage as will as maintaining political support for himself and his party. The theory 
presents a social and political logic for political targeting for the situation in which 
village politicians have discretion over allocation of these benefits.   
 
3.1 Pro-Poor Targeting and Local Social Norms 
 
 Following from the features of local distribution, local politicians are sensitive to 
ensuring that the village community perceives their choices over targeting as legitimate. 
While villagers tolerate some degree of self-enrichment through less visible forms of 
corruption,
101
 I argue that villagers evaluate allocations of observable anti-poverty 
benefits according to whether benefits were predominantly targeted to those who need 
them the most: the poor.
102
 Following from Scott’s (1977, 1985) norm of subsistence— 
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 This is a different informational context than is the case in many agency models that focus on 
informational asymmetries between principals and agents (See Ferejohn 1986; Przeworski et al. 1999). The 
close proximity between politicians and voters in this context provides villagers with a wider menu of 
mechanisms to hold politicians accountable.  
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 For example, it is common knowledge that sarpanch (along with bureaucrats and other politicians) skim 
state funds for local infrastructure projects. Detection of rent-seeking of this form requires greater 
investment in monitoring than the observable selective benefits I discuss.  
 
102
 Besley et al. (2005) see rent-seeking in the allocation of Below Poverty Line (BPL) cards as a 
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in which landlords and tenants understand that the former’s interest in maximizing 
revenues cannot threaten the latter’s physical survival— I argue that local politicians are 
constrained by a social norm to target selective anti-poverty benefits to the poor.  
 Sarpanch face important costs for allocating anti-poverty benefits to villagers who 
are clearly ineligible for these programs or allocating benefits to those known to be close 
to them through, for example, ties of kinship, friendship, or ethnicity. First, sarpanch may 
be physically beaten by local elites or poor villagers themselves (Baviskar and Matthew 
2009). Second, violations of this norm may lead to a loss of support for the sarpanch’s 
party in local and state elections (Bohlken 2013). As many sarpanch function as brokers 
to state politicians, this can negatively affect the careers ambitious of sarpanch and affect 
them financially as well. This may also cause a variety of punishments by local party 
leaders who exert considerable influence and control over sarpanch (See for example 
Inbanathan 2000). Third, sarpanch often move onto lucrative careers as contractors or 
fixers who mobilize labor for state infrastructure projects and mobilize voters for 
politicians. These jobs are granted to local leaders with substantially large local networks 
of support. If sarpanch violate the pro-poor targeting norm, the their level of local support 
is likely to decline, which reduces their chances of obtaining these jobs. Finally, in a 
setting in which sarpanch rarely hold office for more than one term but reside in the 
village permanently,
103
 violating this norm can carry long-term reputational costs that 
affect social relations between members of the local community and sarpanch as will as 
their families. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
behavioral measure of low politician quality.   
 
103
 They also have family reputations to protect that have been developed over generations.  
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 In short, I expect the constraints that characterize gram panchayat politics to 
incentivize sarpanch to target the poor even if they prefer to do otherwise (Scott 1977; 
Bardhan and Mookherjee 2006; Mookherjee 2014). Consistent with my view, Alatas et 
al. (2013) found minimal evidence in Indonesia of elite capture in the form of targeting 
family members when programs were limited to the poorest 5 percent of households in 
the village. Rent-seeking only increased moderately when programs included the poorest 
40 percent of households when the families of local elites could plausibly pass as eligible 
for the conditional cash transfer program. Although this norm is unlikely to be perfectly 
applied (See Besley et al. 2005), village politicians face clear costs for targeting selective 
benefits in a way that their rural communities perceive as broadly illegitimate and anti-
poor.   
3.2 Targeting Supporters and the Logic of Democratic Accountability   
 
 In line with my emphasis on the perception of legitimate targeting among 
villagers, I argue that local politicians will use their discretion over the allocation of 
selective benefits to favor those they perceive to have voted for them (supporters) over 
those they believe did not vote for them (non-supporters). I argue that villagers perceive 
favoritism along these lines as legitimate because it is consistent with democratic 
accountability in a context of selective local implementation of policies designed at 
higher levels of government (See Przeworski et al. 1999; Cox and McCubbins 1986). In 
this setting, rather than politicians proposing programmatic policies, they make promises 
over whom they will favor in the allocation of selective benefits (See Fearon 1999; 
Chandra 2004).
104
 If elected, supporters expect the sarpanch to deliver on their promises, 
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 They also make promises over club goods, which is beyond the purview of this paper. 
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subject to constraints. Adapted to non-programmatic distribution, this follows the basic 
logic of democratic accountability (Cox and McCubbins 1986; Przeworski et al. 1999; 
Crisp and Desposato 2004; See also Vaishnav and Sircar 2012). In my setting, voters 
expect and accept that supporters of the winner will be prioritized over the allocation of 
selective benefits.  
 Moreover, I argue that villagers consider targeting according to the democratic 
accountability principle (favoritism toward supporters) as legitimate because, unlike the 
case with co-ethnic targeting, any voter can opt in to become a supporter of a sarpanch or 
his party. There are two levels of political affiliation. At minimum, voters can vote for a 
local politician in elections or pass as supporters. Given that sarpanch do not perform 
well at identifying voters’ political preferences (See Schneider 2014), this first step 
simply requires voters to convince local politicians that they plausibly voted for the 
sarpanch.
105
 Integration into a sarpanch’s partisan network represents a second, 
substantially closer, political relationship than the perception of electoral support. This 
involves routine interaction with a sarpanch and other co-partisan politicians and 
activists, and often involves an exchange of political and other favors and dense 
information flows between voters and sarpanch (Auyero 2001; Szwarcberg 2010; Calvo 
and Murillo 2013; See also Krishna 2007).
106
 Any voter can also opt into partisan 
networks in the short to medium run, although this requires a greater investment in effort 
on the part of voters compared to voting alone. 
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 In my data sarpanch identified a supermajority of randomly sampled voters as supporters. This is 




 To demonstrate the information differences between voters and voters integrated into co-partisan 
networks, consider that sarpanch correctly identified the partisan preferences of co-partisan supporters 83 
percent of the time as compared to 64 percent for those perceived as supporters.    
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 The openness that characterizes political affiliation as described above does not 
hold for co-ethnic targeting. A defining characteristic of ethnic identity is that 
membership change does not occur in the short to medium run (See Posner 2005; 
Chandra 2014; Fearon 1999).
107
 Returning to my emphasis on the importance of popular 
legitimacy in the allocation of selective benefits, targeting bias on a principle of ethnic 
favoritism excludes a fixed majority. When sarpanch use their discretion over the 
allocation of selective benefits to favor those with even smaller group memberships (e.g. 
kinship), exclusion applies to an even larger share of the local population. In short, I 
argue that villagers consider targeting bias toward supporters to be legitimate, while they 
consider targeting toward groups with fixed boundaries illegitimate. 
 Finally, the democratic accountability principle is legitimate due to its openness 
and inclusiveness.
108
 This requires one important nuance. In the case where sarpanch 
have low levels of support, targeting supporters exclusively will lack legitimacy because 
it will lead to exclusion of a super-majority of villagers. For example, we should expect a 
backlash if a sarpanch who won a multi-candidate election with 20 percent of the vote 
overwhelmingly targeted supporters because the broad legitimacy of targeting members 
of a majoritarian coalition according to the democratic principle would not obtain. In this 
case, I expect sarpanch to target non-supporters as well as supporters. Taking the pro-
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 Taking constructivist notions of identity change into account, ethnic boundary change is at minimum 
restricted to those with shared descent-based attributes (See Chandra and Wilkinson 2008). This means that 
boundaries are fixed in the short to medium run.  
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 Recall that sarpanch on average believed that a super-majority of sampled voters voted for them, which 
exceeds their plausible vote share. This suggests that targeting according to the democratic accountability 
principle excludes certain non-supporters, but is sufficiently broad to include all plausible or potential 
supporters.    
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poor targeting norm into account, this means that more poor non-supporters will receive 
selective benefits in contexts where support is low.     
 To summarize, my theory suggests that the allocation of observable selective 
benefits will be targeted to poor supporters in a context of democratic decentralization 
where village politicians have substantial discretion over the allocation of these benefits 
(See Bardhan and Mookherjee 2006; Alatas et al. 2013). In a local context where there 
are social and political costs to illegitimate allocation of these benefits, I expect to see 
pro-poor targeting and the targeting of supporters according to the democratic 
accountability principle. The theory suggests that this class of benefits is more likely to 
reach the poor when local politicians have this discretion than would be the case under 
centralized distribution where the social and political features of local distribution do not 
apply.  
 
3.4 Scope Conditions  
 My theory applies to distributive preferences where allocation has the 
characteristics outlined in section 2.2. I do not address two related issues. First, I do not 
address politicians’ choices over the mix of policy benefits (Bardhan and Mookerjee 
2012; See also Kramon and Posner 2013). I do not explain whether sarpanch use their 
discretion to select a mix of benefits that favors the non-poor (relative to the poor) as a 
result of local elite capture. Second, my theory does not provide clean predictions on 
policy outcomes. Rather, this paper is motivated by skepticism toward inferring local 
politicians’ preferences and strategies from policy outcomes. In the Indian context, even 
programs that formally grant significant discretion to local governments are the result of 
numerous factors beyond the control of local politicians. Finally, this theory does not 
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apply to all types of rent-seeking. For example, one implication of my theory is that local 
politicians who wish to enrich themselves should engage in strategies of corruption that 
are more difficult to observe such as skimming a fraction of benefits allocated to the poor 
or state funds for infrastructure projects. There is substantial evidence that they do so 
(Niehaus and Sukhtanka 2013; Olken 2005).   
 
4. The Case of India 
 
 I situate this study in rural India and in the northwestern Indian state of Rajasthan 
specifically. In this section, I provide background on the demographics and politics of 
Rajasthan, India’s local government system (panchayat raj), and role that sarpanch play 
in the selection of beneficiaries for federal and state anti-poverty programs. 
4.1 The Politics of Rajasthan   
 
 Rajasthan is a compelling case to test theories of targeted distribution. First, it is a 
predominantly rural state where poverty is pervasive. According to estimates based on 
consumption data from the 2004-5 National Sample Survey, Rajasthan has a rural 
poverty rate of 19 percent, which is just below the 22.5 percent average for Indian states 
and substantially below the 29 percent all-India rural poverty rate (Dev and Ravi 
2007).
109
 Anti-poverty programs are likely to be salient among villagers in this context. 
Rajasthan also has a strict budget constraint on the provision of selective benefits relative 
to comparatively richer South Indian states such as Karnataka, which means that 
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 This takes into account the 17 most populous states.  
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exclusion of a large share of benefit-seekers is a routine matter for Rajasthan’s gram 
panchayats (See Dunning and Nilekani 2013). 
 Second, scholarship on India establishes its politics as patronage-based (Chandra 
2004; 2014; Wilkinson 2007; Stokes et al. 2013; See also Berenschot 2011). Chandra 
(2004, 2011) defines India as a “patronage democracy” characterized by a dominant state 
sector that controls primary avenues to upward mobility and survival and discretion over 
provision of jobs and services.
110
 Moreover, Chhibber and Osterman (2013) see the 




 Third, Rajasthan is politically competitive with a 2-party system that has 
alternated between the BJP and Congress Party in every state assembly election cycle 
since 1993. Across five elections that have taken place at the time of writing, three had 
overall margins of victory in terms of vote share below 4 percent.
112
 Moving down to 
variation across state assembly constituencies, the average margin of victory across 
Rajasthan legislative assembly constituencies in 2003 and 2008 was 8.7 and 8.9 percent 
respectively.
113
 Fourth, Rajasthan’s party system is institutionalized, although its local 
party organizations are weak as is the case for parties throughout India— with the 
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 This takes into account reforms that liberalized the Indian economy and reduced the size of the state. 
Chandra finds that the state sector currently retains dominance as a source of jobs, benefits, and services, 
particularly for the rural poor.  
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 This is consistent with work conducted in Rajasthan by Kruks-Wisner (2013) who finds that Indian 
citizens with more diverse connections are more likely to engage with state office holders, and Krishna 
(2007) who argue that the emergence of local fixers with connection to politicians and bureaucrats have 
become a critical resource for the poor who help citizens seek entitlements and state services they could not 
otherwise access (See also Manor 2000). Politicians covet these fixers who they believe can deliver the 
votes of their supporters during elections.   
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 In 1998 and 2012 the Congress Party and BJP won by 12% of the vote, respectively.    
 
113
 For an alternative summary measure, the median margin of the vote in 2008 was 6.6%. 
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exception of left parties in West Bengal and Kerala (Lodha 2009; Krishna 2007; Kruks-
Wisner 2013; Kohli 1990). Chhibber and Nooruddin (2004) and Heath (2005) place 
Rajasthan in the bottom third among major states for their respective measures of 
electoral volatility. This is moderate compared to state elections in Tamil Nadu and 
Andhra Pradesh where anti-incumbent swings as large as 30 percent are common.  
 Finally, research suggests that ethnicity—particularly caste— is highly salient in 
Rajasthani village life. For example, Chauchard (2014) documents the discriminatory 
nature of interactions between dominant and scheduled castes in Rajasthan and caste 
relations in the state are understood to remain feudal — relative to neighboring Uttar 
Pradesh in the north where lower caste parties have been more successful or southern 
states where the history of social movements of lower caste empowerment preceded 
independence (See Chandra 2004; Ahuja 2008). Thus, Rajasthan provides a case where 
we may expect sarpanch to hold targeting preferences toward co-ethnics who are likely to 
live in their neighborhoods. In sum, Rajasthan is a context of moderate poverty, intense 
but institutionalized electoral competition, politically salient ethnicity, and electoral 
uncertainty at the state and constituency levels. This makes Rajasthan a typical case for 
the identification of the distributive preferences of local politicians in India where inter-
party competition is robust at the local level. 
 
4.2. Targeted Distribution through Gram Panchayats in India 
 In India, anti-poverty programs designed and funded by state and federal 
governments are on a massive scale. For example, in the 2008-9 federal budget, 27 
federal schemes had a collective budget of 790,000 crores or 79 billion Indian rupees 
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(Kapur et al. 2008). The predominant share of selective anti-poverty benefits are 
allocated through the Public Distribution System (PDS), which oversees a wide range of 
subsidies from cooking oil to healthcare, and the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural 
Employment Guarantee program (MGNREGA), which guarantees 100 hours of paid 
labor (on government infrastructure projects) to all Indian citizens. Important for my 
purposes, the lowest tier of local government in rural India, gram panchayats, do not have 
discretion over how funds for these schemes are spent (See Devarajan et al. 2009), but 
play a significant, yet limited, role in selecting beneficiaries to these programs at the 
implementation stage (Besley et al. 2012; Dunning and Nilekani 2013). 
 To illustrate this, consider the allocation of below poverty line (BPL) cards, which 
involve gram panchayats in several ways. First, the BPL Census, which determines 
household eligibility for PDS programs as a function of assets and consumption, is 
implemented by the GP. Generally the sarpanch and local bureaucrats select the 
surveyors and manage the census. Although official procedures call for a progressive 
allocation of BPL cards, a recent study conducted in the state of Karnataka suggests that 
many villagers were not interviewed for the BPL survey and that the list of BPL 
households is rarely vetted, as required, in village meetings (Niehaus et al. 2009).
114
 This 
suggests that sarpanch have room to use their discretion over the selection of 
beneficiaries. Second, sarpanch and the GP secretary (a low-level bureaucrat) ‘officially’ 
must bring the results of the BPL survey to a gram panchayat-wide public meeting (gram 
sabha) for vetting of the list of BPL households, although the extent to which the BPL list 
comes up in these meeting is quite variable (Besley et al. 2005; Niehaus et al. 2011). 
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 Besley et al. (2012) find that voters overwhelmingly do not believe BPL card allocations are determined 
in gram sabhas. 
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Third, sarpanch often function as brokers to higher-level politicians, who can affect the 
allocation of selective policy benefits through their connections to politicians and 
bureaucrats beyond the village. In summary, understanding sarpanch’s distributive 
preferences has clear policy implications. 
4.3 Institutional Background: Gram Panchayat and Panchayat Raj in India 
 
Local elites surveyed for this project are elected gram panchayat presidents or 
sarpanch. Sarpanch are directly elected and there are 750 households on average (in my 
data) in a given GP.
115
 The gram panchayat is the lowest tier of India’s three-tier local 
government (or Panchayat Raj) system below elected bodies at the District (zilla 
parishad) and sub-district or block (Panchayat Samiti) levels.
116
 The panchayat raj system 
existed in some form prior to independence; however, the 73
rd
 amendment to the Indian 
constitution passed in 1993 gave the Panchayat Raj system constitutional status and 
imposed federal requirements for elections of panchayat members, further integration of 
local government and government development functions, and quotas for women and 
marginal groups: scheduled castes, scheduled tribes, and other backward castes.
117
 
Eligibility status based on these quotas rotates with each new election cycle, which makes 
it is unlikely that the same politician will be eligible for re-election (See Dunning and 
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 GP boundaries are based on population and consist of one large village or as many as 35 smaller 
villages. GPs in Rajasthan modally have populations below 3,000 people according to Rajasthan 
Government population estimates from 2000. See: http://www.rajsec.rajasthan.gov.in/secraj/pan_partA-
3.htm. In my survey data, there are 750 households per GP on average.  
 
116
 Gram panchayat boundaries are based on administrative units and are not perfectly nested within 
electoral districts. However, in this study, all the GPs sampled from a selected block reside within one state 
assembly constituency.  
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 Figures on marginal group quotas in Rajasthan from 2008 show that 21, 18, and 42 percent of elected 
seats were reserved for scheduled castes, scheduled tribes, and other backward castes respectively. 
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Nilekani 2013). This creates high turnover as can be seen by the large number of first-
term sarpanch in the elite survey sample.  
Unlike the case for elections at higher levels of government, party symbols are not 
permitted on the ballot in elections to the GP. Parties have nonetheless penetrated the GP 
(Dunning and Nilekani 2013; Yadav and Palshikar 2008). They use the GP as a recruiting 
tool, GP politicians depend on partisan politicians such as MLAs and representatives of 
the higher tiers of the Panchayat Raj for funds for pork projects, and sarpanch often serve 
as middlemen to higher-level politicians. Voters are also aware of GP politicians’ partisan 
affiliations: 82 percent of voters in Karnataka and 96 percent in Rajasthan correctly 
identified the party of the GP President according to a 2012 survey Thad Dunning carried 
out in the state (Dunning and Nilekani 2013). Moreover, limited decentralization of 
decision-making and resources means that state government and state politicians exert 
substantial control over the allocation of resources for distributive policy; this leaves 
sarpanch—like middlemen broadly—dependent on higher-level partisan patrons.   
 
5. Sampling  
 
 My lottery measure of distributive preferences was embedded in cross-referenced 
elite and voter surveys conducted in Rajasthan from January to February 2013. The voter 
survey included questions on political and social ties to politicians interviewed in the elite 
survey and a battery of questions on political participation, political characteristics, 
access to targeted benefits and demographics. The elite survey, conducted the day after 
the voter survey in each GP, includes items on sarpanch characteristics such as political 
experience and family political ties, career characteristics, ties to higher level elites, 
 117 
demographics, and questions on the political preferences of sampled voters. I measured 
distributive preferences in the elite survey prior to any questions on the political 
characteristics of sarpanch and questions on sarpanch perceptions of voters’ partisan 
preferences. In this section, I describe the survey sampling design. 
 The survey sampled 96 gram panchayats in seven districts, twelve blocks and six 
of Rajasthan’s seven administrative divisions.
118
 I restrict the sample to 84 gram 
panchayats due to non-response and coding errors.
119
 Descriptive statistics do not 
significantly change when this restriction from the full dataset is applied. The sample 
generalizes to voters and GP politicians in rural contexts with a moderately high share of 
households below the poverty line and inter-party competition.  
 To build the sample frame for this population, I used 2001 census data on the 
rural composition of blocks,
120
 data from the Government of Rajasthan on the share of 
below poverty line (BPL) households across blocks in 2001, and Election Commission 
data on political competition in panchayat samiti elections—the tier of the panchayat raj 
system above gram panchayats, which aligns with administrative blocks.
121
 The sample 
of blocks was restricted to those with a 75 percent rural population according to the 2001 
census to reduce the chance of sampling GPs that function as suburbs; I also excluded 
blocks with less than 20 percent of households in the BPL category in 2001 to ensure that 
the chance of sampling BPL households at random was non-trivial. I also excluded 
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 Rajasthan has 33 districts, 249 blocks, 7 administrative divisions, and 9177 gram panchayats in all. 
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 The statistical requirement that each gram panchayat had exactly 5 tokens distributed requires this 
restriction to my sample size. This does not change the characteristics of the sample.   
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 Government data on the share of BPL households across gram panchayats was from 2001. More recent 
data was not available at the time of fieldwork in 2012-13.  
 
121
 This is the lowest level of aggregation at which election commission data is available from a central 
source and the lowest level that permits party symbols on the ballot. 
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blocks where the median margin of victory across Panchayat Samiti ward elections was 
greater than 15 percent to increase the chance that competitive GPs were selected.
122
 
After this restriction was applied, approximately 60 of 249 blocks were eligible for 
sampling. Logistical concerns required that I sample two blocks in each district to the 
extent possible. This reduced the list to approximately 50 blocks. I randomly sampled one 
district in 5 of Rajasthan’s seven divisions from a pool of districts in which three or more 
blocks were eligible for sampling according to these criteria. Two blocks were randomly 
selected from the pool of eligible blocks in each district. In Udaipur, the sixth division 
selected, three eligible blocks did not exist in any one district; As a practical alternative, I 
randomly selected one block each from two neighboring districts in the division: Udaipur 
and Rajsamand.   
 Once 12 blocks were sampled, data on political competition across gram 
panchayats was collected through interviews.
123
 Members of the research team 
interviewed block party presidents—party organizers immersed in the politics of gram 
panchayats in their block— who were asked to characterize the level of competition 
between Congress and the BJP as non-competitive, somewhat competitive, or very 
competitive. Of the 452 GPs in 12 sampled blocks, 180 were described as non-
competitive, 133 as somewhat competitive, and 139 as very competitive. To increase the 
chance that the target population would be sampled, given resource constraints, non-
competitive GPs were dropped from the pool for sampling. In each block, 4 GPs among 
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 Each member of this block-level legislative body is elected from one single member ward and elected 
according to a first past the post electoral rule. I use the median margin of victory across ward election in 
each panchayat samiti as gram panchayat electoral data could not be obtained. 
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 This was necessary because electoral commission data on gram panchayat elections is not available 
from a centralized source. 
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those coded as somewhat competitive and very competitive were randomly sampled. 
Then, one ward in each sampled GP was randomly selected. Households were randomly 
sampled (with replacement) using the gram panchayat voters list, which is public 
information provided by the Election Commission.
124
 I sampled (predominantly male) 
heads of household in randomly sampled households because they are generally the 
household member most engaged in village politics and citizen-state relations.
125
 The 
elite survey was fielded the day after the vote survey was completed in a given GP. I 
illustrate the steps for sampling in figure 3 below, and provide descriptive statistics on 
elite and voter survey sample in tables A1 and A2 of the appendix.  
 
6. Identification of Distributive Preferences 
 
 To identify local politicians’ unconstrained distributive preferences, I embedded a 
lottery with a 200 Indian Rupee ($3.64 USD) cash prize in a survey of sarpanch. Elite 
respondents were shown a page with photos and names for 10 randomly sampled voters, 
which I obtained from publicly available voters lists. I gave sarpanch 5 tokens and told 
them to allocate them in any denomination they wished across 10 villagers on the page. 
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 This was done because the elite survey samples one ward member in each GP for analysis not included 
in this paper. To analyze ward member-voter ties, all sampled voters must live in one GP member’s ward. 
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 To identify heads of household, interviewers were instructed to request to speak to the head of 
household upon approaching each sampled household. If heads of household were not at home, 
interviewers were instructors to either interview them in the fields in which many of them worked or to 
return to the household later in the day. If they did not return, supervisors provided alternative respondents 
who were also randomly selected from a voters list.   




Identify Eligible Blocks 
Randomly Select 1 
District in 6 of 7 
Divisions  
Randomly Select 2 
Eligible Blocks from 
Selected Districts  
Randomly Select 4 Very 
Competitive  and 4 
Somewhat Competitive 
GPs in Each Block  
Randomly Select 1 
Ward per  GP 
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Respondents were told that a lottery with a 200 rupee prize (a little more than one day of 
agricultural wage labor) would be held at the end of the survey, and that each token a 
particular villager received would make their chance of winning the prize “much higher”. 
Practically, I included each voter survey respondent’s name on slips of paper once at 
minimum and added one additional slip per token. This means that if a sarpanch gave all 
of his 5 tokens to one person, the probability that this individual’s name was picked was 
approximately four times that of all other sampled respondents from his GP. If he gave 
one token to each person, a villager who received one token was seven percentage points 
more likely to win the prize than one who received no tokens. The survey instrument and 
prompt are provided below. 
6.1 Characteristics of the Lottery Measure 
 The lottery measure, distributive preferences, has several important features. 
First, there is a limited supply of tokens relative to the pool of potential beneficiaries. 
This requires elite respondents to exclude at least five individuals; if a sarpanch 
respondent chooses to allocate more than one token to any particular individual, the 
number of villagers who were excluded increased. A constraint on the number of 
beneficiaries to a level below demand defines targeted distribution (See Elliott 2011).
126
 
Second, the token measure removes institutional constraints and pressures from higher-
level politicians. This means that it captures how local politicians would allocate 
selective benefits if they had complete discretion over the selection of beneficiaries.
127
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 For example, below poverty line (BPL) cards in theory are provided to all households below a state 
mandated poverty line, and the Indian government constitutionally guarantees all citizens 100 days of paid 
labor through the National Rural Employment Guarantee (NREGA) Act. However, numerous studies show 
that a budget constraint requires exclusion. 
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 Closest to my measure, Alatas et al. (2013) gave local village elites full discretion over a cash transfer 
program in Indonesia. Their measure allowed elites to decide as a group, which means that it captures 
 121 
 Third, the lottery measure is public; lottery winnings are handed out publicly and 
sarpanch plausibly realized that lottery outcomes could be traced back to them despite the 
anonymity of token allocations. This means that a sarpanch is likely to allocate tokens 
with the consequences of public allocations of money in mind. I believe that sarpanch are 
sensitive to this since the 200-rupee prize is equivalent to more than one day of 
agricultural wage labor in a context of rural poverty. Fourth, I designed the measure to be 
unobtrusive in order to minimize the potential for conflict that would put my enumerators 
at risk. I accomplished this by giving the sarpanch the option of plausible deniability vis-
à-vis voter survey respondents who did not receive the prize. Sarpanch had the option to 
allocate tokens to up to 5 heads of household and the names of all 10 survey respondents 
was included in the hat from which the lottery winner was drawn. This gave all survey 
respondents a positive chance of winning the cash prize.  
 Finally, I understand the lottery prize as a lower bound baseline on pro-poor 
targeting because sarpanch had complete discretion over targeting. If bureaucratic 
constraints constrain the selection of beneficiaries to anti-poverty programs to be more 
pro-poor than would be the case with high levels of discretion by local elites (Bardhan 
and Mookherjee 2000), targeting should be more pro-poor when this is the case.
128
 
Moreover, the lottery prize is low stakes relative to policy benefits (e.g. jobs on 
government infrastructure projects and BPL cards), which are salient in rural India. We 
may expect such a benefit to either exhibit high levels of favoritism toward more 
exclusive groups (e.g. co-ethnics, kin, friends) than would be the case with policy 
                                                                                                                                                                     
collective rather than individual elite preferences.  
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 I find that sarpanch exhibited more pro-poor distributive preferences toward BPL card targeting than my 
regular token measure (with no cue to a policy outcome). If sarpanch considered bureaucratic constraints in 
determining the BPL allocation, this gives plausibility to this claim.   
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benefits, or to exhibit a great deal of noise due to indifference. Empirics presented in the 
next section show that this was not the case, and qualitative data from the elite survey 




6.2 Benefits Over Alternative Measures  
 The lottery measure has important benefits over previous approaches. First, it 
captures preferences over targeting without concerns of endogeneity between 
partisanship and benefit receipt. A common approach in the literature on selective 
distribution is to use self-reported survey items on access to a range of policy benefits.
130
 
Even if we assume that respondents’ answers on these items were truthful (or verified), 
we cannot establish whether voters’ partisan preferences are endogenous to the receipt of 
benefits (See Stokes 2005). This is also a problem for studies that consider turnout 
buying. We cannot be sure that local leaders targeted benefits to induce turnout rather 
than to reward members of their partisan networks whose participation is assured since 
survey data collected after benefit receipt. My measure does not have this problem. 
Neither token allocation nor winning the lottery prize can impact voters’ partisan 
preferences in my study because token allocation in the elite survey follows data 
collection on partisan preferences in the voter survey that took place the day before.  
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 I asked sarpanch to explain why they allocated the number tokens they chose and economic need was 
the modal response. Of 254 voters survey respondents who received one or more tokens, sarpanch reported 
167 of these to be based on need. Socio-economic status was also the modal reason sarpanch gave for not 
giving tokens to voters survey respondents. In addition, 76 responses fit with the partisan network 




 Note that I also included questions on receipt of selective policy benefits in the voter survey. 
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 Second, this is the first measure of individual local politicians’ distributive 
preferences. For my research question, this is an improvement over dictator games, which 
share my goal to identify distributive preferences. In these games, a dictator makes an 
offer of his choosing from a limited pool of money and keeps the rest for himself. The 
receiver is passive and takes what is offered. Recent work varies the identity of receivers 
to understand how ethnic identity and other receiver characteristics affect investment in 
public goods. For example, Habyarimana et al. (2007) manipulate whether or not a 
receiver belongs to the same ethnic group as the dictator in a series of experiments in 
Uganda. Partisanship could be similarly varied within this set-up; however, my method 
allows multiple voter and dyadic characteristics to vary at the same time; this allows me 
to be agnostic as to which characteristics should dominate.    
 
6.3 Considering Social Desirability Bias 
 Finally, I address the concern that the tokens measure is susceptible to social 
desirability bias. One plausible concern is that sarpanch will appear more pro-poor than 
they are because the lottery prize is a low stakes one-time payment of 200 rupees. This 
could affect my results because the preference to be seen targeting the poor trumps other 
preferences (e.g. enriching family members) when material benefits are low. Analyses by 
other scholars suggest that this is not a major concern. First, Alatas et al. (2012, 2013) 
find very similar results in low stakes (a one time transfer of $3) and high stakes (up to 
$250 annually for six years) experiments on the targeting of cash transfers by local elites 
in Indonesia. As their low stakes allocation is equivalent to mine (i.e. equivalent to one 
day of wage labor), this gives me confidence that elites in my study will not be 
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significantly more likely to target kin, friends, or co-ethnic if the lottery prize was 
larger.
131
 My theory also suggests that increasing the stakes may increase the social costs 
of targeting the non-poor. If sarpanch are constrained by a pro-poor targeting norm when 
allocations are observable, we should expect the cost of violating this norm to be higher 
when the value of the benefit is larger because this is also likely to increase popular 
salience of the benefit. 
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…Although I do not have the funds to pay all respondents for their time, I wanted to make a small 
contribution to the village by running a game with a modest cash prize of 200RS for one head of 
household as part of this research... In this game, your answers will be kept secret. No voters or GP 
politicians in this village will know your choices in this game. I will first show you voters list 
information on 10 people from this gram panchayat who Ire selected at random. I will ask if you know 
these people and then I will give you 5 tokens that you can divide among these 10 people any way you 
want.  All of the voters I mention have a chance to win the prize because everyone will have their name 
in the box at least once. But if you give someone a token, the chance their name will be picked will 
become much higher. This means that you should give tokens to the person you would most like to win 
the prize. Based on your selections, I will put slips of paper with names into a box and the sarpanch or 
a child of the sarpanch will pick a name out of that box. The name picked out of the box will receive the 
200 RS prize, which will be delivered by a member of the research team who has no affiliation to any 
party, government agency, or NGO.  
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7.   Empirical Strategy and Results 
 In this section, I explain the empirical strategy and test observable implications of 
my theory. The main empirical question centers on determining preferences in targeting 
outcomes in the context of observable distribution. I argued in section 3 that a pro-poor 
targeting norm shapes targeting preferences. I also argued that targeting is conditioned 
upon previous electoral support, as this forms the basis for the democratic accountability 
mechanism in targeting. Consistent with the pro-poor targeting norm, there is a clear 
preference for poorer voters among those perceived to be supporters; the poorest voters 
within the co-partisan network are the most likely to be targeted, and poorer supporters 
who are not co-partisans are more likely to be targeted than wealthy co-partisans.  
7.1 Empirical Strategy 
 There are two major empirical challenges in estimating allocation behavior in this 
setting. First, the method must account for the fact that the allocator (in this case the 
sarpanch) can only allocate a maximum of 5 tokens. Thus, the allocation to potential 
receivers (in this case voters) in the same gram panchayat cannot be treated as truly 
independent. In particular, giving a token to one individual in the population implies that 
there are fewer tokens to distribute over the rest of the population. In order to rectify this 
problem, one has to recognize that the average number of tokens over the population is 
always identical (the number of tokens divided by the number of voters). If the sarpanch 
were randomly choosing recipients for tokens, then each voter would have the identical 
number of tokens in expectation (the average). Thus, if a voter has a desirable attribute, I 
expect him to receive a premium, an expected number of tokens above the average. The 
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proposed statistical strategy models these premiums, constraining the average number of 
tokens over the population properly.  
 This non-independence property across potential receivers applies to desirable 
attributes of the voters as well. For instance, the number of co-partisans in the population 
mediates the relative premium in allocation for a co-partisan receiver by the allocator, 
i.e., the premium decreases as the number of co-partisans increases. If the allocator 
wishes to target only co-partisans (with no other distinction between individuals) and 
there are five co-partisans, the allocator can give one token to each co-partisan without 
difficulty. If, however, there are more than five co-partisans, then it is a certainty that at 
least one co-partisan will receive no token. Thus, the relative premium of being a co-
partisan is inversely related to the number of co-partisans in this situation.  
 Here, I briefly outline a regression-based strategy to analyze data of the form 
collected in this study. The key observation that allows for identification of the empirical 
model is that mean allocation in a gram panchayat is always identical, the number of 
tokens divided by the number of potential receivers, or 5/10 = 0.5. This implies that if all 
the predictors are centered around their means at the gram panchayat level, the constant 
term in a regression is fixed. In particular, let yiv denote the allocation given to potential 
receiver i in gram panchayat v ∈{1, …, V}. Consider predictors x1, …, xJ. Let us denote 
the mean of predictor xj in gram panchayat v as xjv. Since the number of tokens is in the 
form of count data, a Poisson regression (accounting for overdispersion) is appropriate. A 
quasi-poisson regression model provides the same mean function as poisson regression, 
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 The model can be written as below:  
 
 Looking at the equation above, and given my previous arguments, it is apparent 
that exp(β0) is fixed at 0.5 (β0 ≈-0.69), which effectively addresses the first concern of 
non-independence due to a budget constraint on the number of tokens. The non-
independence due to the effect of the number of individuals with a particular attribute in a 
gram panchayat (like co-partisanship) is addressed by mean-centering variables at the 
gram panchayat level. However, the salience of each attribute may still vary across gram 
panchayats; in order to address this issue, I fit a two-level hierarchical regression model 
with the higher level as the gram panchayat. In addition, a stochastic term is added to the 
higher level in order to capture the effect of all other attributes at the gram panchayat 
level that have not been explicitly included in the regression equation. This also addresses 
the concern that the data are clustered by gram panchayat.  
The complete regression model is then written as:  
 
 
                                                        
132
 In the standard poisson distribution, the variance is fixed at λi, the same as the mean. 
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where β, σ and σV denote parameters in the regression model, xiv denotes a predictor for 
individual i in gram panchayat v. In order to implement this model for interaction terms, I 
mean-adjusted each predictor at the gram panchayat level (for the main effects), and then 
took the desired interaction term of the mean-adjusted predictors, which was mean 
adjusted again.
133
 All models were estimated using the blmer function (blme package) in 




 In sum, a simple relationship between an attribute(s) of interest and the expected 
number of tokens received can be misleading. The relationship may be due to the 
dependency structure in the data or due to a specific gram panchayat, as opposed to a 
general population-wide phenomenon. Correcting for dependency within the gram 
panchayat, while varying the coefficients in the regression equation at the gram 
panchayat level addresses these concerns. The desired estimations result from the fixed 




 The dependent variable in the analysis is the number of tokens given to an 
individual in the lottery game described above. The game was played in two iterations. 
First, sarpanch were asked to allocate tokens without any prompting of prospective 
targets. A second iteration explicitly asked the sarpanch to allocate the tokens in the same 
manner as below poverty line (BPL) cards. The goal of this second prompt was not to 
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 This is akin to adjusting by the covariance between the predictors at the gram panchayat level. 
134
 The covariance matrix of the random effects has a Wishart prior, and all fixed coefficient have flat priors 
in the models. 
 
135
 All of the intervals presented in this paper are generated from 1000 simulations of the fixed coefficients 
with respect to the estimated variance-covariance matrix of the fixed coefficients. 
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deduce how sarpanch allocate BPL cards, but to understand how sarpanch would respond 
when given an explicit cue to target poorer individuals. The analyses rely on a number of 
predictors which are described in detail in the following two paragraphs.  
 In order to construct the sarpanch perceptions of electoral support, I asked the 
sarpanch whether each of the voters voted for him. If the sarpanch answered in the 
affirmative, the individual was coded as a perceived electoral "supporter." Otherwise, the 
individual was coded as a "non-supporter." Although officially elections at the gram 
panchayat level in India are non-partisan, the partisan affiliation of the sarpanch is 
broadly an open secret (Dunning and Nilekani, 2013). I asked both voters and sarpanch 
whether or not they feel close to any particular party, and then asked them to name the 
party to which they feel close. When the voter reported that he or she feels close to the 
same party reported by the sarpanch, voter was coded as a "co-partisan." Otherwise, the 
voter was coded as a "non-co-partisan." This measure of co-partisanship, since it 
explicitly measures preference, indicates a stronger connection between sarpanch and 
voter than mere previous support. The ethnicity measure, categorizes the sarpanch and 
voters into the categories of upper caste, other backward caste (OBC), scheduled caste 
(SC), scheduled tribe (ST), and other.
136
 I defined a co-ethnic as any voter who fell into 
the same category as the sarpanch.  
 Finally, I construct a measure of personal assets in some detail to understand the 
economic need of the respondents. In order to construct the asset measure, I relied on 
answers to survey questions that were readily verifiable. In particular, the measure is 
constructed upon whether the respondent owns: 1) a "pucca" or permanent house; 2) a 
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 Ethnicity is typically quite difficult to define in the Indian context. I used two different definitions of co-
ethnicity, jati and varna, which yield substantively similar results. 
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scooter/motorcycle; 3) a bicycle; 4) a television; 5) proper toilet facilities; 6) a 
refrigerator; 7) a fan; 8) mobile phone; and 9) electric pump set. Each of these variables 
is a binary variable, and a 2-parameter item response model (Gelman and Hill, 2007) was 
fit using Markov Chain Monte-Carlo (MCMC) using the program JAGS to construct an 
asset index. The asset index was then standardized to have mean 0 and standard deviation 
1 within each gram panchayat for the purposes of interpretability. The value of the asset 
index for an individual can be interpreted as the number of standard deviations the 
individual’s asset score differs from the mean asset score of the gram panchayat.  
The model is written as follows. Let yik ∈{0, 1} denote a binary outcome variable for 
person i and object k, 1 ≤ k ≤ K. A two parameter item response model fits:  
 
where βk is a parameter placing the object on a wealth scale and αi is the value of the 
asset index for individual i. 
7.3 Asset Wealth 
 
 I argue that local elected leaders, such as the sarpanch, are constrained by local 
norms of social propriety when allocating benefits. One of the most prominent norms in 
the setting is to allocate towards those who need the benefits the most; accordingly, I 
hypothesize that tokens are allocated according to a pro-poor norm. The data strongly 
support this claim.  
 Figure 3.1 plots the estimated impact of the asset measure on expected number of 
tokens for the voter, both without (regular tokens) and with (BPL tokens) an explicit cue 
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for targeting the poor. As described above, the asset measure is normalized to have mean 
0 and standard deviation 1 inside each gram panchayat. This means that the curves and 
coefficients are to be understood with respect to standard deviations from the mean asset 
wealth among sampled voters in the gram panchayat. For instance, a value of -1 for the 
asset measure means that the voter is one standard deviation below the mean asset wealth 
in the gram panchayat. For a given coefficient on asset wealth (β) in the regression, 
increasing the asset wealth of the voter by one standard deviation changes the expected 




 The blue curves in figures 1(a) and 1(b) plot the estimated impact from the model 
described in subsection 7.1 with a 90% posterior interval without and with cues for pro-
poor targeting, respectively. The overlaid red dots come from a flexible (penalized) thin-
plate regression spline model,
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 although it is important to note that the spline does not 
model dependencies within and across gram panchayats as in my strategy. In both of 
these models, there is a statistically significant trend towards targeting the poorest voters 
in the gram panchayat, as there is a strong negative association between asset wealth and 
expected number of tokens.  
 Without an explicit pro-poor cue (figure 1(a)) there is considerably more variance 
in the data and the spline picks up some non-monotonicity among wealthier voters. With 
an explicit pro-poor cue (figure 1(b)) there is stronger targeting towards poorer voters 
with much less variance and both models find the expected number of tokens 
monotonically decreasing in the wealth of the voter. Nonetheless, as the graphs show, the 
regression model and the spline produce largely similar results for the poorer 50 percent 
of the voters in each gram panchayat. This gives confidence that the functional 
assumptions of the regression model are not seriously driving the results on asset wealth.  
 Figure 1(c) displays the regression coefficients and 90 percent posterior intervals 
without and with the pro-poor cue, respectively. Consistent with my expectations, the 
coefficient on asset wealth is significant in both regressions, with the magnitude greater 
and variance smaller when there is an explicit pro-poor cue. This demonstrates the 
noticeable targeting of poorer voters in the data regardless of cue, and provides some 
weak evidence that sarpanch are further responsive to explicit pro-poor cues.  
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 A penalized spline model flexibly fits the pattern of the data while trying to prevent over-fitting. In the 
models displayed, the 839 observations are split into 50 bins, equally spaced in terms of quantiles. 
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7.4 Electoral Support 
 In a weak state context, electorally-based decentralized provision uses the 
principles of democratic accountability to prevent the sort of corruption described at the 
start of this article. If electoral support were uncorrelated with distribution of 
discretionary benefits, then this would imply that the force of democratic accountability 
from supporters does not bind the sarpanch in any way. Without formal constraints to 
compel the sarpanch to target benefits in a particular fashion, this is precisely the scenario 
under which one would expect the greatest manipulation in targeting.  
 Thus, I argue that previous electoral support serves as a natural basis for targeted 
forms of distribution. Citizens are free to support any candidate they wish, and with more 
effort they may become committed to a single party. A previous vote for the sarpanch 
constitutes a minimal level of support for the elected leader, while co-partisanship with 
the sarpanch constitutes a more committed level of support since it requires explicit 
investment to integrate into the leader’s partisan network. Unlike co-ethnicity, the 
categories of electoral support and partisan support are free to entry for every citizen. In 
any system of democratic accountability, a politician must have the capacity to flexibly 
construct pluralities of support. A support base with fixed boundaries, like co-ethnicity, is 
subject to decay (e.g., through competing co-ethnic leaders).
8
 The data strongly support 
these claims.  
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 Figure 2 reports the estimated expected number of tokens for perceived electoral 
supporters and non-supporters without and with the pro-poor cue. Irrespective of the cue, 
there is a strong targeting towards perceived electoral supporters. In other words, if the 
sarpanch believes the voter supported him in the last election, then he is willing to give 
significantly more tokens to that voter as compared to a non-supporter regardless of a 
pro-poor cue. This provides strong evidence of the electoral accountability logic in local 
targeting; that is, targeting outcomes, pro-poor or otherwise, are conditioned upon 





 Figures 3(a) and 3(b) further subdivide the expected number of tokens due to 
electoral support by co-partisanship and co-ethnicity, respectively. Figure 3(a) 
demonstrates that there is a partisan bias in allocating regular tokens, but when there is a 
pro-poor cue, this partisan bias disappears. On the other hand, co-ethnicity has no impact 
on allocations beyond electoral support; in fact, although the difference is not statistically 
significant, the co-ethnic supporters are predicted to get fewer token in expectation as 
compared to non-co-ethnic supporters.  
 In short, the data demonstrate some partisan bias in targeting when there is no 
pro-poor cue. This suggests that under purely discretionary allocation, voters integrated 
into the co-partisan network are more likely to receive benefits. However, when the pro-
poor norm increases in salience (either directly due to the cue or due to monitoring 
effects in allocation under the cue), the partisan bias disappears. Consistent with my 
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claims about fixed boundaries of supporters, there is no evidence of targeting bias due to 
co-ethnicity in the data.  
7.5 Combining Electoral Support and Asset Wealth 
 Analyzing the interplay between electoral support and asset wealth yields many 
interesting insights into the structure of allocation in this setting. Figures 4(a) and 4(b) 
display the expected number of tokens at the mean level of electoral support (68%) 
without and with the pro-poor cue, respectively. The two graphs display very similar 
behaviors, showing pro-poor targeting in both populations, with far more pronounced 
pro-poor targeting among electoral supporters. Without a pro-poor cue, the gap between 
supporters and non-supporters in allocation is much greater, with even the wealthiest 
supporters predicted to receive more than poor non-supporters. Under a pro-poor cue, the 
allocations to the wealthiest supporters and non-supporters largely converge, and poorer 
non-supporters receive more than wealthier supporters.  
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Of course, the curves in figure 4 only correspond to the mean level of support. We may 
wonder how the relative interaction between pro-poor targeting and the premium 
associated electoral support changes at different levels of electoral support in the gram 
panchayat. Figure 5 plots the curves for the expected number of tokens predicted at 20%, 
50%, and 80% electoral support, respectively.  
 The graphs in figure 5 demonstrate some of the more complicated dynamics at 
play in this setting. First, as argued above, as the percentage of people in gram panchayat 
with a desirable attribute (e.g., electoral support) increases, the relative premium in 
allocation to voters exhibiting that attribute decreases. In this case, the relative premium 
associated with electoral support decreases as the percentage of support in the gram 
panchayat increases; this is because the curve for supporters shifts downwards as the 
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percentage of support increases. Second, the democratic accountability principle implies 
that as the share of supporters decreases, the sarpanch needs to accommodate non-
supporters at a higher rate. Note that since the sarpanch are not restricted in how many 
tokens they give to each individual, they are not forced to accommodate non-supporters 
at a higher rate. Nonetheless, as the percentage of support decreases, the expected number 
of tokens, and thus the share of allocation, to non-supporters increases. This is seen in 
because the curve associated with non-supporters shifts downward as percentage of 
support increases. This provides strong evidence that the sarpanch is electorally 
responsive to the level of support in the gram panchayat.  
 One criticism of my interpretation of the results might be that the targeting of the 
poor is not due to any pro-poor norm but rather an electoral logic. Targeting the poor may 
also be consistent with the electoral logic of targeting those whose votes can be most 
easily bought or secured. Theories of political targeting have often been grouped into 
theories of "core" and "swing" targeting. The core targeting hypothesis argues those in 
the co-partisan network will be targeted above all others due to efficiency of targeting 
(Cox and McCubbins, 1986). Calvo and Murillo (2004) provide a modification to this 
theory by arguing that the poorest co-partisans will be targeted the most since they 
receive the highest marginal benefit from such patronage. The swing targeting hypothesis 
argues that pivotal voters, those upon which the leader has the most tenuous hold, should 
receive the most benefits (Dixit and Londregan, 1996). Stokes (2005) further argues that 
poorer swing voters should targeted due to the relative ease of buying their votes. 
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Figure 6 plots the expected number of tokens as a function of asset wealth conditioned 
upon being a supporter for co-partisans and non-co-partisans, respectively (with no pro-
poor cue). Given that co-partisanship indicates a stronger level of electoral support, co-
partisan targeting above all else would be consistent with the core targeting hypothesis, 
whereas greatest targeting among poorer non-co-partisans would be consistent with the 
swing targeting hypothesis.  
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Figure 3.6 shows that, as before, poor co-partisans are targeted at a higher rate than poor 
non-co-partisans, contradicting the swing targeting hypothesis. At the same time, the 
figure shows that poorer non-co-partisan supporters are targeted at a higher rate than 
wealthy co-partisan supporters, which contradicts the core targeting hypothesis. It is 
clear, then, that poorer supporters, whether more committed as co-partisans or less 
committed as non-co-partisans, are targeted at the highest rate. The data demonstrate a 
pro-poor norm in targeting once conditioning upon previous electoral support. The data 
are consistent with a democratic accountability mechanism that rewards voters for 
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previous support (Sircar and Vaishnav, 2014); however, among those for whom previous 
support is perceived, there is a strong impetus to target the poorest voters.  
 
8. Conclusion  
 
 This paper engages conventional wisdom on the distributive preferences of local 
politicians engaged in targeted distribution. The expectation in the literature on 
decentralization is that local politicians who have discretion over the selection of 
beneficiaries for targeted programs will either capture benefits for themselves and those 
who are close to them, or politicize state benefits by targeting benefits to buy votes or 
solidify patronage networks. This paper challenges this view in three ways. First, I find 
that local politicians exhibit strongly pro-poor distributive preferences even when they 
have full discretion over the allocation of selective benefits. I argue that in a context in 
which villagers and politicians are in close physical and social proximity and distribution 
is observable that village politicians are subject to a norm to target the poor. This is 
consistent with my results for Rajasthan and results in cases as diverse as West Bengal 
(Bardhan and Mookherjee 2006), Java (Ravillion and Dearden 1988), and Indonesia 
(Alatas et al. 2013). The theory and results of this paper suggest that the suspicion of elite 
capture when power of the selection of beneficiaries to welfare programs is devolved to 
local politicians is exaggerated and fails to consider contextual characteristics that 
encourage progressive targeting.  
 Second, I argue that the concern that decentralized targeting of these benefits will 
lead to party capture employs ideal rather than practical points of comparison. When the 
73
rd
 amendment to decentralize governance in India was passed in 1993, the state lacked 
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the capacity to reach the poor. Although local discretion remains partial in most Indian 
states, decentralization of targeted distribution was expected to increase pro-poor 
targeting relative to centralized provision. Third, my theory suggests that we should see 
targeting consistent with the principle of democratic accountability when elected local 
politicians have discretion over the allocation of selective benefits. In my data, this 
translated to exclusion of a small minority of certain non-supporters given inflated levels 
of perceived support. Importantly those coded (by sarpanch) as non-supporters have the 
ability to affiliate with the incumbent or a future winner simply by voting for them (or 
passing as supporters). Relative to favoritism toward co-ethnics, which results in 
exclusion of a majority of villagers and has fixed group boundaries, targeting according 
to the democratic accountability principle is the best option short of programmatic 
targeting. 
 Finally, it is important to consider a tension between the results of this paper and 
empirical research on the dismal record of targeting anti-poverty benefits to the poor in 
India (Besley et al. 2005, 2012; Banerjee 2013; Bardhan and Mookherjee 2006; 
Atanassova et al. 2009; Hirway 2003). I argue that rather than inferring local politicians’ 
strategies from policy outcomes, analysts should consider additional sources of targeting 
errors. First, Banerjee et al. (2013) find that asset-based methods suffer from severe 
exclusion errors. This is consistent with recent work which shows that centralized 
poverty censuses perform worse at identifying the poor than methods that depend on the 
input of local elites or villagers as a whole (Alatas et al. 2013; Krishna 2006; See also 
Hirway 2003). In the language of my theory, this is an example of a perverse effect of 
bureaucratic constraints on allocation of benefits. Second, research and anecdotal 
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evidence from field research suggest that state politicians, as well as politicians at the 
sub-district (block) and district levels, lobby to alter the BPL list. This is consistent with 
research on the intervention of mayors in similar asset surveys in Latin America (See 
Camacho and Conover 2011). Thus, it is likely that a substantial portion of misallocation 
of anti-poverty benefits is the result of political manipulation from above the GP.
138
 
Third, the incentives of local bureaucrats to obtain income from bribes may bias the 
allocation of BPL cards to the non-poor who are most able to pay bribes.
139
 In short, 
while sarpanch certainly engage in rent-seeking, my results suggests that local 
mechanisms of accountability constrain this behavior with respect to the targeting of 
selective benefits. This suggests that effort to bolster such accountability mechanisms—
through allowing local elections to be partisan and increasing the observability of the 
allocation of other benefits— may lead to important improvements in pro-poor targeting.  
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 The nature of this error is difficult to predict. Higher-level politicians may amplify the effect of co-




 This is also consistent with research that shows the price of bribes increase for those who have more 
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Male 0.55 0.5 
Upper Castes 0.25 0.43 
Other Backward Castes 0.37 0.48 
Scheduled Castes 0.2 0.4 
Scheduled Tribes 0.18 0.38 
Illiterate 0.18 0.38 
Primary School Education 0.24 0.43 
Middle School Education 0.2 0.4 
Secondary (inc. matriculation) 0.19 0.392 
Post-Secondary 0.19 0.39 
Land Holdings Scale 5.98 3.3 
Political Ambitions 0.52 0.5 
Active Party Members 0.39 0.49 
Terms Served as GP President 0.14 0.47 
Termed Served as GP Member 0.38 0.65 
BJP Supporters 0.32 0.47 
Congress Supporters 0.63 0.48 
Participation in Canvassing 0.92 0.28 











































Male 0.99 0.096 
Upper Castes 0.095 0.293 
Rajputs 0.113 0.316 
Jats 0.096 0.295 
Other Backward Castes 0.319 0.466 
Scheduled Castes 0.48 0.355 
Scheduled Tribes 0.063 0.244 
Muslims 0.102 0.303 
Land 3.1 2.64 
Illiterate 0.36 0.48 
Primary School Educated 0.24 0.43 
Middle School Educated  0.22 0.42 
Secondary School (Includes Matriculation) 0.35 0.53 
Post-Secondary School 0.09 0.28 
Voter Turnout in 2008 MLA Elections 0.91 0.29 
Partisans 0.75 0.43 
Swing Voters 0.17 0.37 
Partisan Ties (homogeneity measure) 1.28 0.77 
Volunteer in Political Campaigns 0.29 0.45 
Share Attend Party Rallies 0.29 0.45 
Relatives of Sarpanch 0.05 0.22 
Friends of Sarpanch 0.15 0.36 
Relative of Ward Member 0.12 0.33 
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 Do rural Indian voters condition their expectations of receiving targeted state 
benefits and services on the partisanship of local politicians? Partisanship is understood 
to be salient in many countries characterized by non-programmatic politics and machine 
parties because anti-poverty benefits are mediated by party organizations that reach down 
to the local level (See Auyero 2001; Stokes 2005; Stokes et al. 2013). In these contexts, 
voters who perceive the existence of political clientelism should condition their 
expectations of receiving selective benefits on the partisanship of local politicians who 
function as middlemen between parties and voters at the grassroots (Stokes et al. 2013; 
Calvo and Murillo 2013). This contrasts with scholarship on India, which broadly 
characterizes party-voter linkages at the local level as weak due to a lack of local party 
organization (Kohli 1990; Krishna 2007). With few exceptions, this work suggests that 
voters access selective benefits through opportunistic fixers who eschew partisan 
loyalties (Manor 2000); local government office holders understood as distinct from party 
intermediaries (Kruks-Wisner 2013); or co-ethnics networks (Besley et al. 2004, 2012). 
Using a novel survey experiment, this paper demonstrates that co-partisanship vis-à-vis 
local politicians shapes voters’ expectations of receiving selective benefits. This builds on 
recent research in India which shows that co-partisanship shapes voters’ access to 
targeted anti-poverty benefits, contact strategies for seeking these benefits, and 
expectations of receiving benefits implemented by local governments (Dunning and 
Nilekani 2013; Bussell 2011).  
 The paper makes two contributions to research on party-voter linkages and 
methods for identifying the causal effect of partisanship on voters’ expectations of 
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receiving selective government benefits, which I refer to as distributive expectations. 
First, I use a novel method that captures an observable implication of political 
clientelism— the extent to which voters’ perceive partisan bias in the targeting of state 
anti-poverty benefits. I build on Dunning and Nilekani’s (2013) argument that local 
politicians in India have incentives to target benefits to member of multi-ethnic local 
partisan networks, which they test with a fictional candidate experiment, by developing 
an experiment that is easier to interpret and has features that make it more generalizable 
to local politics in India. Consistent with Dunning and Nilekani, I find that voters are 
significantly more likely to expect selective state benefits from co-partisan village 
council presidents (sarpanch) than those with different partisan affiliations.  
 Practically, my experiment cues real local partisan politicians with a simple 
vignette treatment. I ask survey respondents early in the survey to identify the most 
prominent politicians from each of two major parties in the state of Rajasthan—Congress 
and the BJP—and randomize whether I expose respondents to vignettes that cue the 
Congress or BJP politician named by the respondent. Since respondents identified local 
leaders, I can confidently assume that respondents were exposed to extensive information 
about cued local leaders prior to treatment. This reflects village council (gram panchayat) 
politics in India, which is characterized by a high level of information developed over 
many years of interaction between voters and those running for local office. The real 
candidate experiment provides an alternative to fictional candidate experiments in which 
voters condition their expectations of future policy benefits on information shortcuts such 
as ethnicity and partisanship in lieu of richer information.  
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 Second, drawing on research on the psychology of survey response, and 
satisficing specifically, this paper addresses the problem of cognitive burdens under low 
motivation that characterize fictional candidate vignette experiments. These experiments 
require respondents to take many cognitive steps when the stakes for respondents are low. 
Given incentives to provide answers without completing the cognitive process 
researchers assume to have taken place, it is difficult to know whether experimental 
results capture the decision-making mechanism fictional candidate experiments aim to 
capture. The real candidate vignette experiment presented in this paper aims to minimize 
the risk of satisficing by minimizing cognitive demands and increasing respondent 
interest in the experimental scenario.  
 The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, I motivate the paper by theories of 
targeted distribution and party-voter linkages in India. In section 3, I discuss challenges 
for identifying valid partisan effects and introduce the benefits of the real candidate 
experiment. In section 4, I discuss the case of Rajasthan and citizen survey in which the 
experiment was embedded. In section 5, I conduct validity checks on the real candidate 
survey experiment. In section 6, I present results.  
 
2. Party-Voter Linkages and Distributive Politics in Rural India   
 In a context of targeted distribution of anti-poverty benefits by local governments 
in countries like India where state capacity is insufficient to ensure programmatic 
targeting to the poor, there is a broad expectation of manipulation in the selection of 
beneficiaries (Niehaus et al. 2009; Kapur et al. 2008; Bardhan and Mookherjee 2006). In 
this context, the scholarly debate tends to focus on the conditions in which manipulation 
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in the distribution of targeted policy benefits will favor class, ethnic, and partisan groups, 
rather than engaging the question of when programmatic or non-programmatic 
distribution is most pervasive. In this dissertation, I argue that local politicians use their 
limited discretion over the allocation of selective benefits to target their supporters—and 
co-partisans in particular— according to a political logic rather than targeting benefits to 
co-ethnics according to a social logic. If this is the case, should be more likely to expect 
to receive selective benefits when the village council president (sarpanch) is a co-
partisan. In this section, I characterize the conventional wisdom, which predicts that local 
politicians in India target co-ethnics and recent work that challenges this conventional 
wisdom with an argument for partisan targeting. I also lay out key features of the 
informational context of local politics in India.  
 
2.1 Party-Voter Linkages, Ethnic Ties, and Local Distribution in India  
 A central goal of the 73
rd
 amendment of the Indian constitution, which devolved 
power to local governments in India, was to make governance more responsive to local 
populations. Local accountability in the context of local (rural) government was intended 
to leverage the high level of personal interaction that characterizes village life. To ensure 
that local accountability was not undermined by party leaders’ incentives to manipulate 
benefits along partisan lines, party symbols were banned from the ballot for village 
council (gram panchayat) elections. Along with the depiction of weak party organization 
at the local level in India (Kohli 1990; Kruks-Wisner 2013; Krishna 2007), scholars have 
broadly approached the question of manipulation in policy implementation to understand 
the conditions under which elite capture or co-ethnic targeting will be most pervasive 
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(Bardhan and Mookerjee 2006, 2012; Besley et al. 2007). The expectation here is that 
when land inequality is severe, village elites can take resources allocated to state anti-
poverty benefits for themselves, or prevent the poor from receiving such benefits without 
the approval of the village economic and political elite (Bardhan and Mookherjee 2006). 
Where accountability mechanisms are less likely to be undermined due to lower levels of 
local inequality, the expectation is that local politicians will act on their intrinsic 
preference to target co-ethnics with selective benefits over which they have significant 
discretion. In this literature, the logic of cultivating minimum winning coalitions at the 
gram panchayat level— given the diversity of caste and religious groups in rural India— 
is rarely taken seriously (See Bardhan and Mookherjee 2012 for an exception).  
 The expectation that preferences for co-ethnic targeting will trump political 
incentives to cultivate a broader, multi-ethnic partisan coalition follows from 
observations on rural India’s segregated social geography, hierarchical inter-caste 
relations in social and economic life, and the political logic of citizens pressuring 
politicians to deliver distributive benefits as ethnic blocs rather than as individuals 
(Rudolph and Rudolph 1984; Chauchard 2014a; Jeffrey 2001). Following from research 
in which caste or sub-caste (jati) powerfully shapes daily life socially, economically, and 
politically, it is plausible that local politicians will prioritize members of their ethnic 
group over members of a multi-ethnic partisan coalition. This expectation of co-ethnic 
preferences over targeting is explicitly assumed in citizen-candidate models applied to 
this context among other theories of distributive politics (See Banerjee and Pande 2007; 
Besley et al. 2005; Bardhan and Mookherjee 2012; Chandra 2004; See also Posner 2005). 
The main weakness of this logic, however, is that it assumes an absence of local political 
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strategy or assumes that there is either a sufficient number of co-ethnics to achieve a 
minimum winning coalition or that cross-ethnic bargains are unfeasible in a context of 
ethnic diversity (See for example Banerjee and Pande 2007).  
 This paper builds on an emerging alternative view, which suggests that local 
politicians target voters with selective benefits according to a core political logic. Closest 
to this paper, Dunning and Nilekani (2013) argue that the system of rotating quotas for 
marginal groups in India—which means that a majority of voters will not see a co-ethnic 
on the ballot for sarpanch—necessitates multi-ethnic partisan mobilization (See also 
Gupta 2005). Drawing on survey data from Rajasthan, Karnataka, and Bihar, they find 
that the distribution of jobs and welfare benefits at the household level is powerfully 
explained by membership in the sarpanch’s co-partisan network. Consistent with other 
work, they find that politicians from low-caste groups— who hold office under India’s 
aggressive system of reservations for scheduled castes and scheduled tribes— are no 
more likely to target benefits to co-ethnics than politicians from other castes in similar 
gram panchayats where no quota is in place (See also Chauchard 2014a; Jensenius 
2013).
140
 Moreover, in the prior article of this dissertation on the targeting preferences of 
sarpanch, I find that local politicians, when granted full discretion over the selection of 
beneficiaries, favor those they perceive to have voted for them in local elections, and co-
partisan supports most of all. Contrary to the expectation in political economy that local 
politicians will act on their co-ethnic preferences when unconstrained, we find no 
evidence for co-ethnic targeting preferences. Third, research on citizens’ strategies for 
seeking benefits in India supports the expectation of partisan salience over targeting and 
                                                        
140
 This work uses regression continuity sampling designs to identify the effect of quotas on targeting 
outcomes attitudes.  
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voters’ expectations. In her analysis of which politicians citizens contact when seeking 
access to state services in Karnataka, for example, Bussell (2011) finds that citizens’ 
choices are conditioned by co-partisanship.
141
 Along with Kruks-Wisner’s (2013) finding 
that citizens—especially the poor— contact sarpanch more than any other public official 
public official, it is plausible that partisanship of the sarpanch is salient on targeting 
behavior and citizens’ expectations of future targeting. 
 
2.2 The Informational Context of Village Governance 
 Although previous empirical work suggests that partisanship is salient, this work 
does not capture the informational context of village politics. Three features of gram 
panchayat politics should be taken into account in measurement strategies design to 
identify partisan effects in this context.  First, GPs are information-rich contexts in which 
voters and politicians know each other through a history of localized interaction 
throughout their lives. This builds upon reputations developed through interactions 
between families in the same village over prior generations. Unlike the case for 
candidates for state assemblies or parliament, voters have considerable information on the 
plausible pool of candidates for sarpanch well before elections.  
 Second, voters have extensive information on who in their village— or 
neighboring villages in their gram panchayat— has received selective government 
benefits (in the recent past) from jobs to Below Poverty Line (BPL) card, which 
determine access to a wide range of benefits from food subsidies to healthcare subsidies 
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 While we cannot necessarily take this literally given the number of BJP respondents reporting an 
intention to meet the chief minister of the state to seek a benefit, this provides suggestive evidence that 
voters condition contact strategies on co-partisanship.  
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provides through the Public Distribution System. In Rajasthan, the names of those who 
receive BPL cards are written on the walls of local government office buildings and 
dense social interaction makes information on the targeting of a wide range of benefits 
directly observable or indirectly observable through rumors and discussion. Therefore, 
we should expect citizens to know the criteria sarpanch in their GP generally use to 
distribute selective benefits such as jobs on government infrastructure projects and BPL 
cards, which are salient in local politics in India.
142
 Third, I have argued elsewhere in this 
dissertation that voters are more likely to tolerate favoritism in targeted distribution along 
the lines of partisanship because it is understood that sarpanch elections are fought over 
favoritism in access to selective benefits. Here, social constraints make partisan targeting 
a more legitimate principle of distribution than ethnic targeting, which is characterized by 
exclusion according to membership in groups with fixed boundaries.  
 Taking the high-information and personal context of gram panchayat politics into 
account is critical to empirically capturing the mechanism through which voters 
determine their distributive expectations. In a high-information context, voters can 
develop reasonable expectations of access to selective benefits because they know the 
principal that local politicians employ in allocating selective benefits. If integration into 
local politicians’ local partisan networks is a central basis of discrimination in targeting, 
we should expect voters to develop distributive expectation according to where they 
locate themselves relative to known local politicians’ networks. The experiment I present 
in this paper is designed to capture this high-information context.  
 
                                                        
142
 This is particularly the case in a low-income rural state like Rajasthan. Moreover, I sampled blocks with 
20 and 30 percent of BPL households, which means there is demand and interest with respect to how these 
benefits are targeted.   
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3. Identifying the Effects of Politician Characteristics on Distributive    
   Expectations  
 
 This paper contributes to the debate on the salience of party-voter linkages in 
targeted distribution at the local level by explicitly taking concerns of measurement 
validity and external validity into account in the identification of these effects. 
Identifying the causal effect of a politician’s partisan affiliation on voters’ distributive 
expectations is challenging for three reasons: (1) a candidate’s partisan affiliation is 
difficult to isolate independently from correlated characteristics (e.g. ethnicity), which 
also affect candidate evaluations. In observational studies there are few cases in which 
race and partisanship can be separated and these cases may be outliers that place causal 
claims under question. Random or near-random assignment of candidate characteristics 
such as partisanship is also unfeasible.
143
 (2) The partisan affiliation of elected politicians 
is endogenous to contextual characteristics, which means that matching methods will be 
unlikely to produce a large number of appropriate matched pairs. (3) Voters’ 
partisanship—and expectations of future receipt of benefits— is endogenous to past 
distribution. Under these limitations, fictional candidate vignette experiments have 
become the method most commonly employed to identify the causal effect of politician 
characteristics (such as partisanship) on candidate assessments and vote choice (See 
Dunning and Nilekani 2013; Dunning and Harrison 2011; Banerjee et al. 2014; Thachil 
2014; Chauchard 2014b; Conroy-Krutz 2012; Carlson 2011). This experimental design 
addresses the above three problems that characterize observational studies by exposing 
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 A field experiment that randomizes candidate characteristics would require a researcher to have control 
over the candidate selection choices of one or more parties.   
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respondents to hypothetical politicians, which gives researchers the ability to randomly 
assigned fictional candidate characteristics.
144
  
 In fictional candidate experiments, voters are either asked to imagine an election 
is taking place and that a fictional candidate is running against another fictional candidate 
(Conroy-Krutz 2012; Banerjee et al. 2014), or are asked to imagine a particular fictional 
politician was elected (Dunning and Nilekani 2013) or is considering running for office 
(Chauchard 2014b). After exposure to the treatment (i.e. a profile of candidate 
characteristics) respondents are asked which candidate they would vote for in the former 
case. In the latter case, they are asked what their expectations of policy outcomes or 
future distribution of benefits would be if a single cued politician were to be elected and 
if they would vote for him (Dunning and Nilekani 2013; Winters and Weitz-Shapiro 
2013; Banerjee et al. 2014). Since these experiments are conducted on a representative 
survey sample, experimental results are interpreted as externally valid on the assumption 
that respondents respond to treatment as researchers intend.
145
  
 I argue in this section that the solution fictional candidate experiments provide 
over observational studies is incomplete. Drawing on research on satisficing from the 
literature on the psychology of survey response, I identify concerns of measurement and 
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 For examples of observational studies see: Lindberg and Morrison 2008; Bratton et al. 2012.  
 
145
 In some work, scholars check for consistency between observational data and experimental results, 
although this is not common practice (See Conroy-Krutz 2012).  
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3.1 The Problem of Satisficing in Fictional Candidate Experiments 
 Work in social psychology suggests that when motivation is low and the cognitive 
demands of survey instruments are high, respondents are likely to provide answers that 
appear minimally satisfactory (to interviewers), or satisfice, rather than responding to 
questions as the researcher intended (Krosnick 1991, 1996). Satisficing can take strong 
and weak forms ranging from disregarding the question completely to failing to 
thoroughly think through the cognitive steps necessary to properly answer the question. 
When a respondent carefully answers a survey question in a way that reflects the full 
cognitive process the question requires, this is referred to as optimizing (Krosnick 1991; 
Tournegeau 1984). Although the extreme form of mindless satisficing (e.g. random 
guessing or picking the first answer) may in some cases be more of a problem for 
reliability than bias, weak satisficing has the potential to bias results if responses capture 
different mechanisms than the researcher intends to test experimentally. This is a problem 
for the interpretation of results with respect to external validity because results may not 
reflect candidate assessment or vote preferences but a response based on a prior cognitive 
stage. Survey researchers take these concerns for data quality seriously and have 
developed a range of methods to minimize satisficing such as cognitive interviewing 
(Krosnick 1991, 1996; Collins 2003). This is rarely the case for fictional candidate 
experiments. I lay out why low motivation and cognitive demands are particularly 
extreme for this genre of experiments below.  
 First, even in a context where local politics is highly salient to voters such as India 
(See Bohlken 2013), respondents in fictional candidate experiments are likely to be 
unmotivated in these experiments because candidates are fictional. Even when deception 
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is used, candidates are identified as belonging to another district of little concern to the 
respondent. If respondents perceive a survey question or vignette survey experiment as 
irrelevant to their lives, we should expect their interest in the experimental situation to be 
low. This suggests that fictional candidate experiments should be particularly affected by 
low motivation.  
 Low motivation is also likely when the information-processing mechanism 
simulated in a survey experiment is perceived as unrelated to the mechanism that 
underlies the outcome of interest (e.g. vote choice) or as implausible. For example, 
fictional candidate experiments capture a mechanism rooted in the effect of information 
shortcuts on vote preferences and candidate assessment under low information. 
Chauchard (2014b) applies this experimental design to candidate assessments with 
respect to those seeking their party’s nomination for state legislator, which is a low-
information context. Dunning and Nilekani (2013) apply this method to the context of the 
gram panchayats, which is a high-information context. In the latter case, respondents may 
not believe the experimental setup. McDermott (2011) argues that respondents may 
engage in passive non-compliance or a strategic attempt to fool the researcher when 
motivation is low. This concern is valid in many applications of fictional candidate 
experiments.  
 Satisficing is also likely when cognitive demands are high, which is a central 
problem for fictional candidate experiments. As noted above, weak satisficing occurs 
when respondents do not complete certain cognitive stages required for optimal 
responses, or when they complete some or all cognitive stages in a haphazard fashion. 
Consistent with Krosnick’s (1991) expectations for survey research, the risk of 
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satisficing— due to difficulties of comprehension, passive non-compliance, or strategic 
effort to fool the researcher— increases as the number and complexity of cognitive steps 
increases. Consider the number of cognitive steps that fictional candidate experiments 
interested in identifying the effect of candidate characteristics on distributive expectations 
require for respondents to provide optimal responses. 
 Following the approach of survey research (See Tourangeau and Rasinski 1988), I 
lay out the cognitive steps respondents must go through if they are to optimize in 
responding to fictional candidate vignette experiment treatments above. It is important to 
realize that these cognitive steps are not only numerous but also require complex 
information processing. For example, my own preliminary fieldwork demonstrated that it 
takes considerable effort to convince respondents of the decision-making scenario when 
fictional candidates are involved.
146
 It also takes considerable cognitive effort for 
respondents to link fictional candidate treatments to their own experience; this process 
may frustrate respondents enough to produce satisficing. When we take the insights of the 
literature on satisficing into account, this depiction of cognitive stages for optimal 
suggests we should be especially skeptical of fictional candidate experiments that cue a 
large number of treatments (i.e. candidate characteristics), multiple competing 
candidates, and trade-offs across fictional candidate attributes or across competing 
fictional candidates. It also suggests that we should be wary of interpreting the results of 
these experiments in terms of the real-world outcomes they often employ such as 
prospective judgments of policy outcomes. Survey experiments are more effective at 
capturing the consequences of informational cues on general preferences and 
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 Hypothetical vignette experiments broadly require some comprehension burden. I found real candidate 
vignette experiments are much more easily understood than comparable fictional candidate vignettes in 
pretesting.  
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 The number and difficulty of cognitive steps pose problems for the interpretation 
of fictional candidate experiments under both strong and weak forms of satisficing 
(Krosnick 1991). Under strong satisficing, respondents do not engage in any of the 
cognitive stages required for optimal answers. Here, when motivation is low and 
cognitive demands are high, we should expect results to capture noise rather than 
reflecting the mechanism of interest (i.e. the effect of partisanship on candidate 
assessments). Under weak satisficing, respondents proceed through the above cognitive 
stages superficially or stop at the early cognitive stages. For example, an experiment with 
a vote choice outcome that randomly assigns a fictional candidate’s race and party (in the 
United States) may reflect general attitudes about racial groups and political parties 
without capturing vote preferences because the respondent stopped at the fourth cognitive 
step listed above. We also cannot be sure that the experiment captures the treatment 
effect on vote preferences because we cannot be sure that respondents considered 
tradeoffs across partisan and racial preferences as they would in an election.
148
 If we 
cannot determine the extent to which respondents received assigned cues (due to the risk 
of satisficing) and cognitive demands make optimal response likely to be rare, it is 
difficult to interpret fictional candidate experiments that assume away or ignore this 
problem.   
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 For this reason, even in the real candidate experiment that follows, I interpret distributive expectations 
broadly as expectations of access to the state.  
 
148
 In an experiment where multiple cues are employed, respondents may simply respond to the more 
salient politician cue and ignore the other.  
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 Third, cognitive demands are higher when respondents are exposed to unfamiliar 
experimental situations, which can take two forms. First, when the mechanism simulated 
in a survey experiment does not correspond to a psychological mechanism that is familiar 
to respondents, it will require substantial cognitive effort—which may end in 
confusion—  for respondents to understand the cognitive task the researcher is asking 
them to perform (McDermott 2011; Krosnick 1996). Respondents will have an easier 
time understanding and responding to experimental vignettes that tap into thought 
processes and experimental objects they encounter in their lives. For example, Indian 
voters process information on candidates to local office over time through personal 
interaction and gossip. When they are asked to quickly process information on unknown 
candidates— as most survey experiments require— this is a task that respondents in rural 
India rarely will have encountered in the past. Second, although fictional candidate 
experiments give the researcher the ability to randomly assign otherwise correlated 
candidate characteristics (e.g. ethnicity and partisanship), when implausible combinations 
are employed, it is plausible that respondents will ignore part or all of the treatment. For 
example, if a scheduled caste voter is assigned to a vignette in which a fictional candidate 
is a scheduled caste BJP supporter and does not believe this combination is plausible—
correctly or not— he may respond as if the fictional candidate was a scheduled caste 
Congress Party supporter or a BJP supporter from another caste group. Satisficing or 
strategic response bias on part of the respondent is likely in this case. This means that 
researchers must interpret such results conservatively.
149
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 It is also useful to collect data on respondents’ stereotypes about plausible and implausible combinations 
of attributes along these lines as a control, or more bluntly in the pre-testing stage.  
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 In summary, research on the psychology of survey response suggests that low 
motivation and characteristics of fictional candidate experiments that impose cognitive 
challenges on respondents are likely to lead to satisficing. This suggests that the benefits 
of random assignment independent candidate attributes and causal inference that fictional 
candidate experiments provide may be undermined by poor data quality and uncertainty 
over the information processing mechanism that treatment effects have identified. 
Adcock and Collier (2001) define measurement validity as a mismatch between the 
concept researchers think they are measuring and what is actually being measured. I 
argue that concerns of measurement validity are substantial for this genre of experiments 
when researchers interpret results as if respondents have provided optimal responses and 
experimental result are externally valid to the political phenomenon of interest.  
 
3.2 The Benefits of Real Candidate Vignette Experiments  
 As discussed, the problem fictional candidate vignette experiments solve is the 
causal identification of a particular candidate characteristic on vote choice or candidate 
assessment. Problems of cognitive challenges, low motivation, and weak generalizability 
due to these issues and the artificial nature of the experimental setup undermine the 
degree to which solving the causal inference problem allows one to make valid causal 
inferences about political behavior. I argue that survey experiments that randomly assign 
real characteristics of real candidates can address the latter problem while retaining the 
goal of fictional candidate experiments to identify the effects of partisan ties on 
distributive expectations (and candidate evaluation) with some acceptable costs.  
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 In existing research, real candidate experiments are of two types, both of which 
prime the salience of the ethnicity or partisanship of know politicians or partisanship. 
Closest to the goal of this paper, Adida (2012) developed a vignette experiment in which 
either of the ethnic identities of the mixed ethnicity Benin President were primed in order 
to identify the effect of the primed identity cue on support for that politician according to 
a vote intention item.
150
 The benefit of this design is that candidate characteristics that 
may be confounded with ethnicity are held constant across treatments since all treatment 
are in reference to the current Benin president. Respondents are also likely to have 
information on this politician that were accumulated prior to treatment, which reduces 
cognitive demands, and to be more interested in a vignette about the president than one 
about fictional candidates. The drawback of this design is that the treatment effect on 
vote preferences likely captures the salience of an ethnic priming effect rather than the 
effect of co-ethnicity on vote preferences per se. If priming effects are fleeting, the 
external validity claims of this design may be weaker than expected.
151
 To my 
knowledge, real candidate experiments have not been conducted on candidate assessment 
or distributive expectations outcomes.  
 The experiment I present addresses the weaknesses of fictional candidate 
experiments in a way that addresses concerns of satisficing and external validity. The 
goal of my experiment is to identify the effect of co-partisanship on voters’ expectations 
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 This experiment was conducted using the President of Benin who is of both Nago and Bariaba decent. 
This design may apply to partisanship to independent candidates such as Charlie Christ prior to the time he 
formally changing his party affiliation from Republican to Democrat in 2013, and his partisanship was 
potentially ambiguous to voters.  
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 See Mohler et al. 2014 and Conroy-Krutz and Moehler 2014 for additional examples of a real candidate 
priming experiment. Here ethnic cues (using candidate photos) and party symbols are provided on a 
replicated ballot for MP in Uganda. The experiment was conducted days before national elections, which 
means that information on these politicians was at its peak at the time of the experiment.  
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of receiving future benefits in the high-information context of India’s gram panchayats. I 
do this by developing a simple vignette and randomly assigning cues to known Congress 
and BJP-affiliated local politicians. I then ask respondents for their distributive 
expectations if the cued politician were to become the sarpanch in the next local elections 
set to take place two years from the time of data collection in 2015.  
 To minimize cognitive demands, I asked respondents to identify the most 
prominent Congress and BJP politicians in their gram panchayat. I randomized whether a 
respondent would be exposed to a vignette that cued the Congress or BJP politician he 
identified. In a setting where GP politicians and voters overwhelmingly know each other, 
we can assume that respondent-identified politicians are politicians about whom 
respondents have extensive information accumulated over a long period of time prior to 
the day of the experiment. This means that the experimental design does not require 
respondents to process information in a short period of time, but cues easily accessible 
assessments of personally known partisan politicians. This setup also increases 
motivation because respondents are more interested in questions about local politicians 
whom they know in the context of the next local elections than would be the case with 
fictional candidates. This experiment also captures the high-information context of gram 
panchayat politics, which increases my confidence in the generalizability of my results to 
voters’ assessments of GP candidates in the real world. I discuss the experimental design 





4. The Case of Rajasthan  
 This paper aims to experimentally capture the salience of partisanship on voters’ 
distributive expectations in the context of competitive gram panchayats in rural 
Rajasthan. Gram panchayats in Rajasthan offer a compelling case to test whether or not 
voters consider partisanship to be salient because the election commission bans party 
symbols from the ballot and partisan campaigning. Thus, if voters condition their 
expectations of receiving selective benefits on partisanship, this suggests that partisan 
mobilization has penetrated non-partisan elections informally. There is strong evidence 
that parties have done so. For example, Dunning and Nilekani (2013) find that Rajasthan 
voters correctly guess the party of the sarpanch 96 percent of the time. There is also 
evidence of party capture of programs implemented through GPs (Dasgupta 2014; 
Markussen 2010), and evidence of preferences among sarpanch to target co-partisans 
with selective benefits according to a behavioral measure (See Schneider and Sircar 
2014).  
 
4.1 The Politics of Rajasthan 
 Rajasthan has several features that make it compelling as a case to identify the 
effect of partisanship on voters’ expectations of selective benefits: poverty, patronage 
politics, and intense inter-party competition. First, it is important to select a state with a 
sizeable below poverty line population because a consensus of scholarship suggests that 
clientelistic benefits are targeted to poor voters who are more likely to value, seek, and be 
eligible for selective anti-poverty benefits such as jobs on infrastructure projects and a 
range of subsidies provided to households who possess Below Poverty Line (BPL) cards 
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(See Brusco et al. 2004; Calvo and Murillo 2004; Stokes et al. 2013; Kitschelt and 
Wilkinson 2007). According to estimates based on consumption data from the 2004-5 
National Social Survey, Rajasthan has a rural poverty rate of 19 percent, which is 
modestly below the 22.5 percent average for Indian states (Dev and Ravi 2007).
152
 
Second, scholarship on India establishes its politics as patronage-based (Chandra 2004; 
Wilkinson 2007). Chandra (2004) defines India as a patronage democracy characterized 
by a dominant state sector that controls primary avenues to upward mobility and survival 
and discretion over individualized provision of jobs and services.
153
 Moreover, drawing 
on data from Rajasthan, Krishna (2007) argues that one of the most important changes in 
Indian politics is the emergence of small-time leaders capable of navigating the state on 
the behalf of poor citizens to obtain benefits from an unresponsive state. Politicians covet 
fixers who they believe can deliver the votes of their supporters during elections (See 
Manor 2000).  
 Third, Rajasthan is a politically competitive state with in an institutionalized 2-
party system that has alternated between the BJP and Congress Party in every state 
assembly election since 1993 (See Chhibber et al. 2012; Jensenius and Suryanarayan 
2013). Across five elections that have taken place at the time of writing, three had overall 
margins of victory in terms of vote share below 4 percent.
154
 At the level of state 
assembly constituencies, the average margin of victory across Rajasthan legislative 
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 This takes into account the 17 most populous states.  
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 This takes into account reforms that liberalized the Indian economy and reduced the size of the state. 




 In 1998 and 2012 the Congress Party and BJP won by 12 percent of the vote, respectively.    
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assembly constituencies in 2003 and 2008 was 8.7 and 8.9 percent respectively.
155
 
Despite intense competition, Chhibber and Nooruddin (2004) and Heath (2005) place 
Rajasthan in the bottom third among major states for their respective measures of 
electoral volatility, which is moderate compared to state elections in Tamil Nadu and 
Andhra Pradesh where anti-incumbent swings of 30 percent or more have become 
common in recent years. This means that Rajasthan provides an environment of intense 
competition in an environment of relative stability. Inter-party competition is an 
important feature for this paper because the expectation is that as competition increases, it 
is either difficult to target state benefits according to a political logic, or clientelism will 
be abandoned as a strategy altogether (Mares and Petrova 2013). If this is the case, voters 
should not condition their expectations of future benefits on the partisanship of sarpanch. 
To test this expectation, the survey in which the experiment was embedded sampled 
competitive sub-districts (blocks) and gram panchayats by design.      
4.2. The Gram Panchayat and Panchayat Raj in India 
Local elites surveyed in this project are elected gram panchayat presidents, or 
sarpanch. The gram panchayat (GP) is the lowest tier of India’s three-tier local 
government, or Panchayat Raj, system— falling below elected bodies at the District (zilla 
parishad) and sub-district or block (Panchayat Samiti) levels.
156
 The panchayat raj system 
has existed in some form prior to independence. The 73
rd
 amendment to the Indian 
constitution passed in 1993 gave the Panchayat Raj system constitutional status, which 
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 As an alternative summary measure, the median margin of the vote in 2008 was 6.6 percent. 
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 Note that gram panchayat boundaries are based on administrative units and are not perfectly nested 
within electoral districts. However, in this study, all the GPs sampled from a selected block are within one 
state assembly constituency.  
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imposed federal requirements for direct elections of panchayat members, further 
integration of local government and government development functions, and quotas for 
women and marginal groups. As a result, 227,698 gram panchayats were staffed by over 
two million elected representatives across India by the year 2000. GP boundaries are 
based on population and consist of one large village or as many as 35 smaller villages.
157
 
Each gram panchayat in Rajasthan has one directly elected sarpanch and directly elected 
ward members for each ward. The number of wards in a particular gram panchayat also 
depends on population; in Rajasthan there are nearly 9,200 gram panchayats with 
approximately 114,000 elected members.
158
  
Gram panchayats and higher tiers of the panchayat raj system have aggressively 
implemented quotas for women and marginal groups: scheduled castes, scheduled tribes, 
and other backward (middle) castes. As of 2010, 50 percent of seats were reserved for 
women, up from 35 percent in the 2005 election. Government figures from 2008 on 
marginal group quotas in Rajasthan show that 21, 18, and 42 percent of elected seats were 
reserved for scheduled castes, scheduled tribes, and other backward castes respectively. 
Eligibility status based on these quotas rotates with each new election cycle, which makes 
it unlikely that the same politician will be eligible for re-election (See Dunning and 
Nilekani 2013). This creates high turnover and impacts the distribution of political 
experience of GP politicians as can be seen by the large number of first term sarpanch in 
the elite survey sample. Third, unlike at all higher levels, party symbols are not permitted 
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 GPs in Rajasthan modally have populations below 3,000 people. This data comes from Rajasthan 
Government population estimates from 2000. See: http://www.rajsec.rajasthan.gov.in/secraj/pan_partA-
3.htm. In my survey data, there are 750 households per GP on average.  
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 2008 Figures. Government of Rajasthan: 
<http://www.nird.org.in/Rural%20Development%20Statistics%202011-12/data/sec-9.pdf> 
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on the ballot at the gram panchayat level. The election commission ban on party symbols 
in GP elections aimed to make elections at the village level personal rather than partisan; 
however, parties have penetrated the GP (Dunning and Nilekani 2013). Parties use the GP 
as a recruiting tool; GP politicians often depend on partisan politicians such as MLAs and 
representatives of the higher tiers of the Panchayat Raj for electoral support or funds for 
pork projects; and sarpanch often serve as middlemen to higher-level politicians. Voter 
awareness of GP politicians’ partisan preferences is also high: 82 percent of surveyed 
voters in Karnataka and 96 percent in Rajasthan correctly identified the party of the GP 
President (Dunning and Nilekani 2013).  
Finally, the gram panchayat has responsibility for identifying the beneficiaries of 
targeted benefits from state and national welfare schemes—a task which includes 
collecting information on residents to improve targeting of those benefits. Consistent with 
the depiction of brokers in other contexts where clientelism is pervasive (Stokes 2005; 
Bardhan and Mookherjee 2012; Calvo and Murillo 2013), sarpanch target these policy 
benefits according to a political logic (Dunning and Nilekani 2013; Markussen 2010).
159
 
My observations also suggests that GP Presidents selectively grant voters favors and 
facilitate access to higher level bureaucrats and politicians, which is often necessary for 
citizens to obtain favors or benefits from an unresponsive state (Bussell 2011; Kruks-
Wisner 2010). Contrary to the view by Manor (2000) and Krishna (2007) that fixers are 
independent from the state, observations in fieldwork suggest that while many local 
brokers are not be elected to the GP, it is likely that elected GP politicians, or their 
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 According to responses from an elite survey conducted in Rajasthan by Dunning and Nilekani (2013), 
voters and GP politicians identified GP Presidents as more influential than bureaucrats and other GP 
members when it comes to welfare distribution.  
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husbands or close family members, perform brokerage functions.  
4.3. Sampling 
 The survey sampled 96 gram panchayats in seven districts, twelve blocks and six 
of Rajasthan’s seven administrative divisions.
160
 The sample generalizes to voters and GP 
politicians in rural contexts with a moderately high share of households below the 
poverty line and inter-party competition. To build the sample frame for this population, I 
used 2001 census data on the rural composition of blocks,
161
 data from the Government 
of Rajasthan on the share of below poverty line (BPL) households across blocks in 2001, 
and election commission data on political competition in panchayat samiti elections—the 
tier of the panchayat raj system above gram panchayats, which aligns with blocks.
162
 I 
restricted my sample to blocks with a 75 percent rural population according to the 2001 
census to reduce the chance of sampling GPs that function as suburbs. I excluded blocks 
with less than 20 percent of households in the BPL category in 2001 to ensure that the 
chance of sampling voters eligible for anti-poverty programs at random was non-trivial. I 
also excluded blocks where the median margin of victory across block-level (Panchayat 
Samiti) ward elections was greater than 15 percent.
163
 After this restriction was applied, 
approximately 60 of 249 blocks were eligible for sampling. Logistical concerns required 
that I sample two blocks in each district to the extent possible. This reduced the list to 
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 Rajasthan has 33 districts, 249 blocks, 7 administrative divisions, and 9177 gram panchayats in all. 
 
161
 Government data on the share of BPL households across gram panchayats was from 2001. More recent 
data was unavailable at the time of fieldwork in 2013.  
 
162
 This is the lowest level of aggregation at which election commission data is available and the lowest 
level that permits party symbols on the ballot. 
 
163
 Each member of this block-level legislative body is elected from a single member ward and according to 
a first past the post electoral rule. I use the median margin of victory across ward election in each panchayat 
samiti as gram panchayat electoral data could not be obtained. 
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approximately 50 blocks. I randomly sampled one district in 5 of Rajasthan’s seven 
divisions from a pool of districts in which three or more blocks were eligible for 
sampling according to these criteria.
164
 From this list, two blocks were randomly selected 
from the pool of eligible blocks in each district. In Udaipur, the sixth division selected, 
three eligible blocks did not exist in any one district. As a practical alternative, I 
randomly selected one block each from two neighboring districts in the division: Udaipur 
and Rajsamand.   
 Once 12 blocks were sampled, I collected data on political competition across 
gram panchayats through interviews.
165
 Members of my research team and I interviewed 
block party presidents—party organizers immersed in the politics of gram panchayats in 
their block— who were asked to characterize the level of competition between Congress 
and the BJP as non-competitive, somewhat competitive, or very competitive. Of the 452 
GPs in 12 sampled blocks, 180 were described as non-competitive, 133 as somewhat 
competitive, and 139 as very competitive. To increase the chance that the target 
population would be sampled, given resource constraints, non-competitive GPs were 
dropped from the pool for sampling. In each block, I randomly selected 4 GPs among 
those coded as somewhat competitive and very competitive respectively. I then randomly 
selected one ward in each sampled GP and randomly sampled household in sampled 
wards using the gram panchayat voters’ list, which is public information provided by the 
election commission.
166
 I sampled (predominantly male) heads of household in randomly 
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 Rajasthan has 7 divisions, which include 4 to 6 districts each. 
 
165
 This was necessary because electoral commission data on gram panchayat elections is not available 
from a centralized source. 
 
166
 This was done because the elite survey samples one ward member in each GP for analysis not included 
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sampled households because they are generally the household member most engaged in 
village politics and citizen-state relations.
167
 The elite survey was fielded the day after the 
vote survey was completed in a given GP. I illustrate the steps in sampling in figure 4.1.  
 
5. Experimental Design  
 To identify the effect of co-partisanship on voters’ distributive expectations, I 
developed a vignette survey experiment in which I randomized respondent-provided local 
partisan politician cues across the two major parties in Rajasthan: Congress and BJP.
168
 
To reduce the number of cognitive steps that a respondent must complete in a short time, 
I chose experimental cues that capture information respondents were likely to have 
received prior to the experiment. I randomly assigned respondent-provided Congress or 
BJP politician cues within a short and familiar vignette. Subsequently, I asked voters to 
report their expectations of receiving a several types of benefits implemented by the gram 
panchayat if the cued politician were to win the next elections. There is no control group 
as this is not meaningful and would have likely lead respondents to assume they received 
a cue to the current sarpanch who is overwhelmingly understood to be partisan (See 
Dunning and Nilekani 2013).
169
 In this section, I lay out the design, provide descriptive 
                                                                                                                                                                     
in this paper. To analyze ward-voter ties, all sampled voters must live in one GP ward. 
 
167
 To identify heads of household, interviewers were instructed to request to speak to the head of 
household upon approaching each sampled household. If heads of household were not at home, 
interviewers were instructors to either interview them on the fields in which many of them worked or to 
return to the household later in the day. If they did not return, supervisors provided alternative respondents 
who were also randomly selected from a voters list.   
 
168
 I do not have a pure control in which a sarpanch candidate is from ‘no party’ since this has plausibility 
problems or would lead voters to assume the vignette referred to the current sarpanch who has a partisan 
affiliation— as elite survey results show. 
 
169
 95 percent of my sarpanch sample identified with a political party according to a party closeness 
measure.  
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statistics on respondent-provided politicians, and conduct balance and validity checks.  
 
5.1 Identifying Partisan Effects  
  This experiment captures the effect of co-partisanship on distributive 
expectations in a way that minimizes the risk of satisficing and maximizes external 
validity. To minimize cognitive demand and increase motivation, I randomly assigned 
cues to partisan politicians whom respondents identified themselves. Since local 
politicians and voters in this context overwhelmingly know each other,
170
 we should 
expect voters to have accumulated fine-grained information on plausible candidates for 
sarpanch prior to the implementation of the survey experiment. Thus, voters accumulate 
extensive information on plausible candidates before making prospective judgments on 
how local politicians will perform in office and which villagers they are likely to favor in 
targeted distribution. To capture this informational context, I randomly assigned cues to 
partisan politician whom respondents identify and understand to be prominent Congress 
or BJP politicians from their gram panchayat. Specifically, I asked respondents to 
identify the most popular politicians from Congress and BJP in their gram panchayat and 
subsequently randomized whether they were exposed to the Congress or BJP politician 
whom they named earlier in the survey.
171
 
 This choice of partisan cues has several characteristics that reduce the risk of 
satisficing. First, respondents received information prior to treatment, which means that 
they do not have to process information they have been exposed to for the first time in a 
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 Sarpanch interviewed in the elite survey report to know 95% of voters I my sample. 
 
171
 When voters could not identify partisan politicians, I asked local politicians to provide four alternates, 
and asked respondents if they knew these replacements. The first on the list they reported to know was used 
as an alternative cue.   
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short period of time. Second, respondents are likely to have developed judgments about 
cued politicians prior to the treatment. Thus, the cognitive demands of forming 
distributive expectations are significantly lower in this design than in fictional candidate 
experiments. In the latter, respondents must not only comprehend the profile of fictional 
candidate characteristics provided in a vignette, but develop complicated prospective 
judgments for the first time. Third, cues are plausible to the respondent as they identified 
cued politicians themselves. This avoids the problem of passive non-compliance and 
confusion that can be caused by implausible candidate profiles in fictional candidate 
experiments. I can also be confident that cued politicians are understood as partisans 




 Fourth, by asking respondents to identify popular politicians from the Congress 
and BJP explicitly, I can be confident that cued politicians are understood as partisans 
rather than independents. Finally, by randomizing the partisan affiliation of salient 
politicians only, and allowing other characteristics to vary according to which local 
leaders a voter identifies as salient, I do not depend on respondents to consider tradeoffs 
between candidate characteristics under the time constraints of the survey experiment. To 
the extent that respondents consider trade-offs across politician characteristics, summary 
judgments based on such trade-offs of cued candidates have likely taken place prior to the 
experiment. In a context of highly salient local politics, assigning real partisan politician 
cues is also likely to increase motivation by making the experiment relevant to 
respondents’ lives and in reference to individuals they know personally.  
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 Manor (2000) and Krishna (2007) argue that village leaders often eschew partisanship. I ensure that I do 
not identify non-partisans in partisan cues by explicitly asking respondents to identify prominent leaders 
from Congress and BJP.  
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In short, the choice to employ real candidate cues substantially reduces cognitive 
demands and plausibly increases motivation relative to existing alternatives. This 
substantially reduces the risk of satisficing.  
 Along with comparative advantages vis-à-vis fictional candidate experiments, this 
design has benefits over simply randomizing politicians on the ballot prior to an election 
for theoretical and logistical reasons. (1) Since party symbols are not permitted on the 
ballot for sarpanch elections in Rajasthan, there is no party nomination process for 
candidate selection. This means that candidate lists would have to be coded for 
partisanship by local informants between the time the candidate list is set and the time of 
the elections. The logistics of obtaining election commission data on candidate lists in a 
timely fashion complicates such an approach.
173
 (2) There are often multiple candidates 
on the ballot for sarpanch who are affiliated with the same political party. This mean that 
I would need to collect subjective information from local informants on which of the 
politicians affiliated with the same political party is most prominent across GPs. (3) Due 
to the rotating quota system, candidates on the ballot may be perceived by voters as 
subordinate to a prominent local politician. By allowing voters to identify prominent 
politicians, cues are likely to come closer to how voters understand differences in access 
to targeted benefits across Congress and BJP politicians who make decisions in the GP. 
(4) I can be confident that I am capturing voters’ perceptions of partisan figures since I 
explicitly ask them to identify the most popular politician from Congress and BJP. While 
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 This information is generally held by a block development officer (bureaucrat), which is a civil servant 
at the sub-district level. Obtaining this information often requires developing a personal connection to 
BDOs in all blocks sampled in the survey. Since election take place shortly after candidate lists are 
formalized, it is not feasible to obtain this data between the release of candidate lists and the election. The 




I could have selected one politician for each party ex ante— by deferring to candidate 
lists or asking a local informant— my approach ensures that the voter personally 
understands that the cued politician is a salient partisan representative.  
  For the text of the vignette itself, I developed a scenario that would be familiar 
and simple for respondents to understand.
174
 Sarpanch are understood to have discretion 
over the proposal of local public works projects in the gram panchayat and significant 
discretion over the management of these projects (Duflo 2003). Qualitative interviews 
with sarpanch suggest that the selection of local infrastructure projects such as the 
building of community centers or local roads are an important and visible aspect of the 
sarpanch position. Sarpanch are allocated state government funds for such projects, 
which they propose in cooperation with engineers who ascertain feasibility. Reflecting 
this, the experimental vignette describes a local infrastructure project.  
 Outcome variables capture the distribution of government benefits implemented 
through the gram panchayat. The sarpanch has significant influence over the selection of 
beneficiaries to these programs. The main dependent variable concerns access to jobs on 
the infrastructure   project described in the vignette. These casual labor jobs are often 
funded by the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act— a federal 
government scheme implemented through local governments— that guarantees all Indian 
citizens 100 hours of paid labor each year. Existing research and my own interviews 
suggest that MGNREGA jobs are highly salient to villagers (Dasgupta 2014). I also 
include a measure of selective policy benefits (BPL Cards). I include a measure of the 
sarpanch’s ability to bring development funds, or pork, to the GP from the state 
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 The vignette was developed through preliminary qualitative interviews with voters and sarpanch and in 
pretesting. 
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government to measure voters’ expectations on the effect of partisanship on access to 
local public goods for the purpose of comparison with the two selective benefits at the 
core of the analysis for this paper. Consistent with the discussion of cognitive demands in 
section 3.1, I interpret results on these selective benefit post-treatment outcomes as 
expectations on access to state benefits broadly rather than as a measure of access to 
specific policy benefits in order to be conservative in the inferences I draw. Finally, I 
include a post-treatment vote intention item—like most experiments of this type—as a 
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 Since I cue only one politician in a given treatment group, I do not interpret this as a measure of vote 
choice I expect it, however, to be informative in determining the effect of partisanship on vote choice.  
Experimental Treatment (Vignette) 
 
You must know that the sarpanch requests funds for public projects in the gram panchayat such as 
building a village road, school, or health center. For these projects, the sarpanch can tell the BDO [Block 
Development Officer] that he will choose workers for the project among people with a  (MGNREGA) job 
card. 
 
Let's say the Congress/BJP leader named _______________ (the strongest leader in the GP from 
Congress/BJP mentioned by the respondent in item B8/B9) becomes sarpanch in the next GP elections two 
years from now. 
 
The Congress/BJP leader named ________________will choose workers for a project to build a small 
community center in the village and a small number of people from the village will get jobs. 
Please think carefully about this situation and answer the questions about the project. Remember that 
Congress/BJP leader______________ is the sarpanch in this situation. 
 
Outcome Measures  
 
1) Would you or a member of your family get one of these jobs? 
2) If this person were sarpanch next time, do you think he could help get you access to a below poverty line 
(BPL) card or Public Distribution System (PDS) benefits-- when new BPL cards become released? 
3) If this person were sarpanch next time, would he be able to bring funds from the state government to the 
GP? 
4) Would you give _______________ [Politician Name given] your vote if he ran in the next GP elections?   
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5.2 Limitations   
 I argue that this experimental design has clear advantages over fictional candidate 
experiments with respect to minimizing the risk of satisficing, which increases data 
quality, and better approximates real-world mechanisms, which increases generalizability 
(See Camerer 2011). The design does not, however, come without costs. First, while I 
randomize party affiliation of the sarpanch, I do not identify the independent effect of 
partisanship on expectations of benefits. For example, unlike Dunning and Nilekani 
(2013), Banerjee et al. (2014), and Chauchard (2014b), I do not randomize both the cued 
politician’s partisanship and caste, although I control for this. I made this choice because 
randomizing caste independent of partisanship detracts from realism and removes the 
possibility of identifying local politicians known and perceived as salient by respondents. 
 Second, I cannot reject the possibility that unobserved characteristics of cued 
politicians affect distributive expectations. For example, it is plausible that personal ties 
or a history of personal interactions between voters and named politicians impact 
expectations of benefits. I argue that this does not undermine the result. In a local context 
in India where party-voter linkages are generally non-ideological (See Zeigfeld 2009), it 
may be the case that social proximity affects attachments to partisan politicians. If voters 
identify local politicians according to a mix of true popularity in the GP and social 
proximity (or an interaction between the two), this captures the nature of party-voter 
linkages on the ground. In short, I understand the effect of exposure to a vignette with a 
Congress or BJP politician cue to represent a realistic partisan effect—which reflects the 
information-rich and personal context of partisan competition at the local level— rather 
than the pure independent effect of partisanship (as an information shortcut) that fictional 
 187 
candidate vignette experiments identify.  
 Third, I cue local politicians whom respondents identify themselves and consider 
to be prominent. This means that the treatment is not constant across the full sample but 
varies across GPs and across respondents in the same GP. The logic behind this choice is 
that the treatment captures the effect of a salient, known politician’s partisanship on 
voters’ distributive expectations. Although this is not as clean as alternative designs, 
which have their own limitations, on average the treatment effect captures the effect of 
partisan ties on distributive preferences and without assigning a partisan politician 
treatment that is not salient to all respondents. Fourth, it is possible that using real 
politicians known to respondents as partisan cues creates floor effects. Respondents may 
identify local politicians whom they know better rather than those who are objectively 
most popular—and therefore expect local politicians from both parties to be more likely 
to facilitate access to selective benefits than would be the case with top—performing 
candidates for sarpanch in the real world. They may also be less willing to say that these 
known leaders would be unlikely to provide selective benefits if they won the next GP 
elections. Along with the effects of unobservable characteristics, which respondents 
observe but I do not, I argue that this means the treatment effects identified are 
conservative. This bolsters my confidence in the co-partisan result I discuss in the next 
section.   
 
5.3 Descriptive Statistics: Local Politician Cues 
 In this section, I provide several validity checks on the real candidate 
experimental design. 
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 First, I provide data on the local politicians identified by respondents to 
demonstrate that responses capture relevant and known local politicians. To identify 
politicians, I asked respondents the following: What is the name of the most popular 
BJP/Congress leader in this gram panchayat? 93 percent of respondents provided the 
name and caste of politicians from the partisan treatment condition to which they were 
assigned; 84 percent provided names for both Congress and BJP politicians irrespective 
of treatment assignment. Respondents among the 93 percent who named treated 
politicians are understood to know cued politicians since they named them without 
assistance. For those who refused or did not know the answer to the Congress/BJP 
politician name survey items, I used a list of three to four backups provided by the 
sarpanch, or if he or she was unavailable, the elected gram panchayat ward member from 
the respondent’s ward, before the voter survey began in a particular GP.
176
 Interviewers 
asked respondents if they knew the first backup on the list and proceeded down the list 
until voters affirmed that they knew the named local politician.
177
 The first known 
politician on the list was then used as a partisan cue treatment in the vignette experiment. 
In short, whether respondents provided treated politician names or received a backup, all 
respondents knew the politicians they were exposed to as experimental cues.
178
 Later in 
the survey, I randomized the partisan politician (Congress or BJP) respondents were 
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 The ward is a smaller unit than the GP, so these individuals are more likely to be close neighbors of 
sampled voters than sarpanch. Recall that the survey design sampled all voters in a GP from one ward only.  
 
177
 Of the 100 respondents who required a backup, 73 knew the first name on the list. Only 6 required a 
third or forth backup. 
 
178
 I present treatment effects for the full sample and only those who provided names for both Congress and 
BJP politicians to show that this the use of replacements does not significantly affect results.  
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exposed to across two partisan treatments.
179
  
 Second, I address the concern that non-response is correlated with partisan 
treatments. 90 and 87 percent of respondents provided names for Congress and BJP 
politicians respectively. Aggregating to gram panchayats, the share of respondents 
(according to treatment) who provided Congress and BJP names are similar. I plot this 
visually with a kernel density plot in figure A2 of the appendix. We can see here that the 
share of respondents who named BJP and Congress politicians varies across GPs; 
however, Congress and BJP response rates are consistent across the two partisan 
treatments. To explain this distribution in terms of percentages, respondents who received 
the Congress or BJP treatment provided names for the partisan politician they were 
exposed to in the experiment 100 percent of the time in 65 and 61 of the 96 sampled gram 
panchayats respectively while respondents in these treatments provided 80 percent of 
relevant politician names in 18 and 22 percent of sampled GPs respectively. In only 1 and 
6 GPs did less than 50 percent of respondents provide relevant names for Congress and 
BJP treatments. This shows that response rates were high and broadly consistent across 
respondents exposed to the two treatment conditions.  
 Third, I use evidence from the survey to address the concern that respondents 
provided the names of idiosyncratic politicians such as their friends or close neighbors 
rather than the prominent politicians the survey question aims to identify. To explore 
whether or not voters identified politicians who were understood as prominent in the GP 
in general, I identified the Congress and BJP politician that most respondents from the 
same gram panchayat provided, which I refer to as modal politicians. I code modal 
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 Politician name were included in the second section (B) of the survey; the experiment was in the fourth 
section (D). This created a substantial time buffer.  
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politicians according to the pattern of responses of all respondents in a particular GP 
(irrespective of treatment) to increase the number of observations I have to identify the 
modal politicians. Out of 10 respondents per GP, respondents from the same GP provided 
the same Congress and BJP names 6 and 5 times on average in a given GP. Next, I 
calculated the share of voters sampled from the same GP who provided the modal local 
politician’s name for Congress and BJP with respect to treatment. At the level of gram 
panchayats, 66 percent of respondents from both Congress and BJP treatment groups 
identified the modal Congress and BJP politician respectively.
180
 I provide kernel density 
plots in figure 3 to show the distribution on the share of respondents across GPs who 
named modal politician names with respect to the party affiliation of their assigned 
treatment. We can see here that respondents not only identified local politicians whom 
others agreed were prominent partisan politicians to a substantial degree, but that the 
share of cued politicians who were modal was similar across treatment groups.  
 Fourth, I address the concern that instead of identifying prominent local 
politicians, respondents are simply identifying politicians who are socially proximate. 
Although the survey did not include data on friendship, kinship, or close neighbor ties 
vis-à-vis cued politicians, I asked respondents to provide the sub-caste (jati) of named 
local leaders, which I subsequently coded into broader politically relevant caste 
categories.
181
 I provide data on variation in co-ethnicity by treatment group and ethnic 
groups in table 1. This table shows the share of respondents who named co-ethnics as 
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 In the full sample (irrespective of treatment), 62 and 57 percent of respondents provided the most 
commonly identified Congress and BJP names respectively.  
 
181
 As was the case in the prior two chapters of the dissertation, these groups include: Brahmins (Upper 
Castes excluding Rajputs), Rajputs, Jats, Other Backward Castes (excluding Jats), Scheduled Castes, 
Meenas, Scheduled Tribes (excluding Meenas), and Muslims.  
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popular politicians for politicians they were exposed to in Congress and BJP treatment 
groups across major ethnic group in Rajasthan and in the aggregate. We can see here that 
38 and 37 percent of the respondents who provided politician names, identified a co-
ethnic politician with respect to Congress and BJP treatments respectively. Since 
Rajasthan’s social geography is ethnically segregated by neighborhood (in larger 
villages) or by (small) village, which means that respondents are more likely to be closest 
to co-ethnic leaders than non-ethnic ones, this is a moderate number of co-ethnic 
responses. We might be concerned that respondents chose politicians who were friends or 
neighbors—which is correlated with co-ethnicity in a village setting— if most of the 
named politicians were co-ethnics. This appears is not the case.  
 Table 1 also indicates that respondents who identified co-ethnic politicians often 
did so in a discerning manner that reflected the nature of group-party linkages in 
Rajasthan. For example, among Rajput respondents, 14 percent more respondents 
identified co-ethnic BJP politicians than co-ethnic Congress politicians, while 13 percent 
more scheduled caste respondents named co-ethnic Congress politicians as compared to 
those who identified co-ethnic BJP politicians.
182
 Moreover, respondents were overall 
more likely to have identified BJP leaders from the upper castes (e.g. Rajputs) and 
Congress leaders from the lower castes (e.g. scheduled castes and scheduled tribes). This 
pattern is consistent with the groups broadly understood as core bases of these parties 
(Lodha 2009). In short, variation in the ethnicities of the politicians respondents 
identified and substantial correlation in the specific politicians respondents form the same 
gram panchayats identified suggests broadly that voters are not merely selecting the most 
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 Differences in means (from t-tests) are statistically significant only for scheduled castes although 
differences among Rajputs and scheduled tribes are substantively significant but have subgroup sample 
sizes that are too small to achieve statistical significance.  
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familiar co-ethnics from their neighborhood irrespective of their political prominence in 
the GP.  
 Fifth, to support the argument that voters are identifying relevant local politicians, 
interviewers were asked to collect data on named politicians’ positions in parties and 
local government. Voters provided responses on 439 cases for Congress leaders and 396 
cases for Congress politicians in the full sample (irrespective of treatment). The most 
common answers (in order of frequency) were party workers, sarpanch, and former 
sarpanch. Although there is substantial missing data, this is what we should expect the 
backgrounds of prominent village politicians to be.  
 As a whole, descriptive statistics suggest that respondent-identified partisan 
politicians capture the population of local politicians the design intended to identify.  
 
5.4 Balance Across Partisan Cue Treatments   
 In this sub-section, I show that randomization achieved balance in voter 
characteristics across Congress and BJP treatment groups. Half of the randomly selected 
voters in each gram panchayat received each of the two partisan cue treatments. This 
means that GP characteristics and voter characteristics should be balanced across 
treatments. I estimate regressions on treatment assignment to test for whether voter and 
GP characteristics are balanced across Congress and BJP treatment groups for both the 
full sample and a sample restricted to partisans of any party according to the standard 
psychological attachment measure of partisanship mentioned above. The results show 
this to be the case. 
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 I include a range of demographic and political characteristics as independent 
variables in varying intercept multi-level and logit models (with fixed effects) on 
treatment assignment presented in table 2. I include an index wealth measure that used 
weights from a principal components analysis of 15 asset items, which I split into 
quintiles to capture blunt wealth categories (See Filmer and Pritchet 2001). I find balance 
across treatment groups when I include indicators for wealth quintiles or a single ordinal 
wealth measure. I also include a measure of educational attainment, which captures an 
increase of two standard deviations from zero (i.e. illiterate), indicators for relevant caste 
groups, and number of political characteristics including partisan vote intentions, self-
identified partisanship, and an index measure of political participation. I find balanced on 
all of these respondent characteristics. I also checked for balance on access to selective 
benefits, which may be mediated by partisan ties to local politicians who have some 
discretion over allocation. I included receipt of jobs from the Mahatma Gandhi National 
Rural Employment Guarantee program and a below poverty line (BPL) cards, which 
determines eligibility for subsidized food among many other welfare benefits provided 
through the Public Distribution System (PDS). I find balance on these variables. The only 
characteristics I find to be imbalanced are self-reported turnout and non-response on the 
politician name question with respect to the party of the treatment condition.
183
 These 
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 Respondents in the BJP treatment are more likely to require back-ups according to results from model 1.  
 
184
 Non-partisans are those who reported that they do not feel close to any particular party. I find that 
respondents who are less educated, come from scheduled tribes (STs), and exhibit low levels of political 
participation are most likely to have refused or failed to provide a politician name from the party cued in 
the treatment assignment. Thus, when balance regressions are restricted to non-partisans, this effect 
dissipates. 
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6. Results  
 In this section, I present the results of the real candidate vignette experiment. I 
proceed as follows. First, I present the ATE across outcomes using differences-in-means 
(t-tests), which employ Welch’s calculation for variance. Second, I present results on 
heterogeneous treatment effects conditioning on respondents’ partisan characteristics. 
Third, I demonstrate that partisan effects are not driven by perceived differences in 
ethnicity across partisan politicians.  
 This experiment identifies partisan effects by identifying the effect of a known 
partisan politician from the Congress Party or BJP on voters’ expectations of access to 
selective benefits. The effect of interest is an interaction between a randomly assigned 
partisan cue and co-partisanship between voters and cued politicians. 
 
6.1 The Effect of Partisanship on Distributive Expectations: ATE 
 
 
 Before presenting results on co-partisan (heterogeneous) effects, I present average 
treatment effects (ATE) on benefits and vote choice outcomes, which measure the difference 
between exposure to a BJP or Congress Party politician on vote expectations and expectations of 
selective benefits and state funds for pork.
185
  
 The results in table 3 show that the party in power at the state level affects respondents’ 
distributive expectations for a range of benefits. Respondents who received the BJP treatment 
were 6 percent more likely to expect a BPL card than those who received the Congress 
treatment. Five percent more respondents exposed to the BJP treatment expected that cued 
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 Note that a negative signs means that the BJP treatment group has a larger mean than the Congress 
treatment group. A positive sign means the Congress treatment group had a larger mean than BJP. 
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politicians (as sarpanch) would be able to bring state funds (i.e. pork) to the GP, which often 
depends on a sarpanch’s connection to state politicians. Since the experiment asks voters what 
their distributive expectations would be if the cued politician were to win the next GP election 
for sarpanch (which will occur in 2015) and took place nine months before the BJP decisively 
defeated the incumbent Congress Party government in Rajasthan, the ATE reflects a broad 
perception that the BJP would win the next elections and control the government by 2015, which 
these results suggest respondents perceived to have consequences for access to these benefits. 
Consistent with this interpretation, the difference-in-means on the vote choice outcome shows 
that respondents who received the BJP politician cue were 6 to 7 percent more likely to express a 
vote intention for the cued politician than those who received the Congress politician cue. This 
reflects the timing of the survey, which took place when the Rajasthan electorate was in an anti-
Congress (incumbent) mood nine months before they saw a major defeat in the state assembly 
elections. Interestingly, the ATE shows that respondents in the Congress treatment group 
expressed distributive expectations that were .1 (of 4) points higher than those in the BJP 
treatment group, which is statistically significant at the 90 percent level.
186
  
 The average treatment effects indicate that respondents perceive co-partisanship between 
the state government and sarpanch to have an impact on access to selective state benefits and 
pork. This is as expected in a context of non-programmatic politics where political connections 
play an important role in targeting outcomes. However, the ATE does not provide information on 
the effect of co-partisan ties vis-à-vis the sarpanch who has influence over the selection of 
beneficiaries to government programs implemented by local governments. I present interactions 
between partisan cues and voters’ partisan characteristics in the next sub-section.  
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 This may be due to the fact that this is a Congress flagship program; BJP leaders have attacked this 
program since its passing in parliament in 2005.  
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6.2 The Effect of Co-Partisanship on Distributive Expectations 
 To identify the effects of the party affiliation of the sarpanch on distributive expectations 
for selective benefits, I provide results from difference-in-means tests conditioning on voters’ 
partisan characteristics in table 4.
187
 These results show heterogeneity in treatment effects across 
three types of partisan characteristics: respondent partisanship toward Congress or the BJP 
measured through psychological attachment;
188
 a behavioral measure of partisanship coded 
according to whether or not voters reported that they supported the same party (Congress or BJP) 
in the previous state elections in 2008, and in a vote intention item that asked what party they 
would vote for if a state election were to be held tomorrow;
189
 and non-partisans who report that 
they do not feel close to any particular party. For ease of exposition, I refer to partisans 
according to the psychological attachment measure as Congress and BJP partisans and to 
consistent partisan voters according to the behavioral measure as Congress and BJP voters. 
 At the outset, the results on vote choice demonstrate that partisanship is salient at the GP 
level as I argue throughout the dissertation. Congress and BJP partisans according to the 
psychological attachment measure prefer co-partisan politicians in their GP to non-co-partisans 
by 24 and 30 percent respectively. Congress and BJP voters —a behavioral measure of 
partisanship—prefer co-partisan to non-co-partisan politicians by 19 and 31 percent respectively. 
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 I use Welch’s calculation for variance for all t-test results because sample sizes are not equal when I 
condition on voter characteristics (See Baldwin 2013). 
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 I code partisanship using the standard party-closeness measure: Do you feel close to any particular 
party? If so, Which one? When the respondent answers affirmatively and provide a party, I code co-








The negative sign on vote intentions for non-partisans shows that the BJP had the edge among 
non-partisan or swing voters, which we also saw in the ATE vote intention results.  
 Since allocation of pork is characterized by discretion from state politicians, respondents 
plausibly expect a BJP sarpanch—who is more likely than a Congress Party sarpanch to have ties 
to a new BJP state government— to have better access to funds for pork projects. Results show 
that BJP partisans, BJP voters, and non-partisans were 9, 10, and 10 percentage points more 
likely to expect pork funds to come to their GP if they were exposed to a BJP politician. 
Consistent with results from ATEs, Congress partisans and Congress voters seem to have been 
resigned to a BJP victory in the 2013 state elections, which is evidenced by the weak and 
statistically insignificant treatment effects on expectations of state funds for these respondents.   
 Second, there is evidence that respondents distinguished between pork provided by state 
governments and selective benefits such as BPL cards and MGNREGA jobs on public 
infrastructure projects, which are formally implemented by gram panchayats. Unlike the case for 
state development funds, Congress partisans and Congress voters exposed to a co-partisan 
politician were significantly more likely to expect a job or BPL card from a co-partisan politician 
and vice versa for BJP supporters and voters. According to difference-in-means tests, Congress 
partisans exposed to a Congress politician and BJP partisans exposed to a BJP politician 
expressed job expectations that were .29 and .39 points higher (on a 4 point scale) respectively 
than was the case when Congress and BJP partisans were exposed to a non-co-partisan politician 
cue. Congress and BJP partisans were 15 and 21 percent more likely to expect a BPL card when 
they were exposed to a co-partisan politician as compared to when they were exposed to a non-
co-partisan. When partisanship is measured behaviorally, Congress and BJP voters exposed to a 
co-partisan politician reported expectations on jobs that were .2 and .46 points higher (on a 4-
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point scale) respectively than was the case when they were exposed to a non-co-partisan 
politician cue. Congress and BJP voters were respectively two and five percentage points more 
likely to expect a BPL card when exposed to a co-partisan politician although the result on 
Congress voters does not reach statistical significance at the 90 percent confidence level.   
 To check the robustness of the difference-in-means results, I model variation in response 
to the partisan treatment on distributive expectations using multivariate regression.
190
 As 
selective benefits— namely jobs and BPL cards— are most relevant to voter-sarpanch ties, I 
focus the regression analysis on these distributive expectations. I estimate the effect of co-
partisanship on expectations of a job with ordinary least squares (OLS).
191
 I model the effect of 
co-partisanship on the dichotomous outcome of whether or not a respondent expected to get a 




 The baseline model of treatment assignment and co-partisanship (model 1) is roughly 
equivalent to differences-in-means tests above. I include an indicator for treatment assignment 
and an indictor for whether or not the respondent belongs to the same party as the cued politician 
coded by self-reported partisan attachment.
193
 In model 2, I regress the distributive expectations 
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 I estimated co-partisan effects for the full sample and for a sample restricted to those who were exposed 
to politician names they provided themselves—thus excluding backups. The results on co-partisanship did 
not change. For this reason, I proceed with models without this restriction but include an indicator for those 
who did not provide either politician name as a control.    
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 Recall that my measure of expectations of a job on the local infrastructure project described in the 
vignette has a 4 point scale ranging from 1 to 4 with a mean of 3.34. 
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 I also included gram panchayat fixed effects and found the results to be consistent. The co-partisan 
effect point estimate increases when I add block fixed effects and increases further when I include GP fixed 
effects. Results from the GP fixed effect regression can be provided upon request.  
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 Recall that when a respondent reports that he feels close to a particular party and provides the name of 
that party he is considered a partisan. When that party matches the party affiliation of the cued politician, I 
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outcomes on treatment assignment; co-partisanship; an index measure of assets based on 
principle components analysis that is weighted by two standard deviations (See Filmer and 
Pritchet 2001); a measure of an increase of two standard deviations (from no education or 
illiteracy) in years of educational that is weighted by two standard deviations; indicators for 
major castes groups in Rajasthan and Muslim religion; controls for self-reported turnout in the 
previous state elections and whether or not they feel close to any political party; and an indicator 
coded one if the respondent could not or refused to name either of the two partisan politicians. I 
add fixed effects for gram panchayats in model 3. I provide confidence intervals for regressions 
on the full sample and the sample restricted to partisans for jobs and BPL cards in figures 4 and  
5. Regression results are included in tables 5 and 6 in the appendix.  
 Regression results clearly show that co-partisanship positively affects voters’ distributive 
expectations. Across all models estimated for the full sample and a sample restricted to partisans, 
co-partisanship has a statistically and substantively significant effect on distributive expectations 
for jobs and BPL cards. Confidence intervals show that results do not significantly differ when I 
restrict the sample to partisans. It is also clear that adding controls for voter characteristics and 
GP fixed effects increase the size of the effect of co-partisanship on distributive expectations, 
although an F-test for joint significance fails to reject the null hypothesis that model 2, including 
controls for demographics and political characteristics, fits the data better than the baseline 
model of treatment assignment and co-partisanship on distributive expectations alone. I interpret 
estimates on co-partisan effects from models on the unrestricted sample below. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
consider this person a co-partisan. This differs from the difference in means result because rather than 
restricting to Congress partisans, I code co-partisans 1 and all others (including non-partisans) as 0.  
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 In substantive terms, co-partisanship increases distributive expectations on access to a job 
on the local infrastructure project by approximately .34 points on a four point scale according to 
model 2, which is approximately the average of Congress and BJP treatment effects noted in the 
difference-in-means results in table 4. This increases to an approximately .36 point difference in 
the fixed effect model. To identify co-partisan effects on the BPL card distributive expectations, 
I apply the divide-by-four rule for transforming logit coefficients into probabilities as an upper 
bound (Gelman and Hill 2007), holding the independent variables at their mean. Co-partisans are 
20 percent more likely to expect a BPL card if the cued politician were to win the next GP 
elections than non-co-partisans. In the fixed effect model co-partisans were approximately 24 
percentage points more likely to expect a BPL card than non-co-partisans. These effects are 
substantially large and consistent with the broad argument of this dissertation.   
6.3 Is Co-Partisanship Mediated by Ethnicity?    
 The design of this experiment differs from previous work that employs fictional 
candidate vignette experiments in that the only candidate characteristic that is randomly assigned 
is partisanship, which may coincide with other characteristics that affect distributive expectations 
such as ethnic ties and other unobserved characteristics. My core claim that co-partisan ties play 
a primary role in shaping voters’ distributive preferences would be weakened if co-partisan 
effects were explained by ethnic differences across parties. To demonstrate that co-partisan ties 
are robust to variation in cued politician ethnicities, I present regression results that control for 
co-ethnicity to demonstrate that co-partisan effects are robust to co-ethnicity between 
respondents at the treatment condition. Second, I leverage data provided by respondents on cued 
politicians’ castes for both treated and untreated politicians. This allows me to demonstrate 
identify partisan effects for voters who perceive prominent politicians of both parties to belong to 
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the same ethnic group and different ethnic groups— in effect controlling for ethnic distance that 
underlies the party effect at the individual level.  
 As a first cut, recall that 35 percent of respondent-named partisan politicians (with 
respect to treatment) were co-ethnics according to politically relevant caste and Muslim religion. 
To get a sense of the extent to which co-ethnicity between respondents and cued politicians 
mediates partisan effects on distributive expectations, I estimate regressions on jobs and BPL 
card distributive expectations outcomes with a control for co-ethnicity in two models presented 
in table 7. On the right hand side, I include treatment assignment, co-partisanship, co-ethnicity, 
and the interaction of co-ethnicity and co-partisanship.
194
 The co-partisan effect holds in all 
models. Co-ethnicity has no effect on jobs expectations as a main effect or interaction with co-
partisanship. Co-ethnicity has a significantly large and positive coefficient in models estimated 
on expectations of a BPL card and the interaction of co-ethnicity and co-partisanship is negative 
and significant.
195
 Interpreted in terms of probability, respondents are 2 percentage points more 
likely to expect a BPL card from a member of their caste  (or Muslim religion) than from a non-
co-ethnic irrespective of partisan treatment. For the interaction, co-ethnic co-partisans are 
approximately 7.5 percent less likely to expect a BPL card than co-partisan, non-co-ethnics. 
While I do not identify ethnic effect causally, this analysis suggests that co-partisan effects are 
robust after taking co-ethnicity into account.  
 Next, I leverage data on respondent-identified politician names and castes for both treated 
and untreated politicians to show that variation on the ethnic dimension across parties does not 
                                                        
194
 I included a model with caste group indicators, which did not change results. Thus, for simplicity I 
present results from a more minimalist regression model.  
 
195
 After summing the positive coefficient on co-ethnicity and negative coefficient on the interaction, the 
marginal effect of the interaction is approximately 0.  
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explain the co-partisan effects presented above. Since I observe the ethnicities of Congress and 
BJP politicians for each respondent,
196
 but randomly assign only one of these, I can observe 
when voters identify Congress an BJP politicians from the same ethnic group and when they 
identify Congress and BJP politicians from different groups. Although I controlled for co-
ethnicity previously, this does not tell me whether the distributive expectations voters reported 
were rooted relative to a co-ethnic or non-co-ethnic from the alternative party. This data allows 
me to establish partisan effects for respondents who do and who do not perceive social distance 
(on the caste dimension) across parties. If co-ethnicity mediates co-partisan effects on 
distributive expectations, we should see larger effects among voters who perceive greater levels 
of social distance across parties. I calculate heterogeneous treatment effects for four subgroups 
based on variation in caste across named Congress and BJP politicians: respondents who 
identified two politician from the same caste (irrespective of co-ethnicity), those who identified 
politicians from different castes (irrespective of co-ethnicity), those who identified two co-ethnic 
politicians, and those who identified one co-ethnic politician.  
 I provide results from difference-in-means tests for politically relevant castes across 
partisan characteristics for both distributive expectations outcomes in table 8.
197
  I condition 
treatment effects on Congress and BJP partisans and non-partisans. The latter captures 
respondents who were not exposed to a co-partisan politician irrespective of party— as they hold 
no partisan preferences. Given the weak salience of partisanship for non-partisans, we should 
expect these respondents’ distributive expectations to be particularly shaped by ethnic ties. 
                                                        
 
196
 797 of 959 respondents provided names and castes for both Congress and BJP politicians whom they identified. 
197
 I also conducted the same tests on varna (4 caste clusters including scheduled castes, Scheduled tribes, 
other backward castes, and upper castes as well as Muslims) and found the same results. I do not include 
them in this paper. These results can be provided upon request. 
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Among partisans, the results in table 8 do not show larger partisan effects for voters who 
identified politicians from the same ethnic group or different groups across Congress and the BJP 
for the jobs outcome. The partisan effect is only larger (7 percent) among BJP partisans for the 
BPL card distributive expectations outcome. Among non-partisans, distributive expectations 
were higher in the BJP treatment when politicians from Congress and BJP were identified as 
belonging to different castes. There was a 17 percentage point change toward the BJP when we 
move from respondents who identified politicians from the same caste to difference castes 
irrespective of co-ethnicity. When we move from non-partisan respondents who identified both 
politicians as co-ethnics to those who identified only one as a co-ethnic, expectations are 11 
percentage points higher in the direction of the BJP politician.
198
 
 In short, the analysis in this section suggests that the co-partisan effects I find are not an 
artifact of ethnic differences that map onto differences in partisan preferences. While I do not 
have the ability to make a causal statement on the effect of ethnic ties on distributive, the 
analysis in this section shows that co-partisan effects on distributive expectations are robust to 
controlling for co-ethnicity. Blunt results that capture differences in social distance across treated 
and untreated respondent-identified politician cues—at the level of the respondent— also 
demonstrate that effects of partisan ties on distributive expectations are robust to ethnic ties vis-
à-vis cued politicians.  
7. Conclusion 
   This paper shows that partisanship is salient at the gram panchayat level and that 
voters condition their expectations of receiving targeted state benefits on co-partisanship 
                                                        
198
 Note that in regression analysis (not included here) I find no statistically significant effects on difference 
in co-partisan effects for jobs or BPL card distributive expectations across these subgroup.  
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with the sarpanch. I also find this effect to be robust to co-ethnicity and a more nuanced 
analysis of variation in the ethnic social distance of politicians respondents identified 
from both major political parties in Rajasthan. This paper establishes the robustness of 
this argument with a measurement strategy that is more conducive to external validity 
claims and that more closely identifies co-partisan effects on distributive expectations as 
it occurs on the ground. This paper also confirms at the voter-level the politician-level 
core targeting conclusion of the previous chapter of this dissertation. Above all, the goal 
of this paper is to establish the relevance of partisan salience over targeted distribution 
with a measurement strategy that can give us confidence that co-partisan effects capture 
the nature of village politics.  
 This paper makes three central contributions. First, this paper advances 
substantive research on party-voter linkages at the local level in India. Previous work has 
failed to invest sufficient attention in understanding local mechanisms through which 
partisan competition and distributive strategies affect elite behavior and voters’ access to 
needed subsistence benefits. Existing research suggests that caste shapes distributive 
strategies at the local level. While co-ethnicity has some relevance on BPL card 
distributive expectations in this paper, the basic logic of political targeting in a context of 
non-programmatic politics laid out in this dissertation holds greater explanatory power. 
Where local coalitions are built on targeted distribution, we should expect partisan 
calculations to trump of ethnic preferences, particularly where group tend to be too small 
to reach a majority as is the case in India. This paper support this view of politics. 
 Second, this paper contributes to research on experimentation in the study of 
political clientelism and party-voter linkages in developing democracies (Dunning and 
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Nilekani; Gallego and Wantchekon 2012; Baldwin 2013). Following theory which 
suggests that parties provide information shortcuts to citizens who lack incentives to 
collect complex information on public policies (Downs 1957; Snyder and Ting 2002), 
experimental work on partisan cues generally view party salience through the lens of 
information shortcuts (Brader and Tucker 2012; Samuels and Zucco 2014). This however 
depends on the existence of programmatic parties, or at minimum a perception among co-
partisan voters that party positions should guide their own issue positions. This departs 
from research on clientelism, which suggests that electoral competition shapes policy 
implementation while policy positions lack salience, particularly among the rural poor 
(See Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Chandra 2004; Fearon 1999). This also departs from 
the literature on broker-voter interaction and citizen strategies for accessing state benefits 
in democracies characterized by patronage politics, which suggests that voters strategize 
to obtain policy benefits to which they are formally entitled by integrating into local 
political networks (Calvo and Murillo 2013; See also Kruks-Wisner 2013). This paper 
links these two literatures by designing a partisan cue experiment that taps into personal 
localized relationships between voters and leaders. Building on important advances in 
detecting clientelistic practice, such as vote buying and the provision of patronage jobs in 
government bureaucracies with list experiments (Corstange 2010; Oliveros 2013), this 
paper lays out a method for identifying the effect of local politicians’ partisan affiliations 
on voters expectations of access to state benefits in a way that mirrors ground realities.  
 Third, this paper advances a methodological debate on measurement validity in 
the design and interpretation of survey experiments that identify the effects of candidate 
characteristics on vote preferences and candidate evaluations. I highlight a key problem 
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for fictional vignette experiments: the risk of satisficing due to the low motivation and 
high cognitive demands that characterize this experimental design. Importantly, this 
concern has not been considered in depth despite the pervasiveness of research that 
depends on this method. I argue that data quality is likely to be particularly low because 
respondents have minimal interest in responding to questions on fictional candidates and 
because the number and complexity of cognitive steps needed to properly respond to 
fictional candidate experiment vignettes is quite high. I argue that there is benefit to 
exploring designs that minimize this problem even at the risk of losing some 
experimental control. The experiment presented here is an imperfect yet important step 
forward in this methodological discussion. I expose respondents to a less burdensome 
cognitive task in a way that reflects their own experiences in village politics and keeps 
their interest. If my concern that causal identification in fictional candidate experiments 
comes at a potentially significant cost to measurement validity, I believe future efforts of 
this nature are warranted.  
 In summary, scholars of India have long debated the logic of targeted distribution 
at the local level and policy options for increasing its efficiency. This dissertation 
suggests that political competition and the democratic incentives that come with it play a 
key part in understanding the logic of targeted distribution at the village level in India. 
Consistent with the emphasis of this dissertation on contextually rooted measurement 
strategies that test core assumptions and logics of distribution, this paper provides a step 
forward in examining the effects of partisanship on distributive expectations at the local 
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     I plot kernel densities for the share of respondents within GPs identify the same partisan politician as most popular in the 




















































































Table 1: Co-Ethnic Named Politicians (by Group) 
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 This table indicates the share of respondents overall and within ethnic subgroups who named co-
 ethnic politicians across parties with respect to treatment assignment. Those who did not provide a 
 name for the partisan politician (corresponding to their treatment assignment) are excluded. In the 
 third column, I calculate difference in means. In the first columns, I provide the number of 
 respondents in each treatment group who provided the name of the politician they were exposed to 
 in treatment, which is the denominator used to calculate proportions of named co-ethnic (treated) 























Table 2: Balance Statistics 
 






 (0.10) (0.12) 
Experimental Backup Used -0.11
*
 -0.08 
 (0.06) (0.08) 
Wealth Quintile 0.01 0.02 
 (0.01) (0.02) 
Age 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Education (Standardized) -0.02 -0.02 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
Upper Castes -0.06 -0.06 
 (0.06) (0.07) 
Rajput -0.07 -0.04 
 (0.06) (0.07) 
Jat -0.04 -0.06 
 (0.06) (0.07) 
Scheduled Castes -0.03 -0.02 
 (0.05) (0.06) 
Scheduled Tribes -0.03 -0.06 
 (0.08) (0.09) 
Muslim 0.00 0.01 
 (0.06) (0.07) 
Partisans  -0.02  
 (0.04)  
Turnout (2008 state elections) 0.14
**
 0.12 
 (0.07) (0.08) 
Participation Index 0.00 0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Vote Intention (state elections) 0.00 -0.04 
 (0.03) (0.05) 
BPL Card 0.03 0.02 
 (0.04) (0.04) 
MGNREGA Job 0.02 0.03 
 (0.04) (0.04) 
Number of Congress Partisans (GP) 0.00 0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Partisan Preference  0.04 
  (0.06) 
Log Likelihood -692.18 -535.52 
Num. obs. 895 681 
Num. groups: GP number 96 95 
Variance: GP number.(Intercept) 0.00 0.00 
Variance: Residual 0.25 0.25 
***
p < 0.01, 
**
p < 0.05, 
*
p < 0.1 
 
* I check for balance across voter and GP characteristics with multi-level models (with random intercepts 
only) regressed on treatment assignment. Model 1 is run on the full sample. Model 2 includes a measure of 
partisanship in which Congress partisans are coded 1. Due to co-linearity, Model 2 includes partisans only. 
Thus, there is no estimate for partisans, which is a measure of identification with any political party.     
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Table 3: Average Treatment Effect on Distributive Expectations  
 Job  BPL Card State Funds (Pork) Vote Intention 
Congress - BJP  



























*The first row reports difference-in-means from t-tests for the full sample. The second row reports difference-in-
means only for respondents who provided politician names for both parties. Standard errors are in apprentices. N 
reports the combined number of observations used to calculate each difference across both treatments. I denote 





Table 4: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects Conditioned on Partisan Characteristics  
Sub-Groups Job  BPL Card State Funds (Pork) Vote Intention 




























































This table reports differences in means from t-tests across partisan sub-groups. Standard errors are in apprentices.     
N reports the combined number of observations used to calculate each difference across both treatments. I denote 






Table 5: Co-partisan Effect on Expectations of Jobs (OLS)  








 (0.05) (0.12) (0.12) 
Treatment -0.09 -0.08 -0.09 








 (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) 
Assets  -0.03 -0.04 
  (0.06) (0.07) 
Education  0.05* 0.08 
  (0.03) (0.03) 
Turnout  0.11 0.25 






  (0.09) (0.09) 
Upper Castes  0.09 0.03 
  (0.11) (0.15) 
Rajput  -0.05 0.02 
  (0.13) (0.11) 
Jat  -0.02 0.19 
  (0.14) (0.14) 
SC  0.13 0.16 
  (0.1) (0.1) 
ST  0.06 0.26* 






  (0.14) (0.19) 
Muslim  0.10 0.10 
  (0.13) (0.23) 
Backups (any)  -0.05 0.01 
  (0.1) (0.11) 
R
2
 0.03 0.04 0.04 
Adj. R
2
 0.02 0.03 0.03 
Num. obs. 955 942 942 
***
p < 0.01, 
**
p < 0.05, 
*
p < 0.1 
 







Table 6: Co-partisan Effect on Expectations of BPL Cards (Logit) 






 (0.12) (0.30) (0.54) 
Treatment -0.27
*
 -0.24 -0.24 








 (0.16) (0.18) (0.23) 
Assets  -0.02 0.05 
  (0.17) (0.25) 
Education  0.09 0.18* 
  (0.08) (0.1) 
Turnout  0.34 0.67** 






  (0.18) (0.24) 
Upper Castes  0.45 0.27 
  (0.40) (0.51) 
Rajput  0.29 1.16** 
  (0.28) (0.48) 
Jat  0.21 -0.1 
  (0.32) (0.41) 
SC  -0.09 .38 
  (0.29) (0.36) 
ST  -0.28 0.26 
  (0.29) (0.54) 
Meena  -0.33 0.85 
  (0.31) (0.57) 
Muslim  0.18 0.64 
  (0.32) (0.49) 
Backup (any)  0.18 0.28 
  (0.25) (0.31) 
Log Likelihood -553.26 -537.43 -537.43 
Num. obs. 936 923 923 
***
p < 0.01, 
**
p < 0.05, 
*
p < 0.1 
 
Standard errors are in parentheses. ∗p<0.001*** p<0.05 +p <0.1 ** p<0.01 + >.05*  
Co-partisans and non-co-partisans refer to co-partisanship with the treated (cued) candidate. I also include 
upper castes, Rajputs, Jats, scheduled castes, scheduled tribes, and Muslims as demographic controls. 






Table 7: Co-Ethnic Effects on Expectations of Jobs and BPL Cards  
























 (0.17) (0.34) 
R
2
 0.02  
Adj. R
2
 0.02  
Num. obs. 955 936 
Log Likelihood  -548.48 
***
p < 0.01, 
**
p < 0.05, 
*
p < 0.1 
 
Model 1 is an OLS model on the expectation of a job on the infrastructure project mentioned in 
the vignette. Model 2 is a logit model on expectations of a BPL card. Co-Partisanship and Co-
ethnicity are coded according to a match between self-reported partisan and ethnic characteristics 
















Table 8: Co-Partisan and Ethnic Effects on Expectations of Benefits (Caste)  






































Same Caste  






























































Standard errors are in parentheses. ∗p<0.001*** p<0.05 +p <0.1 ** p<0.01 + >.05∗  
N indicates the number of respondents in both treatment conditions in a given cell. Co-partisans and Non-
Co-partisans refer to co-partisanship with respect to cued (treated) politicians. Partisan effects are 
calculated by subtracting the average distributive expectations of respondents exposed to the BJP partisan 



























Appendix A: Voter Survey 
Questionnaire 
 






































ok sVj lo s Z { k. k 
ot Zu ch 
 
Hello, I am conducting research with social scientists and PhD scholars from Columbia 
University in America. We are conducting a study in a large number of villages across 
many districts in Rajasthan. Who is the household head?  
jke&jke! eSa ;gka vesfjdk dh dksyafc;k fo”ofo|ky; ds ,d lektfoKkuh vkSj ih,pMh LVwMsaV ds lkFk 
v/;;u dj jgk gwaaA ge jktLFkku ds dbZ xkaoksa esa <sj lkjs yksxksa ls ckrphr dj jgs gSaaA ?kj ds eqf[k;k dkSu 
gSa\  
[INTERVIEWER: IF THE HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD IS AVAILABLE, 
PROCEED. IF THE HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD IS NOT AVAILABLE, ASK 
WHEN HE/SHE WILL BE BACK AND RETURN TO THIS HOUSEHOLD FOR 
THE INTERVIEW IF THE PERSON WILL BE BACK THAT DAY.  
¿lk{ k k Rdkjdrk Z %  ;fn ?kj d s e q f[ k;k ? kj e s a  ek St wn gk s a  rk s  lk{ k k Rdkj “k q: dj s a A ;fn e q f[k;k 
? kj e s a  ek St wn u gk s a  rk s  i w fN, fd dc og okil vk, ax s vk S j okil vkdj mudk b aVjO; w 
dj s a AÀ  
*WHEN YOU MEET THE HEAD OF THE HOUSEHOLD, FIND THE HEAD OF 
THE HOUSEHOLD ON THE PHOTO VOTER LIST AND WRITE THE VOTER 
LIST NUMBER ON ITEM V16. IF THE HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD IS NOT ON 
THE PHOTO VOTERS LIST, YOU WILL NEED TO REPLACE THAT 
HOUSEHOLD WITH ANOTHER HOUSEHOLD. YOU WILL NEED THESE 
PHOTOS FOR THE RESPONDENT PHOTO SHEET THAT YOU WILL MAKE 
AFTER COMPLETING THE SURVEY IN EACH VILLAGE WARD.  
tc vki ?kj d s e q f[ k;k l s fey y s a  rk s  mUg s a  Qk sV k s  ok sVj fyLV e s a  ryk”k dj s a a  vk S j ok sVj 
fyLV dk u acj vkbVe oh16 e s a  uk sV dj s a A ;fn ?kj d s e q f[ k;k dk uke ok sVj fyLV e s a  ugh a  
g S rk s  vkidk s og ?kj Nk sM +dj n wlj s ? kj e s a  tkuk gk sxkA vkidk s bu Qk sV k s  dh t:jr 
Lk k{ k k Rdkjnkrk Qk sV k s ”k hV cuku s e s a  enn fey sxh ] ftldk mi;k sx okM Z lo s Z  e s a  fd;k tk,xkA  
[NOW SPEAKING TO THE HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD] Hello, I am conducting 
research with social scientists and PhD scholars from Columbia University in the United 
States. [SHOW MARK  
SCHNEIDER VISITING CARD] We are conducting a study about panchayti raj, 
development and villagers' opinions about politics in order to understand how the gram 
panchayat works. For this study, we are interviewing many people in a large number of 
villages across many districts in Rajasthan. This is an independent study and we are not 
linked to any political party, government agency or NGO in India or the United States. 
The findings of this study should lead to recommendations to improve development in 
the villages of Rajasthan and the interview should last 30 to 40 minutes.   
 
¿ vc ?kj d s e q f[ k;k l s ckrphr dj s a AÀ ueLrs] eSa vesfjdk dh dksyafc;k ;qfuoflZVh ds ih,pMh Ldkyj 
vkSj lektfoKkuh ds lkFk ;g v/;;u dj jgk gwaaA ¿ekd Z “ukbMj dk foftfV ax dkM Z fn[k k, a a AÀ ge 
yksx iapk;rh jkt] fodkl vkSj xkaookyksa ds jktuhfr ij fopkjksa ds ckjs esa v/;;u dj jgs gSa vkSj ;g tkuus 
dh dksf”k”k dj jgs gSa fd xzke iapk;r dSls dke djrh gSA bl v/;;u ds ds fy, ge yksx jktLFkku ds dbZ 
xkaoksa esa yksxksa ls ckrphr dj jgs gSaA ;g fcYdqy Lora= v/;;u gS vkSj ;g fdlh jktuhfrd ikVhZ] ljdkjh 
laLFkk ;k ,uthvks ls ugha tqM+k gSA bl v/;;u ls xkaoksa ds csgrj fodkl esa enn fey ldrh gSA bl baVjO;w 
esa 30 ls 40 feuV yxsaxsA  
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V1. If you agree to participate, the identities of the 
respondents interviewed in this study will be kept 
strictly anonymous. Participation in this study is 
voluntary.  
Would you be interested in participating in our study?  
V1. ;fn vki bl v/;;u esa “kkfey gksuk pkgrs gSa rks vkidh igpku 
iwjh rjg xqIr j[kh tk,xhA bl v/;;u esa vki viuh bPNk ls 
“kkfey gks ldrs gSaA D;k vki bl “kks/k dk fgLlk cuuk pkgrs gSa\  
[INTERVIEWER: IF THE RESPONDENT DOES 
NOT WANT TO PARTICIPATE, PLEASE THANK 
THE RESPONDENT POLITELY AND LEAVE 
THE HOUSE.] 
¿lk{ k k Rdkjdrk Z %  ;fn lk{ k k Rdkjnkrk b aVjO; w n suk ugh a  
pkgrk rk s  lk{ k k Rdkjnkrk dk s / k U;okn n s a  vk S j ? kj dk s 
Nk sM +  n s a AÀ  
a) Able to interview selected 
respondent 
b) Not able to interview selected 
respondent 
,- pqus x, lk{kkRdkjnkrk dk baVjO;w ysus esa 
lQy gq,  
ch- pqus x, lk{kkRdkjnkrk dk baVjO;w ysus esa 
lQy ugha gq,  
 
V2. Thank you for agreeing to participate. Has anyone 
in this household been elected to sarpanch, GP member, 
panchayat samiti, or zilla parishad in the past GP 
elections or in the elections before that in 2005?  
V2.  baVjO;w ds fy, lgefr nsus ds fy, /kU;oknA D;k bl ?kj dk 
dksbZ lnL; fiNys ;k 2005 ds pquko esa ljiap] xzke iapk;r lnL;] 
iapk;r lfefr ;k ftyk ifj’kn lnL;ksa dk pquko thrk \  
[INTERVIEWER: IF THE ANSWER IS YES, 
THANK THE RESPONDENT FOR THEIR TIME 
AND KINDLY TELL THEM THAT THE SURVEY 
MUST NOT INCLUDE ANY FAMILY MEMBERS 
OF LEADERS WHO HAVE SERVED IN THE 
GRAM PANCHAYAT OR OTHER PANCHAYATI 
RAJ BODIES IN THE PAST 5 YEARS]    
¿lk{ k k Rdkjdrk Z %  ;fn mRrj gk a  gk s  rk s  ml s / k U;okn n s a  
vk S j crk, a fd bl b aVjO; w e s a  ml u srk d s ifjokj d s 
fdlh H k h lnL; dk s “k k fey ugh a  fd;k tk ldrk g S ] tk s  
dHk h x z ke i apk;r dk fgLlk jg s g S a  ;k fiNy s ik ap lky 























V3.D;k lk{kkRdkjnkrk dk uke QksVks oksVj fyLV esa gS\ 
[INTERVIEWER: IF THE RESPONDENT IS NOT 
ON THE VOTERS LIST, THANK THE 
RESPONDENT AND MOVE ONTO THE NEXT 
HOUSEHOLD] 
¿lk{ k k Rdkjdrk Z %  ;fn lk{ k k Rdkjnkrk dk uke Qk sV k s  ok sVj 
fyLV e s a  ugh a  g S rk s  ml s / k U;okn n s a  vk S j n wlj s ? kj e s a  






V4a. What is your mother tongue? 
V4a. vkidh ekr`Hkk’kk D;k gS\  
 
a) Hindi  fgUnh 
b) Marwari ekjokM+h 
c) English  vaxzsth 
d) Urdu    mnwZ 
e) Rajasthani (any dialect)   jktLFkkuh 
¼dksbZ Hkh LFkkuh; Hkk’kk½ 
f) Bagri     ckxM+h 
g) Shekhawati  “ks[kkoVh 
h) Mewati  esokVh 
i) Dhundhari /kqa/kkjh 
j) Harauti     gjkSrh 
k) Mewari esokM+h 
l) Wagdi okxnh 
m) Dhakti /kkDrh 
n) Goaria  xksvkfj;k 
o) Loarki yksvkjdh 
p) Gade Lohar xM+s yksgkj 
q) Thali Fkkyh 
r) Sansiboli lalhcksyh 
V4b. INTERVIEWER: Does the respondent speak 
Hindi? 






*INTERVIEWER:  DO NOT ASK THE RESPONDENT ITEMS V5 THROUGH 
V15. INTERVIEWER SHOULD CODE HIMSELF/HERSELF.  
Lkk{kkRdkjdrkZ% Lkk{kkRdkjnkrk ls oh5 ls oh11 rd ugha iwNsaA bls [kqn gh dksM djsaA  
V5. INTERVIEWER ID 
Lkk{kkRdkjdrkZ dh vkbZMh 
 
V6. Duration of Interview  
baVjO;w esa yxk le;  





V8. MLA Constituency 





V10. Gram Panchayat 





V12. Polling Station Number (photo rolls) 
iksfyax LVs”ku uacj ¼QksVks oksVj fyLV½ 
 
V13. Ward Number  
okMZ la[;k  
[ASK A NEIGHBOR TO CONFIRM 
THE WARD NUMBER. IF THE WARD 
NUMBER DOES NOT MATCH THE 
WARD NUMBER SAMPLED, SKIP 
THIS HOUSEHOLD] 
¿iM + k slh l s i wNdj okM Z l a[;k tk ap s a A vxj 
okM Z l a[;k l S Eiy fd, x, okM Z l s e Sp ugh a  
[k krh g S rk s  ml ?kj dk s Nk sM +  n suk g SAÀ  
 
V14. House number from GP voter list  
Xkzke iapk;r oksVj fyLV ls ?kj dh la[;k 
 
V15. Respondent's Voter Number from 
photo voter list 
lk{kkRdkjnkrk dh QksVks oksVj fyLV esa ernkrk la[;k  
 
 
A. Now I am going to ask you a few questions about the leaders in this GP 
vc e S a  vkil s bl i apk;r d s u srkvk s a  d s ckj s  e s a  d qN loky i wNuk pkgrk g w a   
A1. First I will ask you about the sarpanch. 
Please tell me if you have any of the following 
associations with the sarpanch. 
igys eSa vkils ljiap ds ckjs esa iwNuk pkgrk gwaA d`i;k 
eq>s crk,a fd buesa ls vkidk ljiap ls D;k laca/k gS\  
 
A1a. He/she is a relative  
og vkids@vkidh laca/kh gS 
a) Yes gka 
b) No ugha 
A1b. He/she is a friend 
og vkids@vkidh fe= gS 
a) Yes gka 
b) No ugha 
A1c. He/she has given you a loan 
mUgksaus vkidks dtZ fn;k gS 
a) Yes gka 
b) No ugha 
A1d. He/she has rented land to you  
mUgksaus vkidks tehu fdjk, ij nh gS 
a) Yes gka 
b) No ugha 
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A2. In the past year, how many times have you 
met the sarpanch for help in getting  a 
government benefit or for some other favor?  
fiNys ,d lky esa fdlh ljdkjh lsok@Qk;nk ikus ;k 
fdlh nwljh rjg dh enn ds fy, vki ljiap ls fdruh 
ckj feys\ 
a) Never dHkh ugha  
b) Once or Twice ,d ckj ;k nks ckj 
c) Once in several months dbZ eghuksa esa ,d ckj  
d) About once a month  eghus esa ,d ckj  
e) More often than once a month eghus esa ,d ckjs 





A3. If you approached the sarpanch for a 
request to get a benefit from a government  
scheme or with some other favor, do you think 
he/she would work very hard to help you?  
;fn vki ljiap ds ikl fdlh ljdkjh ;kstuk esa Qk;ns 
ds fy, ;k fdlh nwljh rjg dh enn ekaxus igqaprs gSa rks 
vkidks D;k yxrk gS fd og vkidh enn iwjh esgur ls 
djsaxs\  
a) Yes gka 
b) No ugha 
A4. Does the sarpanch have a close 
relationship with the MLA? 
D;k ljiap ds fo/kk;d ls djhch esytksy gS\  
a) Yes gka 
b) No ugha  
A5a. In the last 5 years has the sarpanch 
supported any leaders from the  Congress 
Party?  
fiNys ikap lky esa ljaip us dkaxzsl ikVhZ ds fdlh Hkh 
ussrk dk leFkZu fd;k gS\   
a) Yes gka 
b) No ugha  
 
 
A5b. In the past 5 years, has the sarpanch 
supported any leaders from the BJP? 
fiNys ikap lky esa ljiap us D;k fdlh Hkktik ds usrk 
dk leFkZu fd;k gS\  
a) Yes gka 
b) No ugha 
A6. Now I will ask you about the GP member 
from this ward. Please tell me if you have any 
of the following associations with the GP 
member. 
vc eSa vkils bl okMZ ds xzke iapk;r lnL; ds ckjs esa 
loky iwNuk pkgrk gwaA d`i;k eq>s crkb, ds xzke iapk;r 
lnL; ds lkFk vkidk buesa ls dksbZ tqM+ko jgk gS\  
 
A6a. He is a relative  
og fj”rsnkj gS  
a) Yes gka 
b) No ugha  
A6b. He is a friend 
og nksLr gS  
a) Yes gka 
b) No ugha  
A6c. He has given you a loan 
mlus vkidks dtZ fn;k gS  
a) Yes gka  
b) No ugha 
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A6d. He has rented land to you 
mlus tehu fdjk, ij nh gS  
a) Yes gka 
b) No ugha 
A7. In the past year, how many times have you 
met the GP member from this ward for help in 
getting  a government benefit or for some other 
favor?  
fiNys ,d lky esa fdlh ljdkjh lsok@Qk;nk ikus ;k 
fdlh nwljh rjg dh enn ds fy, vki xzke iapk;r 
lnL; ls fdruh ckj feys\ 
a) Never dHkh ugha  
b) Once or Twice ,d ckj ;k nks ckj 
c) Once every few months dbZ eghuksa esa ,d ckj 
d) About once a month  eghus esa ,d ckj  
e) More often than once a month eghus esa ,d ckjs 







A8a. In the last 5 years, has the GP member 
from this ward  supported any leaders from the 
Congress Party? 
fiNys ikap lky ds nkSjku bl okMZ ds xzke iapk;r lnL; 
us D;k dkaxzsl ikVhZ ds fdlh usrk dk leFkZu fd;k Fkk\  
a)Yes gka 
b) No ugha 
A8b. In the last 5 years, has the GP member 
from this ward  supported any leaders from the 
BJP?  
fiNys ikap lky esa bl okMZ ds xzke iapk;r lnL; us D;k 
Hkktik ds fdlh usrk dk leFkZu fd;k Fkk\  
a)Yes gka 
b) No ugha 
A9.If you approached the GP member from 
this ward for a request to get a benefit from a 
government  scheme or with some other favor, 
do you think he/she would work very hard to 
help you?  
;fn vki bl okM Z d s x z ke i apk;r ds ikl fdlh 
ljdkjh ;kstuk esa Qk;ns ds fy, ;k fdlh nwljh rjg dh 
enn ekaxus igqaprs gSa rks vkidks D;k yxrk gS fd og 
vkidh enn iwjh esgur ls djsaxs\ 
a) Yes gka 















A10. Who do you think makes the main gram 
panchayat decisions? 
vkids fopkj esa xzke iapk;r ds eq[; fu.kZ; dkSu ysrk gS\  
a) Sarpanch ljiap 
b) GP secretary xzke iapk;r lfpo 
c) Gram panchayat BJP or Congress Party 
Presidents xzke iapk;r ds Hkktik ;k dkaxzsl 
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ikVhZ v/;{k 
d) Panchayat Samiti or zilla panchayat 
members iapk;r lfefr ;k ftyk iapk;r 
lnL; 
e) Caste leaders______________ tkfrxr 
usrk------------------------------------ 







B. Now I am going to ask some questions on recent elections and politics in this area. 
vc eSa vkils bl bykds esa gky ghs ds pquko vkSj jktuhfr ds ckjs esa loky iwNuk pkgrk gwaA  
 
B1. Have you participated in any of the  
following political activities in the past 5 
years? 
fiNys ikap lky ds nkSjku D;k vkius buesa ls dksbZ 
jktuhfrd xfrfof/k esa Hkkx fy;k gS\  
B1a. Attended campaign rallies for a party or 
politician  
fdlh ikVhZ ;k usrk dh pqukoh jSyh esa fgLlk fy;k  
a) Yes gka 
b) No ugha 
B1b. Attended party meetings  
ikVhZ ehfVax esa fgLlk fy;k  
a) Yes gka 
b) No ugha 
B1c. Put a party flag in front of your house at 
election time. 
pquko ds nkSjku vius ?kj ds lkeus ikVhZ dk >aMk yxk;k  
a) Yes gka 
b) No ugha 
B1d. Participated in door to door campaigning 
or motivating friends and relatives to support 
your candidate 
?kj&?kj pquko izpkj esa fgLlk fy;k ;k vius mEehnokj ds 
leFkZu esa nksLrksa vkSj fj”rsnkjksa dks vkus ds fy, izksRlkfgr 
fd;k  
a) Yes gka 
b) No ugha 
 
B1e. Contributed money, time, or resources 
(car,  food, etc..) to a candidate's political 
campaign 
mEehnokj ds pquko izpkj esa /ku] le; ;k dksbZ lEink 
tSls&dkj] [kku&iku dk ;ksxnku fd;k  
a) Yes gka 
b) No ugha 
B1f. Attended a caste association meeting 
(meeting of leaders and villagers from your 
jati on matters pertaining to the panchayat) 
tkfr laxBu dh cSBd esa fgLlk fy;k ¼vkidh tkfr ds 
usrkvksa vkSj xkaookyksa dh cSBd] ftlesa iapk;r ls tqM+s 
elyksa ij ppkZ gks½ 
a) Yes gka 
b) No ugha 
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B1g. Attended gram sabha meetings 
xzke lHkk dh cSBd esa fgLlk fy;k  
a) Yes gka 
b) No ugha 
B2a. Did you vote in the last MLA election in 
2008 
D;k 2008 ds fo/kkulHkk pquko esa vkius oksV fn;k Fkk 
a) Yes gka 
b) No ugha 
B2b. I am going to give you a slip of paper 
which has party symbols for all the parties that 
you saw on the voting machine in the last 
MLA elections. On this slip please put a mark 
in front of the same symbol for which you 
pressed the button at the polling place. If you 
gave your vote to an independent candidate, 
mark the empty box. (Supply WHITE dummy 
ballot) 
vc eSa vkidks ,d dkxt dk VqdM+k nwaxk ftlesa lHkh 
ikfVZ;ksa ds pquko fpUg cus gSa] ftUgsa vkius fiNys 
fo/kkulHkk pquko ds nkSjku oksfVax e”khu ij ns[kk FkkA 
dkxt ds VqdM+s ij ekStwn fu”kkuksa esa ls ,d ij fu”kku 
yxk nsa] ftl fu”kku dk cVu vkius oksfVax e”khu ij 
nck;k FkkA ;fn vkius Lora= mEehnokj dks oksV fn;k Fkk] 
rks [kkyh cDls ij fu”kku yxk,aA ¼lQsn Meh c Sy sV 
lk{ k k Rdkjnkrk dk s n s a A ½  
 
After you have marked the box, please fold the 
paper and put it in the sealed box. Your answer 
is secret and your ballot paper will not be 
shared with anyone but the researcher. 
cDls ij fu”kku yxkus ds ckn d`i;k dkxt dks eksM+dj 
bl fMCcs esa Mky nsaA vkidk tokc iwjh rjg xksiuh; j[kk 
tk,xkA vkidk cSysV isij fdlh ls lk>k ugha fd;k 
tk,xkA ;g flQZ “kks/kdrkZ gh ns[k ik,axsA 
a)Congress dkaxzsl 
b) BJP Hkktik 
c) BSP clik 
d) Communist Party (Marxist) ekdik 
e) CPI Hkkdik 
f) SP lik 
g) NCP jkdaik 
h) Independent  Lora= 
i) Other __________ vU;---------------------------- 
99) NA (did not vote for MLA in 2008)  
Ykkxw ugha ¼2008 ds fo/kkulHkk pquko esa oksV ugha fn;k Fkk½ 
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B3. I am going to give you a second slip of 
paper with party symbols on it. Please mark 
the party you would support if an MLA 
election were to be held tomorrow. If you 
would support an independent candidate, mark 
the empty box.  
 
vc eSa vkidks ,d dkxt dk nwljk VqdM+k nwaxk ftlesa 
lHkh ikfVZ;ksa ds pquko fpUg cus gSaA eku yhft, fd 
fo/kkulHkk ds pquko dy gks tk,a rks ftl ikVhZ dks vki 
oksV nsaxs] mlds pquko fpUg ij fu”kku yxk nsaA;fn vkius 
Lora= mEehnokj dks oksV nsuk pkgrs gSa] rks [kkyh cDls 
ij fu”kku yxk,aA 
 
After you have marked the box, please fold the 
paper and put it in the sealed box. Your answer 
is secret and your ballot paper will not be 
shared with anyone but the researcher. 
cDls ij fu”kku yxkus ds ckn d`i;k dkxt dks eksM+dj 
bl fMCcs esa Mky nsaA vkidk tokc iwjh rjg xksiuh; j[kk 
tk,xkA vkidk cSysV isij fdlh ls lk>k ugha fd;k 
tk,xkA ;g flQZ “kks/kdrkZ gh ns[k ik,axsA 
a)Congress dkaxzsl 
b) BJP Hkktik 
c) BSP clik 
d) Communist Party (Marxist) ekdik 
e) CPI Hkkdik 
f) SP lik 
g) NCP jkdaik 
h) Independent  Lora= 
i) Other __________ vU;---------------------------- 
 
B4a. Do you feel close to any particular party? 
D;k vki fdlh fo”ks’k ikVhZ ls T;knk tqM+ko eglwl djrs 
gSa\  
a) Yes gka 
b) No ugha 
B4b. [IF YES] Which one? 
 
;fn gka] rks fdl ikVhZ ls\  
 
a)Congress dkaxzsl 
b) BJP Hkktik 
c) BSP clik 
d) Communist Party (Marxist) ekdik 
e) CPI Hkkdik 
f) SP lik 
g) NCP jkdaik 
h) Independent  Lora= 
i) Other __________ vU;---------------------------- 
99) NA (Do not feel close to any party) 
Ykkxw ugha ¼fdlh ikVhZ ls [kqn dks djhch ugha eglwl djrs½ 
B5a. Do any of your family members, relatives 
and friends in this village support leaders from 
the Congress party? 
D;k bl xkao esa vkids ifjokjh lnL;ksa] fj”rsnkjksa ;k fe=ksa 
esa ls dksbZ dkaxzsl ikVhZ ds usrkvksa dk leFkZu djrs gSa\  
a) Yes gka 
b) No ugha 
 234 
B5b. [IF YES: B7a] About how many of your 
family members, relatives and friends in this 
village support leaders from the Congress 
Party? 
¿;fn gk a %  ch7,À bl xkao esa yxHkx vkids fdrus 
ifjokjh lnL;] fj”rsnkj vkSj fe= dkaxzsl ikVhZ ds usrkvksa 
dk leFkZu djrs gSa\  
 
INTERVIEWER: READ ANSWER 
CHOICES BEFORE ASKING FOR 
ANSWER. 
lk{k k Rdkjdrk Z %  d `i;k mRrj i wNu s l s igy s 
vk W I”ku i< + s a A  
a) 1 or 2 1 ;k 2 
b) 5 or 10 5 ;k 10 
c) Half of the people they know ftrus yksxksa dks tkurs 
gSa] muesa ls vk/ks  
d) Almost everyone yxHkx lHkh 
 
B6a. Do any of your family members, relatives 
and friends in this village support leaders from 
the BJP? 
D;k bl xkao esa vkids ifjokjh lnL;ksa] fj”rsnkjksa ;k fe=ksa 
esa ls dksbZ Hkktik ds usrkvksa dk leFkZu djrs gSa\ 
a) Yes gka 
b) No ugha 
 
B6b. [IF YES] How many of your relatives 
and friends in this village do you think support 
leaders from the BJP. 
;fn gka rks vkids fopkj esa bl xkao esa vkids yxHkx 
fdrus ifjokjh lnL;] fj”rsnkj vkSj fe= Hkktik ds usrkvksa 
dk leFkZu djrs gSa\ 
 
INTERVIEWER: READ ANSWER 
CHOICES BEFORE ASKING FOR 
ANSWER. 
lk{k k Rdkjdrk Z %  d `i;k mRrj i wNu s l s igy s 
vk W I”ku i< + s a A  
a) 1 or 2 1 ;k 2 
b) 5 or 10 5 ;k 10 
c) Half of the people they know ftrus yksxksa dks tkurs 
gSa] muesa ls vk/ks  
d) Almost everyone yxHkx lHkh 
 
 
B7.When you think of elections for MLA, 
Zilla Parishad, and Panchayat Samiti, would 
you say that you only vote for candidates from 
one party or do you support different parties at 
different times? 
tc vki fo/kkulHkk] ftyk ifj’kn vkSj iapk;r lfefr ds 
pquko ds ckjs esa lksprs gSa rks D;k vki ,d gh ikVhZ ds 
mEehnokj dks oksV nsrs gSa ;k vyx&vyx pqukoksa esa 
vyx&vyx ikVhZ ds mEehnokjksa dk leFkZu djrs gSa\  
a) Yes. I only support one party gka] eSa dsoy ,d ikVhZ 
dk leFkZu djrk gwa 
b) No I support different parties at different times 




B8. Consider this. Sandeep is a poor farmer 
from a village like this one who received a 
benefit from a leader in this village this year. 
After that, this local leader asked Sandeep to 
vote for his  party's candidate  in the next MLA 
elections. 
 
lksfp,% ,d ,sls gh xkao esa xjhc fdlku gS ftldk uke 
lanhi gSA mls bl lky xkao ds gh usrk ls ,d ljdkjh 
;kstuk dk Qk;nk feyk gSA cnys esa usrk us lanhi ls 
vxys fo/kkulHkk pquko esa viuh ikVhZ ds usrk dks oksV nsus 
dks dgkA 
 
Should Sandeep vote for the leader's 
candidate. 
D;k lanhi dks ml usrk dks oksV nsuk pkfg,A 
a) Yes gka 






B9a. What is the name of the most popular 
Congress leader in this gram panchayat?  
 
INTERVIEWER: We are asking about the 
local leader ftom the same GP not state level 
leader or MLA.  
bl xzke iapk;r esa lcls yksdfiz; dkaxzsl usrk dkSu gSa\  
lk{ k k Rdkjdrk Z %  ge ;gk a  ij x z ke i apk;r Lrj 
d s LFk kuh; u srk d s ckj s  e s a  i wN jg s g S a  u fd 
fdlh fo/ k k;d ;k jkT; Lrjh; u srk d s ckj s  e s a A  
Name 
U k ke  
Jati 
Tk k fr  
Note 
uk sV  
   
 
B9b. INTERVIEWER: In answering B9a, 
Did the respondent hesitate, have to think for a 
while, or ask someone else the name of a 
Congress leader?) 
lk{k k Rdkjdrk Z %  iz”u ch9, dk mRrj nsrs le; D;k 
lk{kkRdkjnkrk fgpdk Fkk] ;k dqN le; ds fy, mls 
lkspuk iM+k Fkk ;k mlus fdlh nwljs O;fDr ls dkaxzsl usrk 
dk uke iwNk Fkk\  
a) Yes gka 
b) No ugha 
 
 
B10a. What is the name of the most popular 
BJP leader in this gram panchayat? 
INTERVIEWER: We are asking about the 
local leader ftom the same GP not state level 
leader or MLA.  
 
bl xzke iapk;r esa lcls yksdfiz; Hkktik usrk dkSu gSa\ 
lk{ k k Rdkjdrk Z %  ge ;gk a  ij x z ke i apk;r Lrj 
d s LFk kuh; u srk d s ckj s  e s a  i wN jg s g S a  u fd 
fdlh fo/ k k;d ;k jkT; Lrjh; u srk d s ckj s  e s a A  
Name 
U k ke  
Jati 
Tk k fr  
Note 
uk sV  
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B10b. INTERVIEWER: In answering B10a, 
Did the respondent hesitate, have to think for a 
while, or ask someone else the name of a BJP 
leader?)  
lk{k k Rdkjdrk Z %  iz”u ch10, dk mRrj nsrs le; D;k 
lk{kkRdkjnkrk fgpdk Fkk] ;k dqN le; ds fy, mls 
lkspuk iM+k Fkk ;k mlus fdlh nwljs O;fDr ls Hkktik 
usrk dk uke iwNk Fkk\ 
a) Yes gka 
b) No ugha  
 
 
B11a. When a poor person in this village has a 
problem what person in this village would they 
seek for help?  
bl xkao esa vxj fdlh xjhc O;fDr dks dksbZ leL;k gksrh 
gS rks og bl xkao esa enn ds fy, fdlds ikl tkrk gS\  
Name 
U k ke  
Jati 
Tk k fr  
Party (if any) 
ikVh Z  ¼;fn dk sb Z  
g S rk s ½  
   
 
B11b. Suppose you had a problem. Who 
would you ask for help? 
eku yhft, fd vkidks dksbZ leL;k gS] vki enn ds fy, 
fdlds ikl tk,axs\  
Name 
U k ke  
Jati 
Tk k fr  
Party (if any) 
ikVh Z  ¼;fn dk sb Z  
g S rk s ½  
   
 
B12. What community has the most influence 
over decisions made in this gram panchayat? 
bl xzke iapk;r ds fu.kZ;ksa dks izHkkfor djus okyk lcls 
izHkko”kkyh leqnk; dkSu lk gS\ 
Write: ___________________ 
fy[ksa------------------------------------------------------------ 
B13a. Does the GP secretary support any 
party? 
D;k xzke iapk;r lfpo fdlh ikVhZ dk leFkZu djrk gS\  
a) Yes gka 
b) No ugha 
B13b. [IF YES] Which one? 
;fn gka rks dkSu lh\  
a)Congress dkaxzsl 
b) BJP Hkktik 
c) BSP clik 
d) Communist Party (Marxist) ekdik 
e) CPI Hkkdik 
f) SP lik 
g) NCP jkdaik 
h) Independent  Lora= 
i) Other __________ vU;---------------------------- 
99) NA (Do not feel close to any party) 
Ykkxw ugha ¼fdlh ikVhZ ls [kqn dks djhch ugha eglwl djrs½ 
 
C. Now I am going to ask you some questions about government benefits. 
vc eSa vkils ljdkjh Qk;nksa ls tqM+s dqN loky iwNuk pkgrk gwaA 
C1. When was the last time that a BPL survey 
was conducted to determine who will receive a 
BPL Card and the list for Indira Awas Yojana, 
PDS and other benefits? 
fiNyh ckj chih,y losZ dc gqvk Fkk] ftlls ;g fu/kkZfjr 
gks ldk fd fdls chih,y dkMZ feys vkSj bafnjk vkokl 
;kstuk] dksVk okyk jk”ku vkSj nwljs Qk;ns feys\ 
a) In the last year fiNys lky 
b) 5 years back ikap lky igys  
c) 10 years back 10 lky igys 
d) I don't know of any BPL survey eq>s chih,y 
losZ ds ckjs esa dksbZ tkudkjh ugha gSA 
(Do not feel read options) 
¼d`i;k vk W I”ku u i< + s a ½  
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INTERVIEWER: TELL THEM THAT 
THE TEACHER OR VILLAGE 
ACCOUNTANT OFTEN FILLS THIS 
OUT AND ASKS QUESTIONS LIKE “DO 
YOU HAVE A KUCHA OR PUKKA 
HOUSE, ETC... 
lk{k k Rdkjdrk Z %  mUg s a  crk, a fd xk ao e s a  f”k{ kd 
;k xk ao dk ,dkm aV s aV vkid s ikl vkrk g S vk S j 
d qN bl rjg d s loky i wNrk g S fd vkid s ikl 
dPpk ?kj g S ;k iDdk\   
C2a. Does the respondent have a BPL, APL, or 
Antodhya card?  
[ASK TO SEE THEIR RATION CARD TO 
VERIFY] 
lk{kkRdkjnkrk ds ikl chih,y] ,ih,y ;k vaR;ksn; dkMZ 
esa ls dkSu lk dkMZ gS\ 
¿j k”ku dkM Z n s[ k s a À  
a) BPL chih,y 
b) APL ,ih,y 
c) Antodhya vaR;ksn; 
d) No ration card dksbZ jk”ku dkMZ ugha  
C2b. When was the card issued? 
[INTERVIEWER: CHECK THE ISSUE 
DATE ON THE BPL OR ANTYODYA 
CARD] 
dkMZ dc tkjh fd;k x;k Fkk\  
¿lk{ k k Rdkjdrk Z %  chih,y ;k v a R;k sn; dkM Z ij 
tkjh fd, tku s dh rkjh[k n s a[ k s À  
Month_____; Year________ 
eghuk------------------] lky------------------------------- 
C3a. [IF APL] Do feel that the government 
correctly identified your family as APL and not 
BPL? 
¿;fn ,ih,y dkM Z rH k h i wN s a À D;k vkidks yxrk gS 
fd ljdkj us vkids ifjokj dks lgh rjhds ls  chih,y 
dh txg ,ih,y dh rjg fpfUgr fd;k gS\ 
a) Yes gka 
b) No ugha 
C3b. [IF APL] Did you make an effort to get a 
BPL card but were denied a card?  
¿;fn ,ih,yÀ D;k vkius chih,y dkMZ ikus dk iz;kl 
fd;k Fkk ysfdu euk dj fn;k x;k\  
a) Yes gka 















C4. [IF YES: C3b or IF BPL] Who did you 
contact to help you get a BPL card? 
¿;fn gk a %  lh3ch ;k ;fn chih,yÀ chih,y dkMZ 
ikus ds fy, vkius fdlls lEidZ fd;k\ 
INTERVIEWER: CLARIFY THAT THIS 
CAN BE ANY TYPE OF LEADER, EVEN 
IF IT IS NOT THE PERSON WITH MOST 
OFFICIAL RESPONSIBILITY. 
lk{k k Rdkdrk Z %  ;g lkQ dj s a  fd dkM Z n su s d s 
fy, vkf/ kdk fjd :i l s lcl s T;knk ftEe snkj 
O;fDr d s vykok ;g dk sb Z  H k h u srk gk s  ldrk 
g SA  
a) Sarpanch  ljiap 
b) GP Member xzke iapk;r lnL; 
c) GP Secretary xzke iapk;r lfpo 
d) Agent of the MLA fo/kk;d dk ,tsaV 
e) Party Worker ikVhZ odZj 
f) Middleman _________________ nyky-----------------
- 
g) caste leader tkfr usrk 
h) Leader from a different 
village____________ nwljs xkao dk usrk 
i) Panchayat Samiti member  iapk;r lfefr lnL; 
j) Zilla Parishad Member ftyk ifj’kn lnL; 
k) Other__________________ vU;------------------------------- 
l) No one  dksbZ ugha  
C5a. Have you purchased subsidized sugar in 
the last month? 
D;k vkius fiNys eghus dksVs ls “kdj [kjhnh Fkh\  
a) Yes gka 
b) No ugha  
C5b. Have you purchased subsidized wheat or 
kerosene in the last month? 
D;k vkius fiNys eghus dksVZ ls de iSlksa esa xsgwa vkSj 
feV~Vh dk rsy Hkh [kjhnk Fkk\ 
a) Yes gka 




C6. Please tell me if you received benefits or a 
job from any these schemes.   
d`i;k eq>s crkb, fd vkius bu ;kstuk dk Qk;nk ;k 
ukSdjh dh\ 
[INTERVIEWER: IF HAS AN APL CARD 
SKIP TO C8] 
¿L k k { k k Rdkdrk % ;fn lk{ k k Rdkjnkrk ,ih,y dkM Z 
okyk gk s  i z ”u lh 8 ij tk, aÀ  
 
C6a. Indira Awaas Yojana (IAY)  
bafnjk vkokl ;kstuk  
a) Yes gka 
b) No ugha  
C6b. [IF YES: C6a] Did you receive IAY 
benefits to build or upgrade your house in the 
last 2 years, since the last GP elections took 
place in this gram panchayat? 
lh 6, e s a  gk a  rks fiNys nks lky ds vanj ;kuh tc 
fiNyh ckj xzke iapk;r pquko gq, Fks rc ls vc rd D;k 
vkidks vius ?kj dh ejEer ;k u;k ?kj cukus ds fy, 
bafnjk vkokl ;kstuk dk Qk;nk feyk\  
a) Yes gka 
b) No ugha  
C6c. [IF NO: C6c] Did you file an application 
for IAY although it was not approved?  
¿;fn ugh a  rk s  lh6lhÀ D;k vkius bafnjk vkokl ds 
a) Yes gka 
b) No ugha  
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fy, vthZ nh Fkh ysfdu ;g Lohd`r ugha gqbZ\  
C6d.[IF YES: C6a; C6b] Did you seek 
anyone's help to get your application for IAY 
submitted or approved?  
¿;fn gk a %  lh6,] lh6chÀ D;k vkius bafnjk vkokl 
;kstuk dh vthZ dh tek djus ;k Lohd`r djus ds fy, 
fdlh dh enn yh Fkh\  
a) Yes gka 








C6e. [IF YES: C6c] Who did you contact to 
help you get your application approved 
 
¿;fn gk a %  lh6lhÀ vthZ Lohd`r djkus ds fy, vkius 
fdlls enn ds fy, lEidZ fd;k Fkk\  
a) Sarpanch  ljiap 
b) GP Member xzke iapk;r lnL; 
c) GP Secretary xzke iapk;r lfpo 
d) Agent of the MLA fo/kk;d ds ,tsaV 
e) Party Worker ikVhZ odZj  
f) Middleman _________________ nyky----------------- 
g) caste leader tkfr usrk 
h) Leader from a different 
village____________ nwljs xkao ds usrk----------------------------
--------------- 
i) Panchayat Samiti member  iapk;r lfefr ds 
lnL;   
j) Zilla Parishad Member ftyk ifj’kn ds lnL;  
k) Other__________________ vU;------------------------------ 
-  
C7a. Did you receive a Health card in the past 
2 years [or get a health card reissued] 
D;k fiNys nks lky ds nkSjku vkidks LokF; dkMZ feyk 
gS\ ¼;k LokLF; dkMZ nksckjk fn;k x;k gks½ 
a) Yes gka ¼lh7ch ij tk,a½ 
b) No ugha ¼lh8 ij tk,a½ 
C7b. [IF YES: C7a] Did you seek anyone's 
help to get the health card?  
¿;fn gk a %  lh7,À D;k vkius LokF; dkMZ ysus ds fy, 
fdlh dh enn yh Fkh\ 
a) Yes gka  
















C7c. [IF YES: C7b] Who did you contact to 
help you get the health card? 
¿;fn gk a %  lh7chÀ LokLF; dkMZ ysus ds fy, enn ds 
fy, fdlls lEidZ fd;k Fkk\ 
a) Sarpanch  ljiap 
b) GP Member xzke iapk;r lnL; 
c) GP Secretary xzke iapk;r lfpo 
d) Agent of the MLA fo/kk;d ds ,tsaV 
e) Party Worker ikVhZ odZj  
f) Middleman _________________ nyky----------------- 
g) caste leader tkfr usrk 
h) Leader from a different 
village____________ nwljs xkao ds usrk----------------------------
--------------- 
i) Panchayat Samiti member  iapk;r lfefr ds 
lnL;   
j) Zilla Parishad Member ftyk ifj’kn ds lnL;  




C8a. Did a member of your household receive 
an Old Age Pension provided by the 
government? 
D;k vkids ifjokj ds fdlh lnL; dks ljdkj dh rjQ 
ls feyus okyh o`+)koLFkk isa”ku feyh gS\  
a) Yes gka ¼lh8ch ij tk,a½ 
b) No ugha ¼lh9 ij tk,a½ 
C8b. [IF YES: C8a] Did you or a member of 
your household receive approval for 
government pension benefits in the last 2 
years, since the most recent GP elections? 
¿;fn gk a %  lh8,À D;k bl isa”ku dh vthZ fiNys nks 
lky ds nkSjku ;kuh fiNy s x z ke i apk;r p quko d s 
ckn eatwj dh xbZ\ 
a) Yes gka  
b) No ugha 
C8c. [IF YES: C8a] Did you seek anyone's 
help to get the application for pension 
accepted?  
¿;fn gk a %  lh8,À isa”ku dh vthZ eatwj djkus ds fy, 
D;k vkius fdlh dh enn ekaxh Fkh\ 
a) Yes gka  
b) No ugha 
C8d. [IF YES: C8a] Who did you contact to 
help your family member get the government 
pension? 
¿;fn gk a %  lh8,À ljdkjh isa”ku ikus ds fy, vkids 
ifjokj ds lnL; us fdlls enn ekaxh Fkh\  
a) Sarpanch  ljiap 
b) GP Member xzke iapk;r lnL; 
c) GP Secretary xzke iapk;r lfpo 
d) Agent of the MLA fo/kk;d ds ,tsaV 
e) Party Worker ikVhZ odZj  
f) Middleman _________________ nyky----------------- 
g) caste leader tkfr usrk 
h) Leader from a different 
village____________ nwljs xkao ds usrk----------------------------
--------------- 
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i) Panchayat Samiti member  iapk;r lfefr ds 
lnL;   
j) Zilla Parishad Member ftyk ifj’kn ds lnL;  
k) Other__________________ vU;-------------------------------  
C9a. Did a member of your household receive 
a job from MGNREGA in the last 2 years? 
fiNys nks lky esa D;k vkids ifjokj ds fdlh lnL; dks 
eujsxk ds varxZr dke feyk\  
a) Yes gka ¼lh9ch ij tk,a½ 






C9b.[IF YES: C9a] Who told your family 
about the job? 
¿;fn gk a %  lh9,À vkids ifjokj dks bl ukSdjh ds ckjs 
esa fdlus crk;k\  
 
a) Sarpanch  ljiap 
b) GP Member xzke iapk;r lnL; 
c) GP Secretary xzke iapk;r lfpo 
d) Agent of the MLA fo/kk;d ds ,tsaV 
e) Party Worker ikVhZ odZj  
f) Middleman _________________ nyky----------------- 
g) caste leader tkfr usrk 
h) Leader from a different 
village____________ nwljs xkao ds usrk----------------------------
--------------- 
i) Panchayat Samiti member  iapk;r lfefr ds 
lnL;   
j) Zilla Parishad Member ftyk ifj’kn ds lnL;  
k) Other__________________ vU;-------------------------------  
C9c. [IF YES: C9a] What was the daily wage 
you or a family member received most recently 
for day's work under MGNREGA? 
¿;fn gk a %  lh9,À eujsxk ds varxZr gky gh esa dke 
djus ij vkidks ;k vkids ifjokj ds fdlh lnL; dks 




C10a. Are you farmer?  
D;k [ksrh djrs gSa\  
a) Yes gka  
b) No ugha 
C10b. [IF YES: C10a] Did you receive any 
benefits from schemes for farmers such as: 
interest-free loans, subsidized seeds and 
equipment, subsidized fertilizer, debt waivers, 
and so on? 
¿;fn gk a %  lh10,À D;k vkidks fdlkuksa ds fy, fdlh 
;kstuk dk Qk;nk feyk\ tSls^& C;kt jfgr dtZ] de 
dher ds cht] midj.k] de dher dh [kkn vkfnA 
a) Yes gka ¼lh10ch ij tk,a½ 
b) No ugha ¼lh11 ij tk,a½ 
C10c. [IF YES: C10a] Did you seek anyone’s 
help to get government subsidized equipment 
a) Yes gka  
b) No ugha 
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or seeds? 
¿;fn gk a %  lh10,À D;k vkius ljdkj dh rjQ ls lLrs 











C10d. [IF YES: C10c] Who did you contact to 
help you get subsidized farming equipment or 
seeds?  
 
¿;fn gk a %  lh10lhÀ de iSls ds midj.k ;k cht ysus 





a) Sarpanch  ljiap 
b) GP Member xzke iapk;r lnL; 
c) GP Secretary xzke iapk;r lfpo 
d) Agent of the MLA fo/kk;d ds ,tsaV 
e) Party Worker ikVhZ odZj  
f) Middleman _________________ nyky----------------- 
g) caste leader tkfr usrk 
h) Leader from a different 
village____________ nwljs xkao ds usrk----------------------------
--------------- 
i) Panchayat Samiti member  iapk;r lfefr ds 
lnL;   
j) Zilla Parishad Member ftyk ifj’kn ds lnL;  
k) Other__________________ vU;-------------------------------  
C11a. In the last 5 years, have you met the 
MLA or asked someone to approach the MLA 
on your behalf?  
fiNys ikap lky esa] D;k vki dHkh fo/kk;d ls feys ;k 
fdlh dks viuh txg fo/kk;d ls feyus ds fy, Hkstk\  
a) Yes 
b) No 
C11b. [IF YES: C11a] Who did you ask to go 
with you or to go on your behalf? 
¿;fn gk a %  lh11,À vki fdls vius lkFk ;k vius txg 
ij fo/kk;d ls feyus Hkstk\  
a) Sarpanch  ljiap 
b) GP Member xzke iapk;r lnL; 
c) GP Secretary xzke iapk;r lfpo 
d) Agent of the MLA fo/kk;d ds ,tsaV 
e) Party Worker ikVhZ odZj  
f) Middleman _________________ nyky----------------- 
g) caste leader tkfr usrk 
h) Leader from a different 
village____________ nwljs xkao ds usrk----------------------------
--------------- 
i) Panchayat Samiti member  iapk;r lfefr ds 
lnL;   
j) Zilla Parishad Member ftyk ifj’kn ds lnL;  
k) Other__________________ vU;-------------------------------  
C12a. In the last 5 years, have you met a leader a) Yes gka  
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or bureaucrat in the block or asked someone to 
approach one of these leaders on your behalf?  
fiNys ikap lky esa] D;k vki CykWd Lrj ds fdlh 
vf/kdkjh ;k usrk ls feys\ ;k fdlh dks viuh txg 
feyus dks Hkstk\  
b) No ugha 
C12b. [IF YES: C12a] Who did you ask to go 
with you or to go on your behalf? 
¿;fn gk a %  lh12,À vki fdls vius lkFk ;k vius txg 
ij fo/kk;d ls feyus Hkstk\  
a) Sarpanch  ljiap 
b) GP Member xzke iapk;r lnL; 
c) GP Secretary xzke iapk;r lfpo 
d) Agent of the MLA fo/kk;d ds ,tsaV 
e) Party Worker ikVhZ odZj  
f) Middleman _________________ nyky----------------- 
g) caste leader tkfr usrk 
h) Leader from a different 
village____________ nwljs xkao ds usrk----------------------------
--------------- 
i) Panchayat Samiti member  iapk;r lfefr ds 
lnL;   
j) Zilla Parishad Member ftyk ifj’kn ds lnL;  
k) Other__________________ vU;------------------------------ 
l) No one dksbZ ugha  
C13a. Have you or a family member visited the 
police office in the past 2 years?  
fiNys nks lky ds nkSjku vki ;k vkids ifjokj dk dksbZ 
lnL; iqfyl dk;kZy; x;k gS\ 
a) Yes gka  
b) No ugha 
C13b. [IF YES: C13a] Who did you ask to go 
with you? 
¿;fn gk a %  lh13,À vki fdls vius lkFk ys x,\  
a) Sarpanch  ljiap 
b) GP Member xzke iapk;r lnL; 
c) GP Secretary xzke iapk;r lfpo 
d) Agent of the MLA fo/kk;d ds ,tsaV 
e) Party Worker ikVhZ odZj  
f) Middleman _________________ nyky----------------- 
g) caste leader tkfr usrk 
h) Leader from a different 
village____________ nwljs xkao ds usrk----------------------------
--------------- 
i) Panchayat Samiti member  iapk;r lfefr ds 
lnL;   
j) Zilla Parishad Member ftyk ifj’kn ds lnL;  
k) Other__________________ vU;-------------------------------  
l) No one dksbZ ugha 
C14a. Have you or a family member visited the 
government bank to open an account, apply for 
a loan, or for some other matter 
D;k vki vkSj vkids ifjokj dks dksbZ lnL; [kkrk 
[kqyokus] dtZ ds fy, vthZ nsus ;k fdlh nwljs dke ds 
a) Yes gka  
















C14b. [IF YES: C14a] Who did you ask to go 
with you? 
¿;fn gk a %  lh14,À vki fdls vius lkFk ys x,\ 
a) Sarpanch  ljiap 
b) GP Member xzke iapk;r lnL; 
c) GP Secretary xzke iapk;r lfpo 
d) Agent of the MLA fo/kk;d ds ,tsaV 
e) Party Worker ikVhZ odZj  
f) Middleman _________________ nyky----------------- 
g) caste leader tkfr usrk 
h) Leader from a different 
village____________ nwljs xkao ds usrk----------------------------
--------------- 
i) Panchayat Samiti member  iapk;r lfefr ds 
lnL;   
j) Zilla Parishad Member ftyk ifj’kn ds lnL;  
k) Other__________________ vU;-------------------------------  
l) No one dksbZ ugha 
C15a. Did you or a family member visit a 
government hospital for a health problem in 
the past 2 years?  
fiNys nks lky esa D;k vki ;k vkids ifjokj dk dksbZ 
lnL; LokLF; leL;k ds fy, ljdkjh vLirky x;k gS\  
a) Yes gka  
b) No ugha 
C15b. [IF YES: C15a] Who did you ask to go 
with you? 
¿;fn gk a %  lh15,À vki fdls vius lkFk ys x,\ 
a) Sarpanch  ljiap 
b) GP Member xzke iapk;r lnL; 
c) GP Secretary xzke iapk;r lfpo 
d) Agent of the MLA fo/kk;d ds ,tsaV 
e) Party Worker ikVhZ odZj  
f) Middleman _________________ nyky----------------- 
g) caste leader tkfr usrk 
h) Leader from a different 
village____________ nwljs xkao ds usrk----------------------------
--------------- 
i) Panchayat Samiti member  iapk;r lfefr ds 
lnL;   
j) Zilla Parishad Member ftyk ifj’kn ds lnL;  
k) Other__________________ vU;------------------------------- 
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l) No one dksbZ ugha  
C16. Was a well, water tank, or new village 
road built near your house in the last 2 years? 
D;k fiNys nks lky ds nkSjku vkids ?kj ds ikl dksbZ xkao 
dh ubZ lM+d] ikuh dk VSad ;k dqavk cuk;k x;k\   
a) Yes gka  
b) No ugha 
 
D. Survey Experiment 
lo s Z  ,Dli s fje s aV  
You must know that the sarpanch has power to requests funds for public projects in the 
gram panchayat such as building a village road, school, or health center. For these 
projects, the sarpanch can tell the BDO that he will will choose the workers for the 
project among people with a job card. 
vki ;g rks tkurs gh gksaxsa fd xzke iapk;r esa lM+d] Ldwy ;k LokF; dsUnz tSlh ljdkjh izkstsDV ds fy, QaM 
ds fy, vkosnu djus dh “kfDr ljiap ds ikl gksrh gSA bu izktsDV ds fy, ljiap chMhvks dks crk ldrk gS 
fd og bu izkstsDV esa dke djus ds fy, mu yksxksa dks pqusxk ftuds ikl tkWc dkMZ gSA 
 
Let's say the BJP leader named   _______________ (the strongest leader in the GP 
from BJP mentioned by the respondent in B10a becomes sarpanch in the next GP 
elections two years from now.   
vc eku yhft, fd ¼Hkktik usrk dk uke½------------------------------------------------------------¼ ftl s i z”u ch10, e s a  lcl s 
'k fDr’ k kyh u srk crk;k ] mldk uke y s a ½ vxys nks lky ckn gksus okys pquko esa ljiap cu tkrs gSaA  
 
BJP leader named ________________will choose workers for a project to build a small 
community center in the village and a small number of people from the village will get 
jobs.   
H k ktik u srk dk uke- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  xkao esa lkeqnkf;d dsUnz cuokus ds izkstsDV ds fy, dke 
djus okys dk p;u djsaxs vkSj bl xkao ds dqN yksxksa dks Hkh jkstxkj feysxkA  
Please think carefully about this situation and answer the questions about the project. 
Remember that BJP leader______________ is the sarpanch in this situation.  
d`i;k /;ku ls bl fLFkfr ds ckjs esa lksfp, vkSj bl izkstsDV ds ckjs esa dqN lokyksa dk mRrj nhft,A /;ku 
jf[k, fd Hkktik-------------------------------usrk vxys pquko esa bl dkYifud fLFkfr ds vuqlkj ljiap cu tk,axsA  
D1. Would you or a  member of your family 
will get one of the jobs? 
D;k vki ;k vkids ifjokj ls dksbZ O;fDr ;g dke djus 
tk,xk\  
 
INTERVIEWER: READ CHOICES 
lk{k k Rdkjdrk Z %  vk W I”ku i< + s a  
a) Certainly fcYdqy 
b) Perhaps “kk;n 
c) No ugha  
d) Certainly Not fcYdqy ugha  
D2. Would you give the BJP leader 
_______________ [Name given] your vote if 
he ran in the next 
GP elections?  
vxj Hkktik usrk--------------------------¼uke½ vxys xzke iapk;r  
 
 
a) Yes gka  




pquko esa [kM+s gksrs gSa rks vki mUgsa oksV nsaxs\  
D3. If the BJP leader  ______________ were 
sarpanch next time, would he be able to bring 
new funds from the state government/MLA 
to the GP?  
;fn Hkktik usrk------------------------------------------vxyh ckj ljiap 
gksrk gS rks D;k ;s jkT; ljdkj ;k fo/kk;d ls xzke 
iapk;r ds fy, u, QaM yk ldsaxs\  
a) Yes gka  
b) No ugha 
D4. If the BJP leader _________________ 
were sarpanch next time, do you think he 
could help get you access to a BPL card or 
PDS benefits when new cards become 
released? 
;fn Hkktik usrk--------------------------------------------- ljiap gks 
tk,xk rks vkidks D;k yxrk gS fd D;k og chih,y 
dkMZ ;k tc u, dkMZ ckaVs tk,axs rc mfpr ewY; dh 
nqdku ij feyus okyh lqfo/kkvksa dks fnykus esa enn 
djsaxs\ 
a) Yes gka  
b) No ugha 
D5. If the BJP leader_____________ gave 
you gift of money before the next MLA 
elections to support his party, would you vote 
for the candidate?  
;fn Hkktik usrk-------------------------------------- vxys fo/kku lHkk 
pquko ls igys mldh ikVhZ dk leFkZu djus ds fy, 
vkidks dksbZ migkj ;k iSlk nsrk gS rks D;k vki ml 
pquko esa mldh ikVhZ ds mEehnokj dks oksV nsaxs\  
a) Yes gka  
b) No ugha 
D6. Do the BJP leader _______________ 
were sarpanch would be able to choose the 
workers or would the secretary or some other 
leader interfere? 
D;k vkidks yxrk gS fd Hkktik usrk ----------------------------- 
ljiap gksaxs rks dke ds fy, dkexkj pqu ik,xk ;k 
lfpo ;k dksbZ vkSj usrk blesa gLr+{ksi djsxk\  
a) Yes the sarpanch could choose gka] ljiap pqu 
ldrk gS 
b) No he could not. ugha og ugha 
  
 
E. We are nearly done. I will now ask you some questions about your background. 
gekjk b aVjO; w yxHkx i wj k gk s  x;k g SA vc ge vkil s d qN vkid s ckj s  e s a  loky i wNuk 
pkgr s g S a A  
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E1. Please observe the gender of the respondent.  
d`i;k lk{kkRdkjnkrk dk fyax fy[ksaA  
[INTERVIEWER: OBSERVE IF THE 
RESPONDENT IS MALE OR FEMALE.]  
¿L k k { k k Rdkjnkrk % lk{ k k Rdkjdrk Z dk s  n s[ kdj mldk 
fy ax fy[k s a À  
a) Male iq#’k  
b) Female efgyk  
E2. How old are you (Years) 
vkidh mez D;k gS \ ¼lky½ 
Write Number______ 
uacj fy[ksa--------------------------------- 
E3. Until what level did you study?  
vkius dgka rd i<+kbZ dh\  
Write_____________________ 
fy[ksa--------------------------------- 
INTERVIEWER: MARK CORRECT 
ANSWER CHOICE BELOW. 
lk{kkRdkjdrkZ% lgh mRrj uhps ls pqusaA  
a) Class 1 d{kk 1 
b) Class 2 d{kk 2 
c) Class 3 d{kk 3 
d) Class 4 d{kk 4 
e) Class 5  d{kk 5 
f)  Class 6 d{kk 6 
g) Class 7 d{kk 7 
h) Class 8 d{kk 8 
i)  Class 9 d{kk 9 
j)  Class 10 d{kk 10 
k) Intermediate (Class 11 & 12) baVjehfM,V ¼d{kk 
11 vkSj 12½ 
l) Graduate (College or University) Lukrd  
m) Post-graduate (Masters or Doctorate/Ph.D.) 
ijkLukrd@ih,pMh 
E4. What is your Jati/biradari/Tribe name 




E5.What is your Caste group  




a) Brahmin/other forward caste czkgE.k vkSj nwljh 
vxM+h tkfr;ka 
b) OBC vkschlh 
c) Scheduled Caste(SC)   vuqlwfpr tkfr  
d) Scheduled Tribe (ST)  vuqlwfpr tutkfr  
E6. What is your religion?  
vkidk /keZ D;k gS\  
 
 
a) Hindu fgUnw 
b) Muslim eqfLye  
c) Christian blkbZ 
d) Sikh fl[k 
e) Buddhist ckS)  
f) Jain tSu 
g) Sarna (tribal religion) ljuk ¼vkfnoklh /keZ½ 
h) Parsi ikjlh 
i) Other (please specify) _______________ 
vU; ¼d`i;k fooj.k nsa½----------------------------------------- 
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E7a. What is your principal job for earning a 
living? 
vkidh dekbZ dk eq[; lk/ku D;k gS\  
 
 
a) Agriculture (own cultivation) [ksrh ¼[kqn dh½ 
b) Agricultural labor [ksfrgj etnwj 
c) Dairy/poultry farming Ms;jh@ikYVªh QkeZ 
d) Casual labor (coolie) etnwj ¼dqyh½ 
e) Salaried employment osrueku jkstxkj 
f) Shop owner nqdkunkj 
g) Non-agricultural business (tea shop) 
xSj[ksfrgj O;kikj ¼pk; dh nqdku½ 
h) Landlord tehankj 
i) Other _________________________ vU;--------
------------------------------------------------- 
j) unemployed csjkstxkj 
E7b. What is/was (if retired) your father’s 
occupation? 
vkids firk dk O;olk; D;k gS ;k Fkk ¼;fn firk fjVk;j gks 




a) Agriculture (own cultivation) [ksrh ¼[kqn dh½ 
b) Agricultural labor [ksfrgj etnwj 
c) Dairy/poultry farming Ms;jh@ikYVªh QkeZ 
d) Casual labor (coolie) etnwj ¼dqyh½ 
e) Salaried employment osrueku jkstxkj 
f) Shop owner nqdkunkj 
g) Non-agricultural business (tea shop) 
xSj[ksfrgj O;kikj ¼pk; dh nqdku½ 
h) Landlord tehankj 
i) Other _________________________ vU;--------
------------------------------------------------- 
E8. Approximately how much agricultural land 
does your household own 




a) 0-3 bigha 0&3 ch?kk  
b) 3-6 bigha 3&6 ch?kk 
c) 6-9 bigha 6&9 ch?kk 
d) 9-12 bigha 9&12 ch?kk 
e) 12-15 bigha 12&15 ch?kk 
f) 15-18 bigha 15&18 ch?kk 
g) 18-21 bigha 18&21 ch?kk 
h) 21-25 bigha 21&35 ch?kk 
i) 25+ bigha 25 ls T;knk ch?kk 
E9. What is your marital status?  
vkidh oSokfgd fLFkfr D;k gS\  
 
 
a) Married “kknh”kqnk 
b) Unmarried vfookfgr  
c) Divorced/separated rykd”kqnk@vyx jgus yxs 
d) Widowed fo/kqj@fo/kok 
e) Other (specify)________________ vU; 
¼fooj.k nsa½--------------------------------------- 
E10. Is the respondent's house kutcha, semi-pukka 
(Either wall or roof is made of pucca material and 
of other kutcha material), or pukka? 
D;k lk{kkRdkjnkrk dk ?kj dPpk] lseh&iDdk ¼nhokj ;k Nr 
iDdh ;k dPph gksuh pkfg,½ ;k iDdk\  
 
a) Kutcha dPpk 
b) Semi-pukka lseh&iDdk 
c) Pukka iDdk 
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E11. How many rooms are in the house? 






f) More than 5[________]  
ikap  ls T;knk ------------------------ 
E12. Is there a separate kitchen? 
D;k vyx jlksbZ Hkh gS\  
a) Yes gka 
b) No ugha 
E13a. How many family members are living in 
this  household?  




E13b. List members 




E14. I am now going to list a number of items. 
Please tell me whether you or your family own 
each of the following items: 
vc eSa vkils dqN phtksa ds ckjs esa iwNwaxkA d`i;k eq>s crk,a 
fd vki ;k vkids ifjokj ds ikl ;s phtsa gSa ;k ugha%  
E14a. Car/Jeep/Van/Pick-up   
dkj@thi@oSu@fid&vi 
a) Yes gka 
b) No ugha 
E14b. Tractor 
VªSDVj  
a) Yes gka 
b) No ugha 
E14c. Scooter/Motorcycle/Moped 
LdwVj@eksVjlkbfdy@eksisM 
a) Yes gka 
b) No ugha 
E14d. Bicycle 
Lkkbfdy 
a) Yes gka 
b) No ugha 
E14e.Television  
Vsyhfotu 
a) Yes gka 
b) No ugha 
E14f. Toilet  
VkW;ysV 
a) Yes gka 
b) No ugha 
E14g. Fridge  
fQzta 
a) Yes gka 






a) Yes gka 
b) No ugha 
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E14j. Mobile Phone  
eksckby Qksu 
a) Yes gka 
b) No ugha 
E14k. Electric Pump set (for irrigation)  
fctyh ls pyus okyk iEi lsV ¼flapkbZ ds fy,½ 
a) Yes gka 
b) No ugha 
E15. How many of the following livestock do you 
have? 
vkids ikl buesa ls fdrus tkuoj gSa \ 
 

















That concludes our interview. Thank you very much for taking the time to talk with me 
today. Your responses, like the responses of hundreds of other citizens, will help us 
better understand local governance and political participation in Rajasthan and all 
over India.  
vc gekjk lk{ k k Rdkj i wj k gk s  x;k g SA vkt bruk T;knk le; n su s d s fy, /k U;oknA 
vkid s vk S j vkidh rjg l SdM + k s a  yk sxk s a  d s mRrj ge s a  j ktLFk ku dh vk S j i wj s  H k kjr dh 

















Appendix B: Elite (Sarpanch) Survey 
Questionnaire 
 




INTERVIEWER NOTE: ANSWER ALL ITEMS IN SECTION V BEFORE APPROACHING 
THE RESPONDENT. DO NOT ASK THE SARPANCH OR GP MEMBER RESPONDENT 
THESE QUESTIONS!  
V1.   Interviewer Code
V2.   District
V3a. MLA Constituency
V3b. Party of the MLA
V4.   Block Name
V5.   Gram Panchayat Name
V6.   Village where interview was taken
V7.   Ward Number in GP
V8.   Polling Station Number
V9. RESPONDENT Code 
[Example: 09112301]
INTERVIEWER: NOTE THIS IS NOT 
THE VOTER ID NUMBER FROM THE 
VOTERS LIST
NOW BEGIN THE INTERVIEW
Hello,  I  am a researcher  doing a study on development  and politics in  the gram panchayat.  I  am 
working with a team of social scientists from Columbia University in New York City, USA to conduct 
this study, and we are interviewing hundreds of citizens and panchayat members in many villages 
across the state of Rajasthan. This is an independent study, and we are not linked to any political party 
or  government  agency.  [INTERVIEWER:  SHOW  A  COPY  OF  THE  LETTER  FROM 
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY AND PROVIDE A VISITING CARD OF MARK SCHNEIDER 
NOW]. We also informed the BDO and leaders from the BJP and Congress in this taluka about this 
project.
The cooperation of many participants is necessary to make this study successful and as a leader in this  
gram panchayat your participation will be a great help to this study.  If you agree to participate, your 
identity will not be revealed, and your answers will be kept secret. Of course we promised the same 
secrecy for the voters who have been surveyed in this GP and many other GPs across Rajasthan. The 
interview will  include a simple game and  I will ask you some background questions and questions 
about politics and your experiences with government schemes. 
The interview should last  30 minutes. Would you be willing to participate  in our study? (IF THE 
ANSWER  IS  NO,  PLEASE  THANK  THE  RESPONDENT POLITELY AND  LEAVE.  IF  YES, 
PLEASE CONTINUE.) 
INTERVIEWER:  RESPONDENTS  MUST  BE  ALONE  AND  INTERVIEWED  IN  THEIR 
HOME AWAY FROM OTHER VILLAGERS.
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A. First I will ask you some questions about your background. 
A1. Respondent’s position in Gram Panchayat 
(lk{kkRdkjnkrk dk iapk;r esa in)
a) Sarpanch @ljiap 
b) Member @iap 
c) Candidate for GP member (runner up)
A2. INTERVIEWER: Please note the respondent’s 
sex 
lk{kkRdkjdrkZ% d`i;k lk{kkRdkjnkrk dk fyax fy[k ysaA 1. 
Male@iq#"k
a) Male@iq#"k 
b) Female /efgyk) 




A4. How many years of school did you complete? a) Class 1 
b) Class 2 
c) Class 3
d) Class 4
e) Class 5 
f)  Class 6 
g) Class 7 
h) Class 8 
i)  Class 9 
j)  Class 10
k) Intermediate (Class 11 & 12) 
l) Graduate (College or University)
m) Post-graduate (Masters or Doctorate/Ph.D.)
A5. Including this term, how many times have 





e) More than 3
A6. Including this term, how many times have 





e) More than 3
A7a. Outside the gram panchayat, have you 




A7b. Which one(s) and when? WRITE:
Post Years
A9. What is your job or occupation, other than 
SARPANCH/MEMBER of this Gram Panchayat? 
bl xzke iapk;r #lk{kkRdkjdrkZ% ljiap@iap ;k 
lfpo fy[ksa% ds vykok vki dkSulk dke djrs gSa\ 
Write:___________________________________
INTERVIEWER: CODE THE ABOVE 
ANSWER INTO THE FOLLOWING 
CATEGORIES BELOW.
a) Agriculture – own cultivation 
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b) Agricultural labor
c) Own farm enterprise-Dairy/Poultry farming 
d) Casual Labour 
e) Salaried employment  
f) Non-agricultural enterprise e.g. tea shop, tailor 
g) Rent 
h) Pensions 
i) Interest from loans 
j) Other______________
A10. Approximately how much agricultural land 
does your household own










B. You may have heard that we interviewed many voters from this GP in the past week. Although we do 
not have the funds to pay all respondents for their time, we wanted to make a small contribution by 
running a game as part of this research with a modest cash prize of 200RS for one head of household.  
This game has been played by hundreds of gram panchayat leaders across Rajasthan and is only for 
research. In this game, your answers will be kept secret. No voters or GP politicians in this village will 
know your choices in this game. I will first show you voters list information on 12  people from this 
gram panchayat who were selected at random. I will ask if you know these people and then I will give 
you 6 tokens that you can divide among these 12 people any way you want. While each of the voters I 
mention have a chance to win the 200RS cash prize, the people who are given tokens will have a much 
greater chance of winning the prize. This means that you should decide who to give tokens based on 
who you would most like to win the 200RS prize.  Based on your selections, I will put slips of paper 
with names into a hat and  the sarpanch, or a person the sarpanch chooses, will pick a name out of 
that hat. The name picked out of the hat will receive  the 200 RS prize, which will be delivered 
personally by a member of the research  team who has no affiliation to any party, government agency, 
or NGO. Can we begin. 
INTERVIEWER: STEP 1 IS TO WRITE THE VOTER LIST NUMBERS FOR ALL VOTERS 
INTERVIEWED IN THE VOTER SURVEY IN COLUMN A OF THE SHEET BELOW. THIS 
SHOULD HAPPEN BEFORE THE INTERVIEW BEGINS. 
SECOND, TAKE OUT THE PAPER WITH VOTERS LIST INFORMATION AND PICTURES 
FROM VOTER SURVEY RESPONDENTS.  AFTER SHOWING THE RESPONDENT THIS 
PAGE OF VOTERS, POINT TO EACH PICTURE, ONE AT A TIME, AND READ THE 
INFORMATION ABOUT EACH VOTER INCLUDING: PERSON'S NAME, FATHER'S 
NAME, AGE, AND NEIGHBORHOOD. FOR EACH VOTER IN THE PAGE, ONE AT A TIME, 
ASK THE RESPONDENT:  “DO YOU KNOW THIS PERSON?” IN COLUMN B ON THE 
SHEET BELOW, MARK 1 IF THE RESPONDENT SAYS HE/SHE KNOWS THE PERSON ON 
THE PHOTOGRAPH AND 0 IF THE RESPONDENT DOES NOT KNOW THE PERSON.
THIRD, GIVE THE RESPONDENT THE 6 CANDIES (TOKENS) AND ASK THE 
RESPONDENT TO PLACE THE NUMBER OF TOKENS THEY WANT TO GIVE EACH 
VOTER ON THE PHOTOS OF THE VOTERS ON THE PAGE OF VOTERS. RECORD THE 
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NUMBER OF TOKENS GIVEN TO EACH VOTER IN COLUMN C.
FOURTH, KEEP THE CANDIES/TOKENS ON THE PHOTOS ON THE VOTERS PAGE AND 
ASK THE RESPONDENT WHY THEY GAVE WHATEVER NUMBER OF TOKENS TO 
EACH VOTER. THIS MUST BE DONE FOR ALL VOTERS INCLUDING THE ONES WHO 
RECEIVED NO TOKENS. WRITE EXACTLY WHAT THEY SAY IS THERE REASON FOR 
GIVING 0 OR MORE TOKENS TO EACH VOTER IN COLUMN D BELOW. TO DO THIS 
ASK THE RESPONDENT: “WHY DID YOU GIVE ___________ [VOTER NAME] _____ [THE 
NUMBER OF TOKENS GIVEN TO EACH VOTER] TOKENS .” 
Now we will play the game. As I told you about before, This game has been played by GP politicians 
across Rajasthan and is for research purposes only.  Your answers will be kept secret. No voters or GP 
politicians in this village will know how your responded. I will give you 6 tokens that you can divide 
among these 12 villagers any way you want. For example, you can give all 6 tokens to one person or 
you can give one token to each person or you can give 2 to three people. Whatever you want is 
acceptable. Everyone on this list has a chance of winning the prize because all names will be put in the 
hat; however, each token you give to someone on this list makes it much more likely that person will 
win the prize. This means that the more tokens you give someone, the more likely they are to have their 






















Why did you choose to 
give ___ tokens to this 
person?
[INTERVIEWER: 
RETURN TO THIS 
COLUMN AFTER 



















B13. The GP gets few Indira Awaas Yojana (IAY) 
Housing Scheme benefits each year. If you could 
give an IAY benefit to any one of these villagers, 
who would it be?
Write Voter List Number: 
[EXAMPLE: 56]
C. Now I am going to ask you a few questions about each of these villagers. I will ask you for your best 
guess on which party they support and a couple other questions. As I mentioned before the lottery, 
these  voters have been selected completely at random and their inclusion has no special meaning at 
all. We request that you not follow up with these individuals to check your answers or  ask any further 
questions on this matter to protect the research so it can be most useful in leading to improvements in 
Rajasthan. Like the lottery, this is purely for research purposes and your answers will be confidential. 
No voters will know how you responded. Let's proceed.
INTERVIEWER: RECORD THE VOTER LIST NUMBER BEFORE ASKING THE 
RESPONDENT ANY QUESTIONS.
The 1st voter I will ask about is  _____________ [VOTER'S NAME]. 
[INTERVIEWER: POINT TO THE VOTER PHOTO CARD.]
C1a. Write the voter list number of the first 
card you show the respondent. 
WRITE:
C1b. If an MLA election were held tomorrow, 
which party do you think [voter name] 




C1c. Which party do you think [voter name] 





C1d. Do you think this person gave you his/her 
vote in the last GP elections?
a) Yes
b) No
C1e. Did this person work hard for your 
campaign in the last GP elections?
a) Yes
b) No
The 2nd voter I will ask about is _____________. 
[INTERVIEWER: PLACE THE NEXT VOTER CARD ON TOP OF THE STACK IN FRONT 
OF THE RESPONDENT.]
C2a. Write the voter list number of the first 
card you show the respondent. 
WRITE:
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C2b. If an MLA election were held tomorrow, 
which party do you think [voter name] 




C2c. Which party do you think [voter name] 





C2d. Do you think this person gave you his/her 
vote in the last GP elections?
a) Yes
b) No
C2e. Did this person work hard for your 
campaign in the last GP elections?
a) Yes
b) No
The 3rd voter I will ask about is _____________. 
[INTERVIEWER: PLACE THE NEXT VOTER CARD ON TOP OF THE STACK IN FRONT 
OF THE RESPONDENT.]
C3a. Write the voter list number of the first 
card you show the respondent. 
WRITE:___
C3b. If an MLA election were held tomorrow, 
which party do you think [voter name] 




C3c. Which party do you think voter name 





B3d. Do you think this person gave you his/her 
vote in the last GP elections?
a) Yes
b) No
B3e. Did this person work hard for your 
campaign in the last GP elections?
a) Yes
b) No
The 4th voter I will ask about is _____________. 
[INTERVIEWER: PLACE THE NEXT VOTER CARD ON TOP OF THE STACK IN FRONT 
OF THE RESPONDENT.]
C4a. Write the voter list number of the first 
card you show the respondent. 
WRITE:___
C4b. If an MLA election were held tomorrow, 
which party do you think [voter name] 




C4c. Which party do you think [voter name] 





C4d. Do you think this person gave you his/her 




C4f. Did this person work hard for your 
campaign in the last GP elections?
a) Yes
b) No
The 5th voter I will ask about is _____________.  
[INTERVIEWER: PLACE THE NEXT VOTER CARD ON TOP OF THE STACK IN FRONT 
OF THE RESPONDENT.]
C5a. Write the voter list number of the first 
card you show the respondent. 
WRITE:___
C5b. If an MLA election were held tomorrow, 
which party do you think [voter name] 




C5c. Which party do you think [voter name] 





C5d. Do you think this person gave you his/her 
vote in the last GP elections?
a) Yes
b) No
C5e. Did this person work hard for your 
campaign in the last GP elections?
a) Yes
b) No
The 6th voter I will ask about is _____________.  
[INTERVIEWER: PLACE THE NEXT VOTER CARD ON TOP OF THE STACK IN FRONT 
OF THE RESPONDENT.]
C6a. Write the voter list number of the first 
card you show the respondent. 
WRITE:___
C6b. If an MLA election were held tomorrow, 
which party do you think [voter name] 




C6c. Which party do you think [voter name] 





C6d. Do you think this person gave you his/her 
vote in the last GP elections?
a) Yes
b) No
C6e. Did this person work hard for your 
campaign in the last GP elections?
a) Yes
b) No
The 7th voter I will ask about is _____________.  
[INTERVIEWER: PLACE THE NEXT VOTER CARD ON TOP OF THE STACK IN FRONT 
OF THE RESPONDENT.]
C7a. Write the voter list number of the first 
card you show the respondent. 
WRITE:___
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C7b. If an MLA election were held tomorrow, 
which party do you think [voter name] 




C7c. Which party do you think [voter name] 





C7d. Do you think this person gave you his/her 
vote in the last GP elections?
a) Yes
b) No
C7e. Did this person work hard for your 
campaign in the last GP elections?
a) Yes
b) No
The 8th voter I will ask about is _____________.  
[INTERVIEWER: PLACE THE NEXT VOTER CARD ON TOP OF THE STACK IN FRONT 
OF THE RESPONDENT.]
C8a. Write the voter list number of the first 
card you show the respondent. 
WRITE:___
C8b. If an MLA election were held tomorrow, 
which party do you think [voter name] 




C8c. Which party do you think [voter name] 





C8d. Do you think this person gave you his/her 
vote in the last GP elections?
a) Yes
b) No
C8e. Did this person work hard for your 
campaign in the last GP elections?
a) Yes
b) No
The 9th voter I will ask about is _____________.  
[INTERVIEWER: PLACE THE NEXT VOTER CARD ON TOP OF THE STACK IN FRONT 
OF THE RESPONDENT.]
C9a. Write the voter list number of the first 
card you show the respondent. 
WRITE:___
C9b. If an MLA election were held tomorrow, 
which party do you think [voter name] 




C9c. Which party do you think [voter name] 





C9d. Do you think this person gave you his/her 




C9e. Did this person work hard for your 
campaign in the last GP elections?
a) Yes
b) No
The 10th voter I will ask about is _____________.  
[INTERVIEWER: PLACE THE NEXT VOTER CARD ON TOP OF THE STACK IN FRONT 
OF THE RESPONDENT.]
C10a. Write the voter list number of the first 
card you show the respondent. 
WRITE:___
C10b. If an MLA election were held tomorrow, 
which party do you think [voter name] 




C10c. Which party do you think [voter name] 





C10d. Do you think this person gave you 
his/her vote in the last GP elections?
a) Yes
b) No
C10e. Did this person work hard for your 
campaign in the last GP elections?
a) Yes
b) No
The 11th voter I will ask about is _____________.  
[INTERVIEWER: PLACE THE NEXT VOTER CARD ON TOP OF THE STACK IN FRONT 
OF THE RESPONDENT.]
C11a. Write the voter list number of the first 
card you show the respondent. 
WRITE:___
C11b. If an MLA election were held tomorrow, 
which party do you think [voter name] 




C11c. Which party do you think [voter name] 





C10d. Do you think this person gave you 
his/her vote in the last GP elections?
a) Yes
b) No
C11e. Did this person work hard for your 
campaign in the last GP elections?
a) Yes
b) No
The 12th voter I will ask about is _____________.  
[INTERVIEWER: PLACE THE NEXT VOTER CARD ON TOP OF THE STACK IN FRONT 
OF THE RESPONDENT.]
C12a. Write the voter list number of the first 
card you show the respondent. 
WRITE:___
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C12b. If an MLA election were held tomorrow, 
which party do you think [voter name] 




C12c. Which party do you think [voter name] 





C12d. Do you think this person gave you 
his/her vote in the last GP elections?
a) Yes
b) No
C12e. Did this person work hard for your 
campaign in the last GP elections?
a) Yes
b) No
C13a. Write the voter list number of the first 
card you show the respondent. 
WRITE:___
C13b. If an MLA election were held tomorrow, 
which party do you think [voter name] 




C13c. Which party do you think [voter name] 





C13d. Do you think this person gave you 
his/her vote in the last GP elections?
a) Yes
b) No
C13e. Did this person work hard for your 
campaign in the last GP elections?
a) Yes
b) No
C14a. Write the voter list number of the first 
card you show the respondent. 
WRITE:___
C14b. If an MLA election were held tomorrow, 
which party do you think [voter name] 




C14c. Which party do you think [voter name] 





C14d. Do you think this person gave you 
his/her vote in the last GP elections?
a) Yes
b) No
C14e. Did this person work hard for your 
campaign in the last GP elections?
a) Yes
b) No
C15a. Write the voter list number of the first 
card you show the respondent. 
WRITE:___
C15b. If an MLA election were held tomorrow, 
which party do you think [voter name] 




C15c. Which party do you think [voter name] 






C15d. Do you think this person gave you 
his/her vote in the last GP elections?
a) Yes
b) No
C15e. Did this person work hard for your 
campaign in the last GP elections?
a) Yes
b) No
D.  Next, I will  ask you questions about your political experiences and interactions with political  
parties.
D1.  Have  you  participated  in  any  of  the 
following  activities  from the time of the last 
MLA elections to now? 
D1a. Attending party/politician rallies a) Yes
b) No
D1b. Going to party meetings a) Yes
b) No




D1d.  Assisting  a  citizen  who  wanted  help  in 




D1e.  Door  to  door  campaigning/motivating 
friends and relatives to support your candidate
a) Yes
b) No
D2. Now, I  am going to give you a slip of paper 
with party symbols printed on it. What you mark on 
this paper will be secret and nothing on this paper 
can be traced to you. 
Please check the box next to the symbol of the party 
you would support  if  an MLA election were held 
tomorrow. 
(Supply WHITE dummy ballot and explain 
procedure) ___________________________
After  you  have  marked  the  box,  please  fold  the 







g) NA (did not vote for MLA in 2008)
D3a. Did you vote in the last MLA election in 2008 a) Yes
b) No
D3b. I am going to give you a second slip of 
paper  which  has  names  and  election  symbols 
for all  the parties that  you saw on the voting 
machine in the last MLA elections. On this slip 
please put a mark in front of the symbol of the 
party you voted for at the polling place in the 
last  MLA  elections.  (Supply  WHITE  dummy 
ballot)
After  you  have  marked  the  box,  please  fold  the 






99) NA (did not vote for MLA in 2008)
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D4a. Have any members of your family served  
in elected office in the past or currently serve in 
elected office? 
a) Yes 
b) No  
D4b. [IF YES], Can you tell me the family 
relations who held elected positions, what 
positions they held, and when they held these 
positions?
[FOR EXAMPLE: पिता, सरपंच, 5 साल पहल/ेअब]
INTERVIEWER: WRITE YOUR 
ANSWERS IN THE CHART ON THE 
RIGHT.
Relative Position Time Held
D4c. [IF YES TO D4A]
Did all of these family members support 
______  [RESPONDENT'S PARTY. 
EXAMPLE IF THE RESPONDENT IS 
FROM CONGRESS SAY CONGRESS]  or 
did some also support __________[OTHER 
PARTY. EXAMPLE: IF THE 




c) Some supported both Congress and BJP
d) Other___________________
D5a.  Do you hold a party post such as party 




D5b. [IF YES] What is the post and since when 
have you held the post?
Job Party Year
D6. When you think of elections for MP, MLA, 
Zilla  Parishad,  and  Panchayat  Samiti,  In  the 
past  5  years  have  you  campaigned  only  for 
Congress  candidates,  only for  BJP candidates, 
or  have  you  campaigned  for  some  Congress 
candidates  and  some  BJP  candidates  or 
candidates from other parties at different times?
a) Only work for Congress candidates
b) Only worked for BJP candidates
c) Worked for both Congress and BJP candidates
d) Other__________________
D7. In the past month, how often did you meet 
or speak by phone with: 
D7a. The MLA a) Not at all
b) One or two times
c) A few times
d) Once a week
e) More than once a week
D7b. The panchayat samiti president/pradhan? a) Not at all
b) One or two times
c) A few times
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d) Once a week
e) More than once a week
D7c. The panchayat samiti member that 
represents this gram panchayat
a) Not at all
b) One or two times
c) A few times
d) Once a week
e) More than once a week
D7d. The zilla panchayat president/pradhan a) Not at all
b) One or two times
c) A few times
d) Once a week
e) More than once a week
99. Doesn't Know/Doesn't Reply
 D7e. The zilla panchayat member who 
represents this gram panchayat?
a) Not at all
b) One or two times
c) A few times
d) Once a week
e) More than once a week
D7f. A party official from the block or district 
Congress/BJP party office? 
a) Not at all
b) One or two times
c) A few times
d) Once a week
e) More than once a week
D7g. BDO? a) Not at all
b) One or two times
c) A few times
d) Once a week
e) More than once a week
D7h. SDM a) Not at all
b) One or two times
c) A few times
d) Once a week
e) More than once a week
D8a.  How  much  of  the  costs  of  your  last 
campaign for  GP member/sarpanch were  paid 
for by an MLA, ex-MLA, MP, ex-MP, or party 
leader at the zilla or panchayat samiti levels? 
a) Nearly all of it





D9a. Do you plan to contest elections for GP 





 D9b. Do you plan to contest in the next 
elections for sarpanch 2 years from now? 
a) Yes
b) No
D10a. Do you intend to seek a party ticket for 




D10b.[IF YES TO D10a], If you requested a 
party ticket for panchayat samiti from  BJP, 




c) A little bit likely
d) Not likely at all
D10c. [IF YES TO D10a], If you requested a 
party ticket for panchayat samiti from Congress, 




c) A little bit likely
d) Not likely at all
D11. In this GP, who is the leader closest to the 
MLA?
a) Sarpanch
b) Polling booth or gram panchayat party president 
c) Ward member
d) Other
E. Next, I will ask you a few questions on your experience with government schemes.
E1a. Are there currently any MGNREGA projects 
in this gram panchayat?
a) Yes
b) No
E1b. Would you say that politicians from the 
Gram Panchayat or bureaucrats have more  
influence in deciding how to spend MGNREGA 
funds in this village? 
a) Politicians from the GP
b) Bureaucrats
c) There is no difference
E1c. When it comes to MGNREGA, who has the  
most influence over which people in this ward  
will benefit?
a) Sarpanch
b) GP (ward) member




E2a. Have you heard of the Indira Awaas Yojana 
(IAY) Housing Scheme? 
a) Yes
b) No
E2b. When it comes to the Indira Awaas Yojana 
(IAY) Housing Scheme, who has the most 
influence over which people in this ward will 
benefit?
a) Sarpanch
b) GP (ward) member
c) caste leader  
e) MLA
f) Other __________________
E3. When it comes to getting a BPL Card, who 
has the most influence over which people in this 
ward will get cards?
a) Sarpanch
b) GP (ward) member
c) caste leader  
e) MLA
f) Other __________________
F. We are almost finished with the survey. Before we conclude, I would like to ask you some final 
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questions about yourself as well as the other members of the Gram Panchayat. This will allow us to 
become better acquainted with the members and officials of this Gram Panchayat. 
gekjk losZ yxHkx iwjk gks x;k gS ysfdu [kRe djus ls igys eSa vkils dqN vkf[kjh iz’u vkids vkSj iapksa 
iwNuk pkgrk gwaA blls gesa iapksa vkSj xzke iapk;r ds inkf/kdkfj;ksa dks le>us dk cf<+;k ekSdk feysxkA
F1. For which category is the Sarpanch position in 
this Gram Panchayat reserved? 
;g xzke iapk;r fdl Js.kh esa vkjf{kr gS\ 
[INTERVIEWER: PLEASE READ OPTIONS] 
#lk{kkRdkjdrkZ% d`i;k vkWI’ku i<+saA% 
Scheduled Caste (SC) Scheduled Caste (SC)—
Woman Scheduled Tribe (ST) Scheduled Tribe 
(ST)—Woman Other Backward Classe (OBC) 
Other Backward Class (OBC)—Woman General 
General--Woman know/Doesn’t reply 
a) Scheduled Caste (SC) vuqlwfpr tkfr 
b) Scheduled Caste (SC)—Woman/vuqlwfpr 
tkfr&efgyk  
c) Scheduled Tribe (ST)/ vuqlwfpr tutkfr 
d) Scheduled Tribe (ST)—Woman/vuqlwfpr 
tutkfr&efgyk 
e) Other Backward Classe (OBC)/ vU; fiNM+k oxZ 
f) Other Backward Class (OBC)—Woman/vU; fiNM+k 
oxZ&efgyk  
g) General/lkekU;  
h) General—Woman/lkekU;&efgyk  
99. Doesn’t know/Doesn’t reply  
irk ugha@mRrj ugha fn;k  
F2. What is your Caste group? 
vkidk tkfr oxZ D;k gS\ 
Write: ___________________________
a) Brahmin/other forward caste/ czkg~e.k@nwljh vxM+h 
tkfr;ka 
b) OBC/ fiNM+k oxZ  
c) Scheduled Caste (SC)/ vuqlwfpr tkfr;ka
d) Scheduled Tribe (ST)/vuqlwfpr tutkfr;ka 
e) Other (please specify)/vU; 
______________________________ 
99. Does not know/Doesn’t reply/irk ugha@mRrj ugha 
fn;k 
F3. What is your jati/vkidh tkfr D;k gS\ Write: ______________________
F4a. Do you feel close to any particular party? a) Yes
b) No





F4c. [IF YES] Are you an active member of a) Yes
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this party? b) No
This concludes our interview—thank you very much for your time and assistance. Your answers will be 
very helpful for our academic study, in which we will interview hundreds of panchayat members and 
Sarpanches in Rajasthan and many other states. 
#lk{kkRdkjdrkZ% dsoy iap@ljiap ds fy, lk{kkRdkj iwjk dhft,A % blds lkFk gh gekjk baVjO;w iwjk gks 
x;kA vkidks le; vkSj enn djus ds fy, /kU;oknA vkids lkjs fopkj gekjs v/;;u esa dkQh enn djsaxsA 
bl v/;;u esa ge jktLFkku vkSj nwljs jkT;ksa ds gtkjksa lnL;ksa vkSj ljiapksa ls ckrphr dj jg gSaA 
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